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Recent Irish Cases
Practice—In a libel action, plaintiffs will not normally
be required to furnish particulars of the persons
to whom the libel was allegedly published.
The defendants brought a motion in the High Court
seeking an order that the plaintiffs furnish particulars
of the names and addesses of the persons to whom
they allege the libel complained of was published;
Gannon J. granted the order. It is well established
that plaintiffs will not be compelled to furnish par-
ticulars of the persons to whom publication was made
save in special circumstances, as the defendant is in
a better position than anybody to know to whom he
published the alleged libel. There are no special cir-
cumstances in this case which would warrant a
departure here from established practice. The appeal
is accordingly allowed.
[Fanning & Co. v. Surgical Distributors Ltd. —
Supreme Court (Walsh, Henchy and Griffin JJ.) per
Walsh J. — unreported — 27th February, 1975.]
In jury action for personal injuries, the sum of £5,658
for general damages reasonable, but 63%
apportionment against defendant unreasonable in
view of plaintiff's contributory negligence.
In respect of his injuries, the plaintiff obtained
£2,342 agreed damages for out of pocket expenses,
and £5,658 for general damages. Having regard to the
severe injuries suffered by the plaintiff, the fact that
it took 14 months before he was lit to return to work,
and the degree of permanent weakness in his leg, the
sum of £5,648 for general damages is not excessive,
and the appeal on this point is dismissed.
As to the accident, the jury were entitled to find
the defendant negligent if they found that, as a careful
driver, he should have been able to see the plaintiff in
time and thereby avoid the collision. But the jury
could not acquit the plaintiff of negligence, in that, as
a cyclist on a minor road with a vision of 300 yards,
he had failed to see the defendant's motor car, and
cycled into its path. Consequently the jury's apportion-
ment of 63% on the defendant for his part in the
accident was perverse. The appeal on this point is
allowed, and there will be a new trial on the issues of
liability and apportionment.
Per Budd J.: This case exemplifies the desirability
of posing the question of damages in the issue paper
in such a way as to concentrate the jury's mind on the
different heads of damage—(1) Out of pocket expenses
to date of trial; (2) Pain and suffering to date of trial;
(3) Pain and suffering in the future, etc.
[Hanley v. Morrissey
— Supreme Court (Budd,
Henchy and Griffin JJ. per Budd J.) — unreported —
20th December, 1974.]
Practice—In an application by a local authority under
the Planning Act for compulsory acquisition of
land, it is not necessary to join the Minister as
defendant if he has granted planning permission
in respect of such land.
Appeal against a decision of Kenny J., in which he
has allowed the Minister for Local Government to be
joined with the Housing Authority as a defendant in
a Special Summons brought under Order 92 to enforce
a claim against a Compulsory Order under S. 78 (2)
of the Housing Act, 1966. The point to be determined
is whether the County Council, having already granted
planning permission in respect of the property com-
pulsorily acquired, are estopped or debarred from
acquiring it compulsorily, so that the Compulsory
Purchase Order, confirmed by the Minister, is invalid.
This issue essentially only involves the powers of the
County Council. The Minister sees no reason why he
should be defendant. The test is whether the presence
in the proceedings of the Minister as a defendant is
justifiable by the plaintiff as necessary for the proper
prosecution of his claim. It seems that the presence
of the Minister would in fact be a redundancy, and
his participation is unnecessary. The appeal accord-
ingly is allowed.
[Fuller and Holiday Motor Inns Ltd. v. Dublin
County Council and Minister for Local Government—
Supreme Court (Walsh, Henchy and Griffin J J.) per
Henchy J.—unreported—28th February, 1975.]
In a winding-up, a salaried director is entitled to
accrued holiday remuneration.
A company was unable to pay its debts and passed
a resolution for voluntary winding up. The plaintiff
as liquidator asks the Court whether the defendant's
claim for accrued holiday remuneration should be
treated as a debt ranking in priority under S. 285 of
the Companies Act 1963. The defendant held 3,000
shares of £1 each, and was a director of the company
which had an issued capital of £6,450. Though not
managing director, he was responsible for the day to
day running of the business. He was paid £225 per
month which he regarded as a salary. His employment
was terminated by the liquidator in July, 1974, and
the defendant claimed accrued holiday remuneration.
If the defendant was a director, and also a salaried
employee, he is entitled to priority under S. 285 for
salary and accrued holiday remuneration. Having
reviewed numerous authorities, Kenny J. came to the
conclusion that the defendant's claim was justified.
Accordingly Kenny J. directed the plaintiff to pay to
the defendant in priority in the winding-up his claim
for accrued holiday remuneration, as the money he
received was a salary.
[Re Dairy Lee Ltd.—Stakelum
v.
Canning,
—Kenny
J.—unreported—24th February, 1975.
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