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The Gazette of the Incorporated Law Society of Ireland,
[MAY, 1910
Housing of the Working Classes Act, 1890 ,
(see s. 3 (1) of the Labourers (Ir.) Act, 1896),
but not so as to exclude the Railways Act
(Ir.), 1851. The preamble of that Act shows
that the tenure according to the law of
Ireland is to be rec"gnised in proceedings
under it.
It says : " Whereas, on account
of circumstances connected with the tenure
of land in Ireland, the provision of the Lands
Clauses Consolidation Act, 1845, are found
to be unsuited to the existing condition of
that country, &c., &c., be
it
therefore
enacted." Owners,
lessees and occupiers,
therefore, in s. 4 of that Act mean owners:
lessees and occupiers according to the law
of Ireland ;
and a judicial tenant, according
to the law of Ireland, is a lessee both by
reason of holding from year to year, which
contract need not be in writing under s. 4
of Deasy's Act, and by virtue of the order
of the Land Commission, which is a contract
of tenancy reduced to writing, and enforced
on both parties to it by statute
(R. Wright
v. Chairman and Justices of Co. Cork,
40 Ir.
L.T.R., 103 (1906) ; 2 Ir. R. 349.) The same
principle applies to the rules made under the
Acts.
Wylie, for the Stranorlar District Council.
Owner or lessee means a person who can give
a title to something more than the occupation
interest, and all through the Acts the words
are used in this sense. Owner or lessee really
means a person having power to sell under
the Land Purchase Acts :
(see s. 11 (1) of
the Labourers (Ir.) Act, 1906), and in this
connection lessee means a person holding
under a long lease. Tenants from year to
year and judicial tenants have always been
treated as occupiers, and come under sub-
rule (9).
Palles, C.B. I cannot follow the argument
that the word " lessee " in this order is to
have any other meaning than that usually
attached to it. Apart from the Labourers
Acts and the Lands Clauses Acts, a judicial
tenant is certainly a lessee, and I cannot see
why any other construction should apply
when these Acts (or rules made in pursuance
of
them) are under consideration, and I
think the plaintiffs are entitled to a decree
for the amount claimed.
(Reported 7mA
Law Times Reports,
Vol.
xliv, p. 95).
COURT OF APPEAL (ENGLAND).
(Before Vaughan Willi
ams and Fletcher
Moulton,
L.JJ.)
Jones
v.
Stott and Others.
April
5, 1910.
Costs
Appeal and Cross-
Appeal R.S.C., Iviii.,
6.
1, (Rules of
Supreme Court of Judicature, Ireland,
Order, Iviii.,
6, 7).
The plaintiffs sued the defendants, and the
trial ended in judgment being entered for the
defendants without costs.
Both parties
appealed, but the defendants set down their
appeal (which was merely for costs of the
action) first. Consequently, the plaintiff's
appeal, which raised the substantial issue as
at the trial, came on by way of cross-appeal.
On the hearing of the appeals, both were
dismissed with costs.
Held,
that in taxing the costs the appeal
and cross-appeal should be treated by the
taxing master as two separate appeals.
Appeal by the plaintiff on a question of
taxation arising out of an Order made by the
Court of Appeal in an action decided last
Sittings. The facts sufficiently appear from
the judgment.
Vaughan Williams, L.J. I do not think
that in this case we have anything further to
do than to consider the terms of the order
which was made in this Court. The part of
the order which deals with costs
is as
follows : " Upon hearing Mr. Scott Fox, for
the defendant, and Mr. Norman Craig, for
the plaintiff, on the notice of motion, dated
2(ith day of February, 1909, given on behalf
of the defendants on appeal from so much
of the judgment of A. T. Lawrence, J., given
on the trial of this action before him at York
on the 15th day of January, 1909, as directs
that the defendants shall have no costs, and
as deprives them of their costs of the action,
that such part of the said judgment as directs
as aforesaid might be reversed and set aside,
and that the judgment in the said action
might be entered for the defendants with
costs. And upon hearing the same Counsel
on the cross-notice, dated the 19th day of
April, 1909, given on behalf of the plaintiff
of his intention to contend that the said
judgment should be reversed or varied in so
far as it adjudges that judgment be entered
for
the defendant without costs." That
cross-notice went to the whole of the plaintiff's