275 / 336
plicant to submit that he had an additional constitu-
tional right of appeal from the Central Criminal Court
directly to the Supreme Court.
The application for extension of time is unanimously
dismissed.
The People (Attorney-General) v Conmey (No.
2)—Supreme Court—Majority judgment on Con-
stitutional issue by O'Higgins C. J., Walsh and
Doyle J.J.—Opinion reserved by Budd and Grif-
fin J. J.—Separate judgments by O'Higgins C.
J., Walsh J: and Griffin J.—unreported—6 Octo-
ber 1975).
Owing to fraudulent answers given by London solicitor
agents in an application to the Land Commission,
innocent Irish solicitors, who have not been paid
by their clients, cannot recover a substantial
deposit in a sale of land.
The plaintiff has claimed specific performance of a
written agreement dated 30 January 1974 for the sale
to the first defendant, and to the second defendant as
his nominee, of registered lands contained in Folio No.
22978 in Co. Limerick for £325,000, and for a manda-
tory order that the defendants, or one of them, should
pay forthwith the sum of £32,500, being 10 per cent
of the deposit. The third defendants, a Dublin firm of
solicitors (hereinafter called X) signed the agreement
as agents for the first defendant. The first two defen-
dants have not entered an appearance or defence. X
entered a defence and counterclaim. X pleaded that
there was an implied condition that the agreement
could not be carried out, unless a consent from the
Land Commission, under S. 45 of the Land Act, 1965,
had first been obtained, otherwise the sale was to be
deemed void. X pleaded that the Land Commission
had refused consent to the vesting in this case. X fur-
ther pleaded that, by direction of the Law Society,
they had paid a deposit of £32,500 to plaintiff's solici-
tors, and in the circumstances they counterclaimed for
the return of the deposit. It follows that the only mat-
ter to be considered is X's counterclaim for £32,500.
The plaintiff, Mrs. Gostelloe, is the owner of a sub-
stantial stud farm of 206 acres at Kilpeacon outside
Limerick, containing a Georgian mansion. This stud
farm was managed by her husband. The first defen-
dant, Mr. Maharaj, inspected the farm, which was for
sale, in January 1974, and stated he wished to purchase
the lands as a stud farm, and that he had 40 thorough-
bred mares boarded out at different studs, with a total
value of £ l i million. He spoke of employing up to 50
stable lads, discussed the expansion of the stables, and
asked that if agreement were reached, fodder and farm
machinery were to be left behind. After inspection, he
agreed to purchase the lands for £325,000. A standard
form of the Law Society's agreement for sale for private
contract was drawn up, and X signed in trust on
behalf of Mr. Maharaj, on 30 January 1974. The
Special Conditions of Sale, which were subsequently
held not applicable, provided that the sale was subject
to the consent of the Land Commission under S. 45
and for the return of the deposit, if such consent .was
not forthcoming, and giving leave to the vendor at his
option to rescind the contract or return of the deposit,
if such consent was not made before 1 April 1974!
X undertook to pay the deposit of £32,500.
In applying for consent, X, on the instructions of the
London solicitors acting for the plaintiff, stated that the
premises were a registered stud farm, and that the
plaintiff's intention is to develop the property for stud
purposes.
On 8 May 1974 the Land Commission submitted to
X a further questionnaire, and, as they did not know
the replies, they passed it on to the London solicitor.
The London solicitors replied on 22 May 1974 to the
following effect:
(1) At this stage, the Company has not an interest in
Ireland but hopes to undertake land development in
Ireland.
(2) Mr. Maharaj's interest in bloodstock in Ireland is
limited. We understand he has some brood-mares in
the stud and one or two racehorses.
(3) It is
not
the intention of the Company to use
Kilpeacon. It is intended to apply for planning per-
mission to develop the land, and, pending the determ-
ination of the planning application, it is proposed to
let the land on eleven month tenancies to local farmers
for grazing purposes.
(4) No direct employment is planned other than such
employment as would be given by the building contrac-
tors who would be engaged to carry out any redevel-
opment.
The plaintiff therefore contended that these replies
were not
bona fide,
but a
mala fide,
intentional effort
to prevent the granting of consent by the Land Com-
mission, which was refused. A solicitor in X stated that
consent would have been automatically granted, if the
lands were to be used for purposes of a stud farm.
The case of
Rooney
v.
Byrne,
(1933) I.R., was applied;
here the plaintiff had been refused an advance by an
insurance company in respect of property, and, despite
an undertaking, had made no further efforts to obtain
advances; the defendant could consequently recover his
deposit.
There is undoubtedly an obligation on the purchaser
to make a
bona fide
application to the Land Commis-
sion for consent. Consequently this application is
mala
fide;
this automatically prevents the return of the
deposit. The mention of the eleven months lettings was
almost certain to produce a refusal, as was the fact
that no direct employment was planned.
Despite the fact that firm X had not been refunded
by the Company for the amount of the deposit, and
that, though acting with complete propriety, they had
suffered a substantial loss, nevertheless on the basis of
these legal principles, they were not entitléd to the
return of their deposit of £32,500. The counterclaim
must be dismissed.
(Costelloe v. Maharaj, Krishna Properties (Ireland)
Ltd. and X
— Finlay
P.
— unreported — 10 July
1975.)
Revocation of public service vehicle invalid, as licensee
not given opportunity to explain his case.
S. 82 of the Road Traffic Act, 1961, empowers the
Minister for Local Government to make regulations for
the control and operation of Public Service Vehicles,
duly exercised by the Public Service Vehicles (Amend-
ment) Regulations 1963 (S.I. No. 191 of 1963, as
amended by the 1970 Regulations—S
.I.
No. 200 of
1970). These regulations provide for the granting and
revocation of public service vehicles, entrusted to the
Commissioner of the Garda or one of his authorised
officers.
The plaintiff had for some years been the holder of
a small public service vehicle, and of a licence to drive
. 2 6 8