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9

Morningstar FundInvestor

February

2016

An Outlier

Dodge

&

Cox does not explicitly link bonuses to fund

performance. It believes that tying compensation

directly to returns might adversely promote competi-

tion instead of constructive teamwork. Instead,

the firm focuses on the caliber of investment ideas

and industry insight. Morningstar generally favors

a compensation structure that specifically links port-

folio-manager pay to long-term fund results, but

there is no reason to question Dodge

&

Cox’s focus on

the long haul. Over the past five years, the firm’s

equity funds had an average turnover of just

15%

, and

it has one of the highest manager-retention rates.

Does Compensation Structure Influence Portfolio

Turnover or Manager Tenure?

One might expect firms that emphasize long-term

returns to have funds with low portfolio turnover,

and vice versa. That appears to be the case in some

circumstances. American Funds, Oakmark, and T. Rowe

Price’s equity funds had below-average turnover

during the past five years as compared with other firms

in Table

1

. However, the relationship is weak in

other instances. For example, Lord Abbett and Franklin

Templeton use the same compensation structure,

though the former had an average turnover of

111%

versus

33%

for the latter.

It also would be reasonable to assume that including

a longer assessment period leads to greater retention

of managers, by encouraging skippers to stay put.

That seems to be the case with Oakmark and American

Funds, though T. Rowe Price’s average manager

tenure ranks lower than most peers’ in Table

1

.

PIMCO

has the shortest average tenure of the bunch, but that

owes largely to Bill Gross’ recent departure.

K

Contact Leo Acheson at

leo.acheson@morningstar.com

Table 1

How the Largest Active Management Shops Determine Portfolio-Manager Bonuses

Time Periods (years) Evaluated to

Determine Manager Bonuses

Investment Firm

Active Mutual

Fund AUM Bill ($)

1

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

Time Period

Weighting Scheme

2

Avg Horizon

(years)

3

Average Equity

Fund Turnover (%)

4

Average Longest

Manager Tenure (years)

T. Rowe Price

447.3

• • •

Equal

4.75

44

7.1

Oakmark

79.2

• • •

Equal

4.75

34

17.1

American Funds

1,198.1

• • •

Progressive

4.25

27

11.4

Fidelity

1,073.6

• •

Equal

4

91

6.0

JPMorgan

270.3

• • •

Progressive

3

80

7.9

Janus

106.2

• • •

Progressive

3

55

6.3

American Century

100.8

• • •

Progressive

3

97

8.4

The Hartford (Wellington)

93.4

• • •

Progressive

3

84

7.4

Oppenheimer

181.4

• • •

Progressive

3

55

7.2

Invesco

138.6

• • •

Progressive

3

41

7.0

Columbia

138.9

• • •

Progressive

3

71

6.8

BlackRock

216.3

• • •

Equal

3

86

5.7

Franklin Templeton

409.7

• • •

Equal

3

33

14.6

MFS

178.4

• • •

Three-year emphasized

3

48

9.9

Lord Abbett

101.5

• • •

Equal

3

111

7.6

Goldman Sachs

90.5

• • •

Equal

3

90

7.6

Putnam

71.3

Equal

3

80

8.8

PIMCO

299.5

• • •

Dollar-weighted

2

3.4

Waddell & Reed (& Ivy)

82.5

• •

Equal

2

58

9.2 (5.9)

Dodge & Cox

183.4

15

21.7

Median

0.20

3

58

7.6

1

As of 11/30/2015. Excludes fund-of-fund and money market assets.

2

Equal

means the firm places even weight on each measurement period;

progressive

means the firm places increasing weight on each succeeding

measurement period.

3

Calculated as the average of time periods (in years) used to determine bonuses; if performance is more heavily weighted to the long term, the greater-than symbol (

) is added before the average.

4

The average turnover of a firm’s equity funds during the past five years through 2014. Source: Morningstar.