Previous Page  30 / 56 Next Page
Information
Show Menu
Previous Page 30 / 56 Next Page
Page Background

other background investigation. Employers

should also scale background checks to the

risk the particular position presents to the

company and its customers.

Many companies also overlook the risk

that counterparties present. According to

Global Profiles of the Fraudster

, 32% of

fraud events resulting in $1 million or more

in losses was committed by employees col-

luding with outsiders. These outsiders can

include vendors, suppliers or customers.

Yet these third-parties are seldom subject to

the same background checks as employees.

A thorough third-party diligence system is

critical for businesses of all sizes.

Insurance

Most businesses are familiar with commer-

cial liability, errors and omissions, director

and officer liability, business interruption

and hazard insurance. Fewer are familiar

with “employee dishonesty” coverage,

which helps alleviate losses in the event of

employee fraud. For example, according

to one Arthur J. Gallagher & Co. case

study, this type of policy helped a large

public university recover losses when its

treasury department employee fraudulently

invested university funds in a Ponzi

scheme in exchange for a kickback from

the scheme. Such insurance would seem

especially critical when the recipients of the

ill-gotten gains have either squandered the

money, sent it offshore, or otherwise made

it impossible to recover.

How Should a Fraud Be Investigated?

When an employee fraud is detected, the

company must take immediate steps to

investigate and remediate. No single set

of rules exists for investigations, but effec-

tive investigations share many common

characteristics. They are expeditious, but

thorough and broad enough to capture

the full extent of the employee fraud and

its various components. The investigators

who review documents and interview

witnesses should be impartial and free of

biases. Documents, hard drives and other

electronic materials should be immediately

preserved lest they be destroyed through

routine policies or concealment by the

fraudsters and their cohorts.

At the outset of an investigation, care

must be taken to identify the precise

client of the investigation team. Is it the

company? The board? A special committee

created by the board such as the audit com-

mittee?This question is imperative because,

at the end of the investigation, some type of

report (verbal or written) will be made. To

preserve the attorney-client privilege, the

report should be made only to the client.

Individuals conducting employee inter-

views during the course of the investigation

should give warnings to the employee

fraudsters or coworkers in line with the

seminal Supreme Court decision,

Upjohn

Co. v. United States

, 449 U.S. 383 (1981).

Upjohn

established the corporate attorney-

client privilege for employee interviews

conducted during internal investigations.

So-called “Upjohn Warnings” inform the

interviewee that: the company (not the

employee) is the client; the employee is

not being represented by the person con-

ducting the interview; the communication

is subject to the attorney-client privilege;

30

JANUARY 2017