The Gazette 1961 - 64

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testatrix had made a valid donatio mortis causa of
the insurance policy moneys to her sister or whether
they went into residue, Plowman J. held that the
moneys went into residue. The mere fact of sending
the coupon to the sister was no evidence of a gift.
Nor did the letter add anything. In any event, the
claim was defeated by the fact that the coupon
could not have been delivered until after the death
because it bore the date October 23 on the postmark
and the testatrix had died on October 22. There
was no reason to hold that the mere fact of putting
it in the posting box was equivalent to delivery to
the donee. 105 S.J. 207.
Libe! and Slander—mitigation of damages—evidence of
reputation—particularisation of specific acts.
In Plato Films v. Speidel (March 2, 1961)
defendants, in an action for libel in a film, pleaded
justification, and, in the alternative, that in mitiga–
tion of damages, they would give evidence as to
the character of the plaintiff. As particulars under
the latter it was alleged that the pictures and
words complained of were published as part of the
film wherein the plaintiff was depicted as having
been guilty of conduct therein set out "the truth
of which the plaintiff in his amended statement of
claim does not deny." The guilty conduct was then
particularised under the description of various war
crimes. The House of Lords (Lords Simonds,
Radcliffe, Denning, Morris and Guest), dismissing
an appeal from the Court of Appeal held that the
evidence which a defendant in a libel action can
give in mitigation of damages where he has failed to
justify must be limited to the general reputation
of the plaintiff, and cannot be extended to specific
acts ; and that the defence should be amended so as
to omit reference to the specific acts. (1961) i All
England Reports, 876.
Malicious Prosecution and False Imprisonment.
In McKay v. Att.-Gen. (March 14, 1961) plaintiffs
brought an action against the Attorney-General and
two police officers for malicious prosecution,
conspiracy, trespass and libel. The action arose out
of convictions, later quashed, under the Betting and
Lotteries Act, 1934. McNair J. dismissed the action
on the ground that the plaintiffs had failed to prove
their case (1960) C.L.Y. (1950). The Court of Appeal
(Ormerod, Devlin and Danckwerts ) held,
dismissing the appeal, that the tri ge had
correctly decided that there was no evidence to
justify the plaintiffs' allegations ; the convictions
had been quashed on purely legal points. The
Times, March 15, 1961,
Medical Practitioner—swab left in body after operation—
departurefrom normalprocedure.
In Cooper v. Neville (March 9, 1961) C. had been
awarded damages by the Supreme Court of Kenya
for injuries sustained by her as the result of an
abdominal swab left in her body in the course of an
operation performed by N., a surgeon. The Court
of Appeal for Eastern Africa had allowed N.'s
appeal against the finding of negligence against him.
The Judicial Committee (Lords Tucker, Denning
and Morris) held, allowing C.'s appeal, that the
finding of the trial judge should be restored, namely
that if the swab was a mopping pack, it was negli–
gence on the part of the person who used it, whether
it was N. or his assistant, to lose control of it and
leave it in the body ; if it was a restraining pack,
then having regard to the small number used,
their obvious position, the absence of movement
and the lack of any particular need for haste at the
end of the operation, it was negligent of N. not
to have removed it, since the responsibility was on
him, as he admitted, to do so. There was no justifi–
cation for the departure from the normal routine.
The Times, March 10, 1961.
Bill of Costs may be "moderated" even if one year since
payment has expired.
On the application for taxation of a solicitor's
bill of costs under s. 69 of the Solicitors Act, 1957,
after payment of the bill, there is by virtue of sub-s.
(2) proviso (ii) no jurisdiction to order taxation if
twelve months since payment have expired before
the order is made, notwithstanding that the applica–
tion originated within the twelve months and that
there are such special circumstances as would justify
an order for taxation being made within the twelve
months ; but, in such a case, the court may, under
its inherent jurisdiction over solicitors as officers
of the court, deal with the bill by ordering a taxation
or "moderation", independently of the statute,
either of the whole bill or of some items in it: and,
on the facts in the present case, the taxation of an
item of 3,500 guineas in a solicitor's bill, described
as "Fee by way of general instructions, care and
responsibility", followed by particulars, would
be ordered under the inherent jurisdiction at the
instance of his client, although the bill had been
paid more than twelve months before the date of
the hearing so held by Cross J. Storer & Co. v.
Johnson (1890), 15 App. Cas. 203 applied.
(EDITORIAL NOTE. In this case the court was
satisfied that special circumstances, such as would
have satisfied s. 69 (2) proviso (i) of the Solicitors
Act, 1957, existed and the proposition stated above