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attempted to be made under section 3

(b)

of the

Custody of Children Act, 1891, that Kavanagh

was 'unmindful of his parental duties', and there

fore not entitled to the custody of his children,

failed, and, accordingly, the decision of the High

Court must be reversed. The conditional order of

habeas Corpus

was accordingly made absolute.

In the course of his judgment, Kennedy C.J.,

reviewing

the parent's right

to determine

the

religion of the children, said:

The rules which determine the religion of an

infant, when brought

in question

in

the

Courts, and the basis of those rules are well

known and firmly established in this country.

As against the rest of the world the parent,

as between 'the lawful parents the father, has

the right in law to determine in what religion

the child shall be educated and brought up —

speaking at any rate with reference to the

Christian Churches with which only we are

concerned here. The parent may forfeit the

right by his personal conduct .

.

. The parent

may abdicate his right by causing or permitt

ing the child to be educated in a particular

faith for a sufficient time to form its mind

definitely in the mould of that faith. From

the point of view of the child, however, these

are but particular instances of the one great

restriction on the exercise of the parent's

right, namely, the paramount consideration

of the welfare of the child.

The high-water mark of statement of

the

father's right over his child's religion is to be

found in the judgments in the English case of

In

re Agar-Ellis,s

in which James L.J., delivering the

judgment of the Court of Appeal, said:

The right of the father to the custody and

control of his children is one of the most

sacred rights. No doubt the law may take

away from him this right or may interfere

with his exercise of it, just as it may take

away his life or his property or interfere

with his liberty, but it must be for some suffi

cient cause known to the law. He may have

forfeited such parental right by moral mis

conduct or by the profession of immoral or

irreligious opinions deemed to unfit him to

have the charge of any child at all; or he

may have abdicated such right to have the

charge of any child at all; or he may have

abdicated such right by a course of conduct

which would make a resumption of his

authority capricious and cruel towards child

ren. But in the absence of some conduct by

the father entailing such forfeiture or amount

ing to such abdication, the Court has never

yet interfered with the father's legal right.

Likewise in the Irish case of

In re Browne,s

it was held by the Master of the Rolls that, not

withstanding an ante-nuptial oral agreement with

the wife to the contrary, it was the right of the

father to direct the religious faith in which the

child should be brought up, and that the Court

would not interfere with that right unless in the

case of an abuse of parental authority.

Such were the principles recognized and applied

in all the Courts in Ireland and in England since

the Judicature Acts of 1877 and 1873 respectively.

The Guardianship of Infants Act, 1886 (infra),

and the Custody of Children Act, 1891 (supra)

(which expressly saved the parents' legal right to

require the child to be brought up in any par

ticular religion), were the only modifications of

the father's domain up to the establishment of the

Irish Free State. Referring to the 'development of

thought' in England in these matters since the

separation of the two countries, indicating a de

preciation of the authority and dominion of the

father, Kennedy C.J. in

Kavanagh's Case

(supra)

said:

Even

if there be such a

'development of

thought' in England, as there may well be in

consequence of the extension of divorce and

the resulting increase in the number of what

are called elsewhere 'broken homes,' never

theless

in

this country, where

the social

structure has not been subjected to these

strains, and the family and the home remain

the foundation upon which it stands, there

has been no modification of the legal position

of dominion of the parent or of the rights of

the father over the care, custody, education

and religion of his children or of the prin

ciples upon which the Court may interfere

with the exercise of such rights, as these had

been laid down and defined by the authorities

8(1878) 10 Ch. D., p. 49.

9(1852) 2 Ir. Ch. R. p, 151,

235