371
AND NEVER THE TWAIN SHALL MEET: PARALLEL ARBITRAL AND COURT PROCEEDINGS…
a more favourable arbitration clause. The Tribunal rebuffed the argument by stating
that, “the access to arbitration does not fall within the scope of the MFN clause”.
22
If
they had approached only the arbitral tribunal, the investor would probably have lost
the possibility to later litigate in front of a national court.
In contrast, assuming that a State aimed to obtain an injunction limiting an
investor’s possibility to advance with arbitration against it, the national courts would
be willing, under some circumstances, to issue such a restriction. Having established
this precondition, one may look at the ICSID practice and analyze whether litigation
before such a respected centre for dispute resolution, in fact, did adopt a sustainable
approach when it came to fighting parallel proceedings. One of the seminal cases
elaborating on this issue is undoubtedly
SGS v. Pakistan.
23
Despite the fact that the
local court exercised its power in order to forestall an investor’s attempts to litigate
in front of an arbitral tribunal, the injunction failed because the Tribunal claimed
its responsibility to safeguard the investor’s right to access international litigation
in front of an independent tribunal formed in accordance with the arbitration
agreement, and declared itself to be the patron, “for the proper operation of both
the BIT and the ICSID Convention”.
24
Therefore, an injunction aiming to repudiate
the ICSID arbitral proceedings would seem to be irreconcilable with the obligation
stipulated under Article 26 of the Washington Convention, in which the parties to
the Convention undertake to give “consent to such arbitration to the exclusion of
any other remedy”.
25
Having discussed the possibility that an investor may intercede
with an injunction, an investor could attempt to persuade the Tribunal to proceed
with litigation without recognizing the issued measure.
Accordingly, all attempts of States would share the same destiny of being doomed
to failure due to the overriding principle of the precedence of international law over
national law.The precondition of this conclusion is based on the fact that international
law and principles anchored therein create a somewhat respected immunity from the
leverage derivable from local courts. This has the consequence that international law
takes precedence over national law applicable at the seat of arbitration which creates
a somewhat independent and detached position for international arbitration.
26
In
22
Austrian Airlines v. the Slovak Republic
, Final Award dated 9 October 2009, para. 140.
23
SGS Société Générale de Surveillance S.A. v. Islamic Republic of Pakistan
, Case No. ARB/01/13.
24
Procedural Order No. 2 of October 16, 2002, 18
ICSID Rev.
–
FILJ
293 (2003); 8 ICSID Rep. 388
(2005).
25
Article 26 of the Washington Convention, as an expression of the exclusion of any other methods
applicable to dispute resolution once ICSID litigation has been chosen, represents, in conjunction
with Article II of the New York Convention, a valuable tool against the potential threats of parallel
proceedings.
26
Some authors argue that the cases
Himpurna California Energy v. Republic of Indonesia
and
Salini
Construttori
S.P.A. v. The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia
can be used to demonstrate the will
of the arbitral tribunals to create a neutral forum for dispute resolution given that the tribunals derive
their power to adjudicate a dispute from the arbitration clause and from the concurrence of will of
the parties expressed therein to resolve the dispute via a method other than the usual national judicial
procedure. Additionally, according to Garnett, such an approach is reminiscent of the ‘delocalized’