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were to choose between a statement made by an
accused person seeking to evade justice in another
jurisdiction and a sworn statement made by a
person whose knowledge of the facts in that juris
diction was evident and who himself was not try
ing to escape from justice, he would naturally be
more inclined to accept the evidence of the per
son in authority. In the present case no such
choice existed as evidence had been received on
one side only. Held that the case came within
Section 50 of the Extradition Act, 1965 and that
the applicant should be released accordingly.
(Ex. P. Magee, May 1968).
Evidence of Previous Convictions
The Criminal Act
1967,
Section
1
(f)
(ii)
allowes the judge an unfettered discretion to ad
mit or exclude evidence about
the accused's
character or previous record where an accused
person attacks a prosecution witness in the course
of his defence. His duty is to ensure a fair trial.
It is desirable that a warning should be given
when the defence is taking a course which might
expose the accused to such cross examination. The
four propositions set down in R. v. Turner (1944)
1 KB 463 approved of :—
1. The words of the Act must be given their
ordinary natural meaning.
2. The section permitted cross-examination of
the accused as to character both when im
putations on the character of the prosecutor
and his witnesses were cast to show their
unrealibility as witnesses
independently of
the evidence given by them and also when
the casting of such imputations was neces
sary to enable the accused to establish his
defence.
3. In rape cases the accused could allege con
sent without placing himself in peril of cross-
examination.
4. If what was said amounted in reality to no
more than a denial of the charge, even if
expressed in emphatic language, it should
not be regarded as coming within the sec
tion.
Held the failure to give the judge a warning
that the course which the defence was taking
could expose the accused to cross-examination on
character and previous convictions would not
justify allowing the appeal.
(Selvey
v. Director
of Public Prosecution,
Times,
May 9th, 1968).
Criminal Law :
Election to be tried summarily
The applicant was summoned before Justices on
64 motoring offences, on one of which offences
he was obliged to elect whether or not he wished
to be tried summarily or by a jury. The charge
was read and the applicant was told that he had
a right to be tried by jury whereupon his solicitor
replied that he elected to be tried summarily. The
applicant was convicted and appealed on
the
ground that the question as
to mode of trial
should have been answered by the applicant him
self.
Lord Parker C. J. said that the sub section in
question
(Section
25
(3)
of
the Magistrates
Courts Act, 1952) had clearly not been complied
with since the statute enjoined the court to ask
the accused personally whether he wished to be
tried by a jury. R. V. Cockshott (1898)
1 Q.B.
582 held that the provision then contained in the
Summary Jurisdiction Act, 1879 was mandatory.
Therefore the question must be put to the accused
himself.
(R. V. Kettering Justices ex Parte Patmore
112. S. J. 656).
Evidence—impunging credibility of witness
1. A witness might be asked whether he had
knowledge
of
the
impunged
witness's
general reputation for veracity and whether,
from such knowledge, he would believe the
impunged witness's sworn testimony.
2. The witness called
to
impeach the credi
bility of a previous witness might also ex
press his
individual opinion based on his
personal knowledge as to whether the latter
was to be believed on his oath and was not
confined to giving evidence merely of general
reputation.
3. Whether his opinion as
to
the impunged
witness's credibility was based simply upon
the latter's general reputation for veracity or
upon his personal knowledge,
the witness
could not be permitted to indicate during his
examination
in chief
the particular facts,
circumstances or incidents which form the
basis of his opinion, or he might be cross-
examined as to them.
This summary of the legal position was made
by the Court of Appeal in which the defendants,
L and R were charged on two counts of con
spiracy to prevent the course of public justice by
trying
to
influence a
jury and by suborning
witnesses at a trial in 1966. The prosecution evi-