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GAZETTE
JUNE/JULY 1976
residence or resumes residence in the State.
There has been a good deal of discussion about the
ideal length of the limitation period or whether any
limitation period is needed at all.
One interesting
feature of the Act is that, where a person who is not
the mother brings maintenance proce?dings against
one of the child's parents (as he may now do under
the amended s. 4A(l) of the
Illegitimate
Children
(Affiliation
Orders) Act
1930), no limitation period
is expressed. Arguably therefore, in a situation where
a mother has failed to bring proceedings against the
alleged father within the 3 year period, it may still be
possible for some third party (a social worker perhaps)
to bring proceedings against him for the support of
his child at a later date. But this argument will only
hold water if a Court is prepared to accept that the
right to bring maintenance proceedings against the
father of an illegitimate child implies also the right
to bring proceedings to have the alleged father ad-
judged the "putative" father (i.e. affiliation proceed-
ings). The reason is that a maintenance order can be
obtained by a third party only against a "putative"
father (see amended s. 4A(4) of the 1930 Act). If such
a right cannot be implied and it is not possible for
a third party to bring maintenance proceedings against
the alleged father of a child, who has not yet been
adjudged the putative father, then one can see little
value in permitting third party proceedings at all. One
of the reasons for allowing third parties to bring pro-
ceedings is to protect the child's interests in cases
where the mother is not for whatever reason prepared
to act. If an affiliation order has to be obtained before
the third party can bring maintenance proceedings, and
if the only person who may bring affiliation proceed-
ings is the mother (or a local body giving relief to the
mother), then the safeguard is lost.
Section D. The Collection and Enforcement of
Maintenance Payments.
S. 9 of the Act takes a considerable burden off the
shoulders of the maintenance creditor by requiring the
Court to order the maintenance debtor to transmit pay-
ments through the District Court Clerk, and by re-
quiring the Clerk, in a case of default, at the request
of the creditor, to take steps to recover arrears, in-
cluding the institution of enforcement proceedings. The
Court must order payments to be made through the
Clerk unless the creditor requests the Court not to do
so and the Court thinks it proper not to do so. Such
an order may be discharged on the application of the
debtor, provided the creditor is given an opportunity
to oppose the application and provided also that the
Court is satisfied that, having regard to the debtor's
record of payments and other circumstances, it is pro-
per to do so. The Clerk cannot on his own initiative
commence enforcement proceedings; a written request
from the creditor to do so is required. And even then
the creditor's right personally to bring enforcement
proceedings is preserved.
Clearly in most cases the Clerk will be ordered by
the Court to act as collecting agent, and will be request-
ed, where default occurs, to institute enforcement pro-
ceedings. This procedure certainly has advantages
from the creditor's point of view and knowledge of
its existence may persuade some maintenance debtors
to be more assiduous in keeping up payments. But
there is one objection to the scheme. S. 9(2) gives the
Clerk powei inter alia to "proceed in his own name for
an atiachment o; earnings order or ot'neiwise."
A
situation may thus arise in which an olf'cer of the
Court becomes a party to a dispute before the Court,
if a Clerk commences attachment proceedings and the
debli r contests them on the ground e.g that he has
a reasonable excuse (under s. 10(3)) for non payment,
the Clerk may find himself in an argument with the
debtor or the debtor's solicitor or counsel. The Clerk
might avoid this situation at the outset by arguing that
he considers it "unreasonable in the circumstances"
(under s. 9(2)) to commence attachment proceedings
himself. But once attachment proceedings have been
begun by the Clerk it would be strange if he were to
terminate them simply on the ground that ihey were
likely to be contested.
Whether the attachment of earnings provisions them-
selves, which occupy Part III of the Act, will make a
significant improvement in securing payment of main-
tenance debts is difficult to predict. Indeed since no
survey has been undertaken to assess the efficacy of
existing enforcement procedures, there will unfortunat-
ely be no basis for comparison. There are certain in-
herent limitations in the attachment scheme. It c.'nnol
operate in respect of persons who derive income from
a source other than an employer (e.g. self-employed
persons, persons living on unearned incomes, persons
receiving unemployment benefit etc.). And in the
case of an employed person it is doubtful whether the
provisions of the Act are strong enough to prevent the
classic method of maintenance avoidance, i.e. getting
lost by a change of address and employment and pos-
sibly even a change of name. In this context it is un-
fortunate that, whereas the Act requires (s. 14(a)) the
maintenance debtor to inform the Court of changes in
his employment, no effective sanction is stipulated in
case of non-compliance. The sanction set out in s. 20(1)
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