The Gazette 1980

GAZETTE

MARCH/APRIL

1980

purpose, is in the

de facto

service of the person who

makes the request and for whom the duty is being

performed."

Walsh, J. referred to the "family car" cases

where

liability was imposed on parents, stating that they showed

that vicarious liability could rest on gratuitous or

de facto

service. He added:

"It may well be, as has been suggested by one noted

writer,

that the fact that this imposition of vicarious

liability has apparently been confined to motor-car

cases is because it was developed as a means of

reaching the insurance company of the owner of the

car. Whatever may be the reasons for the develop-

ment of the doctrine in a particular area, the reasons

cannot mask the basic principle of law involved."

Henchy, J., dissenting, saw:

"no justification for stretching the law so as to make

it cover the present claim when, by doing so, the

effect would be that liability in negligence would

attach to persons for casual and gratitous acts of

others as to the performance of which they could not

reasonably have been expected to be insured . . . it

would be unfair and oppressive to exact compensa-

tion damages from a person for an act done on his

behalf, expecially in the case of an intrinsically harm-

less act, if it was done in a negligent manner which he

could not reasonably have foreseen and if — unlike an

employer, or a person with a primarily personal duty

of care, or a motor-car owner, or the like — he could

not reasonably have been expected to be insured

against the risk of that negligence."

Moynihan

would appear to be a

decision of considerable importance in relation to the

liability of parents for the torts of their children.

Whilst it proceeds on the basis of liability for control

over domestic hospitality, which was "not in any way

dependent upon the relationship of mother and

daughter",

nevertheless the fact remains that the

grandmother

was

held liable for her daughter's

conduct. It is relatively easy to conceive of applica-

tions of the principle that would extend into areas

now only partially covered by the concept of parental

negligence (discussed below). If a host asks his ten-

year-old son to entertain a guest while the host is in

the kitchen for a few minutes, and the son injures the

guest with a bow and arrow,

the parent may or may

not be liable under the law of negligence, depending

on a number of factors, such as his awareness of the

child's previous propensities. If, however, the

ratio

Moynihan

is to apply, the host may be vicariously

liable without consideration of these factors.

3. Where the Parent is Negligent in Affording his Child

an opportunity to injure another

A parent may be negligent in affording his child an

opportunity to injure another.

The negligence may

consist of a wide range of behaviour, which may

conveniently be summarised under three headings.

(a) Dangerous Things

It may be negligent for a person to leave dangerous

things within access of a child in circumstances where

injury to the child or another is foreseeable. A clear case

is where a person leaves a loaded gun within reach of a

young child. Liability will not depend simply on the

relationship between parent and child that may exist in

such a case but rather on the foreseeability of harm

and

the reasonableness of attributing blame to the defendant

for his lack of care. This was well illustrated in the lead-

ing Irish decision on the subject,

Sullivan v. Creed.

There, the defendant, a farmer who had been shooting

rabbits on his property, left his gun loaded and at full

cock standing inside a fence on his lands. His fifteen-year-

old son, not realising that the gun was loaded, pointed it

in play at the plaintiff and accidently shot him. A verdict

for the plaintiff was upheld by the Court of Appeal.

FitzGibbon, L.J. stated:

"The scope of the duty is the scope of the danger,

and it extends to every person into whose hands a

prudent man might reasonably expect the gun to

come, having regard to the place where he left it. The

ground of liability here is not that the boy was the

defendant's son, but the fact that the gun was left

without warning, in a dangerous condition, within

reach of persons using the pathway, and the boy was

one of the very class of persons whom the defendant

knew to be not only likely but certain to pass by, viz.

his own household."

A parent (or other person) may also be liable where he

or she negligently entrusts a dangerous thing to a child in

circumstances where injury to the child or another is

foreseeable. Whether or not the entrustment was negligent

" . . . must depend upon the exact facts of every case".

(b) Child's Dangerous Propensities

A parent may be liable in negligence where he knows

or ought to know

of a particular dangerous propensity

of his or her child and fails to protect others against injury

likely to result from it. Thus, for example, if the parent is

aware that his or her child has attacked other persons

previously,

or has displayed a tendency to steal,

or to

set fire to property

or to drive dangerously,

he or she

may be liable for failing to take the steps necessary to

protect others from harm likely to result from a repetition

of such conduct.

The steps that the parent will be required to take will

depend on the circumstances of the case. The proper

approach may be to discipline the child, encourage him to

mend his ways, remove him from likely sources of

temptation or warn his potential victims. Clearly the age

of the child and the nature of the danger will greatly affect

how the parent should behave. It is settled, however, that

the parent is not an insurer: he will not be liable where his

reasonable best was not sufficient to prevent theinjury.

(c) Failure to Control Child Properly

Where a parent fails to control a child properly, he or

she may be liable for injuries resulting to others (or,

indeed, the child himself or herself)-

Curley v. Mannion

the Supreme Court held that it

might be negligence for the owner and driver of a car to

permit his passenger to open a door without checking that

no traffic would thereby be endangered. The case

involved the 13-year-old daughter of the driver opening a

door in the path of a cyclist. O'Dalaigh, C.J. stated that,

in his judgment:

"a person in charge of a motor car must take reason-

able precautions for the safety of others, and this will