CYIL 2014

VERONIKA BÍLKOVÁ

CYIL 5 ȍ2014Ȏ

intervention”.

.38

These States are particularly suspicious of, and hostile towards, the

proposals of introducing explicit criteria for UN-mandated R2P military operations,

of having the system of control of these operations enhanced, and of understanding

the three pillars in a sequencing manner. Moreover, the Global North has doubts

as to the appropriateness of using the R2P context to discuss broader political

questions, especially that of the UN Security Council reform. The mistrustful stance

of the Global South, or some parts of it (China, India, South Africa) stems, on the

other hand, from the fact that RwP accepts a relative, conditional understanding

of sovereignty, conceptualizing sovereignty as responsibility, not as a right. The two

groups of states seem to share the assessment of RwP as a new concept, differing in

some important aspects from that of R2P. Yet, is it truly the case?

The section will first give a

negative answer

to this question, before offering

some possible explanations of the critical reactions that RwP has received at the

international scene. Starting with the

first reading

of RwP, it is possible to say that

there is a large overlap with R2P as defined in the 2005 Outcome Document and,

partly, in the 2001 ICISS report.TheOutcomeDocument stresses the need to consider

R2P

“bearing in mind the principles of the Charter and international law”

(par. 139).

This reference is vague and, moreover, does not relate to the implementation of R2P

under the three pillars but to the UN General Assembly debate of the topic. Yet, it

confirms the conviction of the international community that R2P cannot derogate

from international standards. While the Outcome Document is silent as to what

these standards are, it would be difficult to deny that in the course of a military

action under R2P, such standards encompass, as a minimum, applicable rules of

international humanitarian law and, if applicable, of international human rights law.

The 2001 ICISS report was explicit on this point, ranking

“adherence to international

humanitarian law”

among the operational principles of R2P.

The situation is more complicated as far as the just war criteria and the monitoring

principles are concerned. The ICISS report uses the criteria as indicators which the

UN Security Council should take into account when deciding upon the use of force

under R2P. The Outcome Document, on the contrary, fails to include the criteria

altogether. This omission was officially justified by the uniqueness of each situation.

Yet, in reality, it is more likely that the criteria were left aside in reflection of the

interest of great powers not to bind their hands in advance. The discussions over the

military intervention in Libya and over the lack of such an operation in Syria have,

however, shown again how useful such criteria could be. Bringing them back to the

fore is thus one of the merits of RwP, which immediately links the concept back to

the original ideas behind R2P, at least as this was conceived under the 2001 ICISS

report. In this context, one solely has to express regrets that Brazil has not done more

to make the criteria clearer and better adapted to UN-authorised operations. The

Oliver Stuenckel,

Brazil as a norm interpreneur: the Responsibility While Protecting,

in Eduarda

P. Hamann and Robert Muggah (eds.),

Implementing the Responsibility to Protect: New Directions for

International Peace and Security?,

Igarapé Institute, Brasília, 2013, p. 59.