320 / 328
should as far as possible be regarded as impartial
and
therefore equally available
to both sides.
Altogether apart from leading to protracted litigation
of which medical witnesses not infrequently com
plain, the task of judge, jury, counsel and solicitors
is made more difficult, where the application of a
little common sense ought not to be above the
high standard of the profession.
Summons heard in absence of defendant
A husband left his wife in July, 1956 and in
October 1956, she applied to the High Court, for
maintenance on the ground of his wilful neglect to
maintain her. By November, 1957, affidavits were
filed, but the proceedings were then left in abeyance.
In March, 1963, the wife complained to justices
that her husband had deserted and wilfully neglected
to maintain her. The husband's solicitors informed
the justices' clerk of the High Court proceedings
which were still pending and asked for an adjourn
ment of the hearing. The clerk wrote back granting
an adjournment for four weeks but the husband's
solicitors had no record of its receipt and it was
possible that it went astray in their office. Accor
dingly only the wife and her solicitors appeared at
the adjourned hearing, when the justices found that
the husband had deserted and wilfully neglected
to maintain the wife a maintenance order was made
against him.
The husband appealed on the grounds that the
justices should not have heard the complaint since
(i) High Court proceedings on the same issue
were pending, (2) he was not present or represented
at the hearing :—
Held, (i) that the issues were the same in the
proceedings before the High Court as they were in
the maintenance proceedings before the magistrates
since, although the High Court would have to
determine whether
the husband was guilty of
wilfully neglecting to maintain his wife in 1956,
whereas the magistrates would have to determine
whether he was so guilty in 1963, once liability
had been established, in either case the quantum
would have to be ascertained on the basis of the
present circumstances of the party.
(2) That, where High Court proceedings were
pending on the same issue, justices had a discretion
to proceed or to adjourn; and that in all other
than exceptional cases they should, as a matter
of obvious convenience and public policy, exercise
their discretion to adjourn the proceedings until the
High Court proceedings were disposed of that,
since they had not considered whether the present
case was one of those exceptional cases where
they could nevertheless proceed, they had failed
to exercise their discretion; and that, therefore,
a rehearing would be ordered.
An application was made by the husband for an
order that the costs falling on him should be paid
by his former solicitor.
Sir Jocelyn Simon P. dealing with this matter
stated that the court would make no order on this
aspect of the matter in view of the fact that the
husband had rights at common law should he choose
to test them and enforce them.
(Kaye
v.
Kaye, 1964, 2 W.L.R. 672.)
Trade Unions—trade dispute—conspiracy
(Trade Dispute Act, 1906 (6 Edw. 7, c. 47), ss. i,
3.) Defendant trade union officials, whose union
was in dispute with an associate of the plaintiff
company, " blacked"
the plaintiffs' barges by
prohibiting union members from working them.
Marshall, J. held that the defendants were
prima
facie
guilty of conspiracy, and granted an inter
locutory injunction against them ((1964) 2 C.L. 387).
Held, allowing the defendants' appeal, (i) that the
defendants were
primafacie
not guilty of conspiracy ;
(2) that their conduct was in contemplation of
furtherance of a trade dispute and, since they had
merely threatened to induce their members to break
their contracts of employment
(as opposed
to
threatening to break such contracts) they were
protected by the provisions of ss. i and 3 of the
Trade Disputes Act, 1906 ;
(3) that there was in
any event no
prima facie
case of intimidation ; and
(4) that the defendants
-were primafacie
not guilty of
inducing the breach of contracts other than contracts
of employment—J. T. Stratford & Son
v.
Lindley.
(1964) 3 C.L.
Backing of Warrants
In view of the passing of the Extradition Bill
1963 through the Houses of the Oireachtas, the
question raised therein regarding the backing of
warrants and the case of R.
v.
Metropolitan Police
Commissioner
ex parte
Hammond may be of interest
to members.—(1964) 2 W.L.R. 777.
The applicant, an Englishman domiciled
in
England, was arrested in London on a warrant
issued in £ire reciting that a complaint had been
made on oath and in writing that the applicant,
within six months, at an address in Dublin, had
wilfully neglected two children of whom he had
custody in such a manner likely to cause them
unnecessary suffering or injury to
their health
contrary to s. 12 of the Children Act, 1908, as
amended by an Irish statute of 1957. It was signed by
a justice of a District Court in County Dublin, and
authorised the execution of the warrant by a con
stable of the metropolitan police force; the signature
100