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GAZETTE
AUGUST 1976
persons who are likely to read it by virtue of the
method of publication selected.
That privilege may apply if the following conditions
are fulfilled:—
(A) The subject matter must be one that involves
at least the social or moral obligations of the
Members of the Local Authority to the county,
city or town. It must fall within the purposes,
duties and obligations of the particular local
authority.
(B) The contents of the motion must be such as to
be reasonably confined to the privileged matter.
As Lord Loreburn put it "Anything that is not
relevant and pertinent to the discharge of the
duty or the exercise of the right or the safe-
guarding of the interest which creates the
privilege will not be protected".
(C) Publication ought not to go beyond what is
reasonably necessary for the purposes of fulfilling
the duty in question. Thus if there is to be pub-
lication it must be in relation to a matter in
respect of which the public or a large or sub-
stantial proportion of it has a right to be
informed.
There are cases where the public or a substantial
part of the public is entitled to know facts which
though injurious to the character and reputation of
an individual are nonetheless justified. One such case
was Allbut v. The Medical Council 23 Q.B.D. 400
(1889), where a doctor who had been struck off the
register took an action against the Medical Council
and the Judges in the Court of Appeal took the view
that the communication was protected by privilege.
Indeed S.17 of the Solicitors' Act, 1960, imposes a
statutory duty on the Incorporated Law Society to
publish certain notices on certain orders being made
by the High Court, nothwithstanding which such must
of necessity injure the character and reputation of the
individual solicitor.
DURING THE MEETING
Standing Orders
FORMULATION: Section 62 of the Local Govern-
ment Act, 1955, empowers a Local Authority to make
Standing Orders for the regulation of their proceedings.
This provision is in effect in substitution of the
powers previously conferred under Section 96 of the
Commissioners Clauses Act, 1847, which was repealed
by Section 5 of the 1955 Act. Some preliminary points
may be made regarding Standing Orders:—
(a) They must not be
ultra vires
the Statutes;
(b) They cannot confer any immunity outside the
scope of the General Law;
(c) They cannot enlarge the scope of the business to
be considered;
(d) They cannot impose an obligation on the Manager
as to accepting or giving or publishing Notices
outside the Statutes, and
(e) They cannot protect members or officials in rela-
tion to matters that are offences or actionable in
ordinary process of law.
AMENDMENT: While the formulation of Standing
Orders is a matter that by and large gives rise to no
great difficulty, their amendment may and often does.
The tendency to change the rules of the game when
losing the game is not peculiar to members of local
authorities, but a solicitor being consulted in such a
case (and it is usually one of urgency and controversy)
must be careful to observe the basic tenets of Natural
Justice and fair play, and to ensure that whatever rules
are laid down in the Standing Orders themselves for
amendment are strictly followed.
IMPLEMENTATION: The implementation of Stand-
ing Orders is one that only gives rise to difficulty in
moments of crisis and heated argument, when rage
rather than reason prevails. It is in such circumstances
that the value of simple direct orders is appreciated—
the touchstone is simplicity; for we have moved into
an age when in Ireland, at least in politics, words mean
what we choose them to mean. We have adopted the
Fables of Aesop and abandoned the Concise English
Dictionary.
Conduct
OFFICERS: In treating the conduct of a meeting and
regarding the position of the officers of the local
authority, there can be little to say to the experienced
official who knows what his functions are and how
and when to carry them into effect. The impartiality
of the official at the meeting, especially when he sees
what he considers to be poltroons making hay of his
cherished plans, is of importance. The official's entitle-
ments at the meeting are very limited, usually to
record, report, explain and rarely to recommend. He
has not the same latitude as the members. Had Lowe
(in the case of Horrocks v. Lowe of which I treat
later) been an official, it is very doubtful if he would
have been accorded the privilege extended to him in
that case.
MEMBERS: To say that members should conduct
themselves at meetings is to state the obvious, but
that is not always understood. Marshall and Others v
Tinelly 81 S.J. 902 (1937) was an Appeal by way of
Case Stated from a decision of a Justice who con-
victed the appellants of assault. On the 1st April
(a well chosen date for the prank), 1937, the three
appellants and the respondent Tinelly were present
at a Meeting of the Fire Brigade and Sanitary Com-
mittee of Feltham Urban District Council in the
Council Chamber of the Council, the appellant Mar-
shall being in the chair. The meeting was conducted
in accordance with regulations regarding the conduct
of business and Standing Orders of the Urban District
Council. Paragraph 47 reads:—
"The Chairman may call the attention of the
Council to continued irrelevance, tedious repeti-
tion, unbecoming language or conduct, or to any
breach of order on the part of any member and
may direct such members, if speaking, to dis-
continue his speech, or, in the event of persistent
disregard of the authority of the chair, the meet-
ing may, on Motion made by the Chairman and
put without debate, order the member to be
suspended for the remainder of the sitting. Any
member so suspended shall forthwith quit the
Council Chamber and in the event of his neglect
or refusal to do so, the Chairman may order him
to be removed therefrom."
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