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394

KATARÍNA CHOVANCOVÁ

CYIL 7 ȍ2016Ȏ

important in maintaining a balance between investment protection and the regulatory

power of the host states, much like Article XX of the General Agreement on Tariffs and

Trade /GATT/ /the general exceptions clause/…”

Within a broader context, NPM clauses may be also extremely practical in

new investment treaties in the form of “exceptions”, which secure the right of the

host state to promote sustainable development.

12

However, the dictum of the NPM

clause must always be treated with caution, at least when it comes to compensation,

which has become one of the main concerns of negatively afflicted foreign investors.

Equally, dispensing with the duty to compensate proved to be a highly debatable

topic for those authors who are less enraptured by the proclaimed effect of the

NPM provision, being an exclusion of the duty to provide the foreign investor with

appropriate compensation.

13

Furthermore, despite being conceived initially only as an interpretive attempt

of rambling investment tribunals, a more onerous conflation of the nature of NPM

clauses in BITs with the state of necessity doctrine under the customary international

law (“the CIL necessity”) in five ICSID arbitration cases followed. Unfortunately,

this paved the way for disparaging of the NPM clauses’ status of

lex specialis

and that

of the primary source of law

14

as plastic enough to be changeable and replaceable by

the customary international law, depending on the precarious mood of the deciding

arbitral tribunal.

To avoid any argument, it is necessary to stress the most recent theoretical

accounts disclosing the nature of NPM clauses. It is apparent that NPM clauses

are inseparable parts of BITs, while BITs themselves are by nature

lex specialis

, into

which the customary international law should not be freely transplanted

a la carte

by

arbitrators, unless they are obliged to do so specifically by the BIT’s provisions. As

Lowenfeld confirms,

15

“The fact that ‘a codification’ of the customary law on this issue is

easy to find, and that that codification has been endorsed by the ICJ in an unrelated case,

does not….give customary law status superior to the treaty on which the claim is based.”

16

12

MAYEDA, G.: Chapter 22: Sustainable International Investment Agreements: Challenges and Solutions

for Developing Countries in CORDONIER SEGGER, M.C., GEHRING M., NEWCOMBE, A. :

Sustainable Development inWorld Investment Law,

Global Trade Law Series 30, Kluwer Law International,

The Hague, 2011.

13

DESIERTO, D.A.: Necessity and Supplementary Means of Interpretation for Non-Precluded Measures

in Bilateral Investment Treaties,

U. Pa. J. Int’l L.

, 2009–2010, Vol. 31, pp. 827-934.

14

See the correct observation of judge Tomka, properly distinguishing between NPM clauses in BITs as

substantially different from, though related to the CIL necessity in TOMKA, P.: Defences Based on

Necessity,

op. cit.

, p. 478.

15

LOEWENFELD, A.:

International Economic Law

, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2008, p. 583.

16

See in detail

Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia)

,

Judgment of 25. September 1997, I

.

C.

J. Reports 1997, p. 7, para 51.