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DECEMBER, 19 14]
The Gazette of the Incorporated Law Society of Ireland.
69
The plaintiff, who was a photographer,
brought an action against the defendants, a
firm of Solicitors, to recover
£5
17s., the
price of photographs taken by him on the
instructions of a member of the defendants'
firm in connection with a charge of man
slaughter in which
the defendants were
acting for the accused person.
It was proved
at the trial that when the photographs were
ordered the plaintiff knew that the defendants
were Solicitors and that the photographs were
wanted for the trial. It was also proved that
in ordering the photographs the Solicitor
said, " Make the charges as low as you can,
for the fellow is only a poor chap."
At the conclusion of the plaintiff's case the
County Court Judge held that the defendants
were only acting as agents for their client,
and were not responsible for the cost of the
photographs.
The plaintiff appealed.
The Court, without calling on Counsel for
the' defendants, dismissed the appeal.
Mr. Justice Coleridge, in giving judgment,
said that there was no question that the
plaintiff knew that the defendants were
Solicitors acting on behalf of a client, and
that being so, apart from any other considera
tions, they would be agents acting on behalf
of a principal.
Prima facie,
in such a
contract the person supplying the goods
would have to have recourse to the principal
and not the agent.
It was said, however,
that in the present case the mere fact that
the Solicitor •
gave
the order made him
responsible.
In his Lordship's opinion that
was not the case.
There were exceptional cases in which,
although one party to a contract knew that
the other was a Solicitor, yet'the Solicitor
was personally responsible. For instance, in
cash transactions where it was to be assumed
that the Solicitor had no authority to pledge
the credit of his client. The present trans
action was not a cash transaction in that
sense, although no doubt an action would lie
for the price of the goods as soon as they
were delivered. Another case in which the
Solicitor might be personally responsible was
where a custom would be proved that it
should be so.
It was for the Judge to say in
o,ny particular case whether such a custom
had been proved, and if it were it would
override the ordinary incidents of law so far
as that case was concerned.
In the present
case no such custom has been proved. The
photographer knew that he was dealing with
the Solicitor as an agent, and the mere fact
that he chose to debit the agent in his books
did not throw upon him any liability to pay.
The decision of the County Court' Judge was
right, and the appeal must be dismissed.
Mr. Justice Shearman concurred.
(Reported
The Times Law Reports,
Vol.
XXXI., p 40.)
COURT OF APPEAL (ENGLAND).
(Before Buckley, Phillimore and Pickford,
LJJ.)
Softlaw v. Morgan.
November 9, 1914.—
Moratorium—Contract—
Date
of
making
—
Applicability
of
moratorium—Postponement of Payments
Act,
1914 (4
and
5
George V., c.
11).
THE moratorium proclaimed under
the
Postponement of Payments Act, 1914, does
not extend to contracts made after August 4,
1914.
The defendant here appealed from an order
made by Mr. Justice Scrutton. The action
was begun by a specially indorsed writ
claiming money due from the defendant to
the plaintiff under two contracts made after
August 4, 1914. The question was whether
the moratorium applied to contracts made
after August 4.
On an application under
Order 14 Mr. Justice Scrutton held that the
moratorium did not apply to such contracts,
and ordered final judgment to be entered for
the plaintiff.
The defendant appealed.
The Court dismissed the appeal.
Lord Justice Buckley said that the order
of Mr. Justice Scrutton was right. By the
Postponement of Payments Act, 1914, His
Majesty had power by proclamation
to
authorise the postponement of any payment
in pursuance of any contract to such extent,
for such time and subject to such conditions
or other provisions as might be specified in
the Proclamation.
By a Proclamation of