contained in the policy; therefore the Zurich Com
pany were not liable to indemnify the first defen
dant; but the Zurich Company were one of the
insurers concerned in a domestic agreement made
between the Motor Insurers Bureau of Ireland
(henceforth called M.I.B.) and the insurance com
panies made on 30 November 1955. Various terms
of this agreement are cited, including clause 2A
which provides that if a judgment is obtained
against anyone in respect of road traffic liability,
the insurer will satisfy the plaintiffs judgment
creditor to the extent that the judgment has not
been satisfied within twenty-eight days of its
enforceability. The annexed memorandum of agree
ment of November 1955 made between the Minister
for Local Government and the M.I.B. provides that
if any judgment is not satisfied within twenty-eight
days of its enforceability, then the M.I.B. will pay
to the judgment creditor the sum payable under
such judgment and costs, provided preliminary
notice is given by registered post (1) to the
insurer, and (2) to M.I.B. and provided that the
plaintiff has before then taken all reasonable steps
to recover the sum due. Any dispute as to the
reasonableness of any requirement by M.I.B. shall
be referred to the Minister, whose decision shall be
final.
M.I.B. were made aware :
(1) That the Zurich Company disputed its
liability to indemnify the plaintiff.
(2) That in July 1965 the plaintiff's solicitors
notified the M.I.B. of their intention to issue
proceedings.
(3) In May 1966 M.I.B. and the Zurich were
notified by the second defendant that he would
claim contribution in respect of damages and costs
against the first defendant.
(4) In November 1966 the Zurich Company's
solicitors, on behalf of M.I.B., wrote to the plaintiff
formally requiring him, in the event of his obtain
ing judgment against the defendants jointly, to
bring execution against the second defendant only
for the entire amount of the judgment.
(5) In December 1966 the Zurich Company's
solicitors wrote to the plaintiff to the effect that, if
he could not recover against the first defendant,
he was entitled under Section 38 of the Civil
Liability Act, 1961, to mark a secondary judgment
against the second defendant, and they required
him to do so.
(6) In October 1968 the Zurich Company
repeated this request, and made it clear they were
acting on behalf of M.I.B.
(7) In November 1968 the plaintiff replied that
he had taken all reasonable steps to recover from
the two defendants the damages and costs awarded
to him. The question whether in the particular
circumstances the requirement that an application
for a secondary judgment should be made by the
plaintiff was reserved to the Minister. Murnaghan
J. therefore put the plaintiff on terms to obtain the
decision of the Minister on this matter.
[Gillespie v Fitzpatrick and McCartney (No. 2)
1970; Murnaghan J.; Unreported; 27 April 1970.]
CRIME
Blackmail Case for the House of Lords
A person who wrote a letter in England demand
ing money with menaces from a person abroad was
held to have committed the offence of blackmail
once he posted the letter and accordingly the
offence was triable in this country.
The court dismissed an appeal by Eugene
Treacy, who was convicted last December at the
Central Criminal Court (Judge King-Hamilton) of
blackmailing a Mrs. X in West Germany by posting
in the Isle of Wight a letter to her demanding
£175 with menaces, contrary to Section 21 (1) of
the Theft Act, 1968. The appellant had pleaded
guilty on the fifth day of the trial but preserved
his objections that the offence was committed out
side the jurisdiction. He was sentenced to three
and a half years' imprisonment.
Mr. Justice John Stephenson, reading the judg
ment of the court, said that the question was
whether the court of trial had jurisdiction as the
judge found, or whether the offence had been
committed outside the jurisdiction, in Germany,
as the appellant contended.
When the demand was by letter the demand was
made, unless there were exceptional circumstances,
when the letter was posted. If the intended victim
was blind or illiterate the demand was made, not
when it reached him but when it left the demander
beyond recall on its way to the intended victim
in the ordinary course of events.
The demand could be regarded as continuing
until it was regarded as received. Leave to appeal
to House of Lords.
[Regina v Treacy; Court of Appeal; 29 July
1970.]
EASEMENT
Claim to Damp Proof Adjoining Wall Rejected
On appeal from the County Court, who awarded
79