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to the interest of the individual, and the complementariness of the interests of the
individual and national State within the framework of diplomatic protection.
This enlarged view of diplomatic protection was repeatedly and explicitly emphasized
by the ICJ, including the recent
Ahmadou Sadio Diallo
case, where the Court stated that
“the scope ratione materiae of diplomatic protection, originally limited to alleged violations of
the minimum standard of treatment of aliens, has subsequently widened to include, inter alia,
internationally guaranteed human rights”
.
63
The traditional discretionary character of diplomatic protection is more frequently
challenged by the present realities of international law. The individual’s limited
procedural rights under international law and the ineffectiveness of the available
mechanisms have led to the view that the national State should have a particular duty to
protect its injured national and act on his behalf when asserting his claim, attempting,
thus, to support the view that the right to diplomatic protection is a human right.
64
However, at the current stage of international law, what Borchard suggested, in 1915,
still remains pertinent:
“if it is a duty internationally, it is only a moral and not a legal duty,
for there is no means of enforcing its fulfillment”.
65
Despite some signs in contemporary
international practice of the widening of the scope of diplomatic protection, this
“means” still remains in the form of an instrument in the hands of the national State
of the injured individual. The only progressive development in this regard is the
provision of Article 19 that recommends and invites States to consider the relevance
of diplomatic protection in case of significant injury, to consider the views of the
individual and to transfer any compensation obtained to the injured individual.
66
Conclusions
It remains evident that, even in the contemporary international system, international
law maintains an inter-State legal order in which only the States retain the certainty
to successfully pass the test of the international legal personality. Nevertheless,
contemporary practice does indicate that individuals have gradually been accorded
the role of participants and even as (limited) subjects of international law when they
have the “capacity to act”. This is primarily the product of the development of
human rights law. Despite, though, the considerable effort taken by international
law to grant individuals their necessary procedural rights, the standing of the
individuals in international law has only advanced with the limits conferred by
States through treaties.
63
Ahmadou Sadio Diallo
case (Republic of Guinea v. D.R. Congo), Judgment, (Preliminary Objections),
2007 ICJ Reports, para. 39.
64
J.-F. Flauss,
supra
note 4, at pp. 35-36.
65
E. Borchard,
Diplomatic Protection of Citizens Abroad
, New York, The Banks Law Publishing Co., 1915,
at p. 29.
66
Diplomatic Protection, Titles and texts of the Draft Articles adopted by the Drafting Committee on
second reading, A/CN.4/L.684 (2006), Article 19.