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Name and Arms clause held void for uncertainty.
It had already been held by Dixon J. in Re Mont-
gomery Deed. — Jellett v. Waddington — (1953) 89
I.L.T.R. — and by Budd J. in De Vere Deed. Jellett v.
O'Brien — (1961) I.R. — that a Name and Arms clause
was void for uncertainty. However, the English Court of
Appeal in Re Neeld Deed. — (1962) 2 All E.R. — had
reversed all previous decisions and held such a clause
valid. The purchaser is buying from the vendors, who
are Jesuit Fathers, a substantial area of land in Clon-
tarf which formerly formed part of the Vernon Estate.
Despite these two Irish decisions the purchaser main-
tains that a Name and Arms clause in a deed of 18
December 1933 is valid and effective and that conse-
quently vendors had not shown proper title. Kenny J.
first set out the title in full, and referred to a Settlement
of 23 December 1879 and to a Disentailing Deed of
18 December 1933. Apart from the Disentailing Deed,
a further Deed was made on the same date between
(1) Edward Kingston Vernon, (2) Robert Vernon
(Edward's eldest son) and (3) John G. Oulton and
Edward W. Davy (trustees), which appointed the lands
therein described, subject to the life estate of Edward,
to the use of Robert during his life, and, after his death,
to each of Robert's sons in remainder according to
their seniority, and to their heirs male. If Robert had
no issue, then the land was to go to his three sisters,
Gwendoline, Elizabeth and Cynthia Vernon, and their
heirs, in tail according to their seniority. Every person
who becomes entitled to the lands as tenant in tail male
or tenant in tail by purchase shall use the surname of
Vernon and bear the arms of Vemon within one year
after becoming so entitled. In the case of a married
daughter, the husband is to assume the name of Vernon
and apply for a license to bear the arms of Vernon
within one year of the daughter obtaining possession of
the lands. If for any reason later the daughter or her
husband should disuse such surname, the lands were
to devolve upon the person next entitled in remainder.
On 15 July 1937, a Supplemental Deed to the one of
December 1933 was made between (1) Edward and
Robert Vernon, and (2) John Oulton and Edward
Davy. By this instrument, Edward and Robert, in exer-
cise of their power of appointment, appointed the lands
in default of Robert's issue to Margaret Gwendoline
Vernon, Daisy Elizabeth Vernon and Cynthia Mabel
Vernon; these daughters were to hold the lands as
tenants in common in tail with cross remainders.
Robert died on 30 June 1945 unmarried, and thereupon
his three sisters became entitled to the lands as tenants
in common in tail. Gwendoline had married John Kell-
ett, who would not assume the name of Vernon, and
whose interest was thus determined. Elizabeth became
Mrs. Shepard, while Cynthia became Mrs. Rann. By
a deed of 15 January 1962 between (1) Elizabeth Shep-
ard and Mabel Cynthia Rann, (2) Edward Vernon
(their father), and (3) Rupert Willoughby Oulton and
Leslie Mellon (trustees), Elizabeth and Cynthia, with
the consent of Edward (the protector of the settlement),
granted two equal undivided third parts in the lands
to hold the same unto the trustees upon trusts therein
defined. Edward has since died, and from then, Eliza-
beth and Cynthia, and probably also Gwendoline Kell-
ett, have all become tenants in tail of the estate. The
Jesuit Fathers, who are plaintiffs, purchased the free-
hold interest in the lands from Gwendoline, Elizabeth
and Cynthia.
In the course of investigating the present title, the
solicitors for the defendant company made the follow-
ing Requisition on Title: "Mrs. Gwendoline Kellett
does not appear to have complied with the Name and
Arms Clause of the Deed of December 1933. Accord-
ingly the purported Conveyance by her of one-third of
the property for sale was inoperative, and such one-
third is outstanding in the person next entitled as
tenant in tail male of her'share. A confirming Convey-
ance from him must be procured." The reply was : "No
confirming Conveyance necessary. The Name and
Arms Clause is void for uncertainty." The plaintiffs
then issued a Vendor and Purchaser Summons seeking
a Declaration that all Requisitions had been sufficiently
answered. Since the Irish decision in Re Montgomery
Deed. (1953) and in De Vere Deed. (1961), titles to
property included in the Vernon and other estates have
been accepted on the basis that Names and Arms
clauses are void for uncertainty in Ireland; there were
at least five decisions of the English Chancery Court to
the same effect.
Prima facie
the previous Irish decisions
should be followed, particularly as Dixon J's judgment
in Montgomery Deed, was unanswerable. Vendors claim
that the 78 Requisitions on Title were sufficiently
answered. This claim is too broad, and accordingly a
declaration will be made that the Name and Arms
clause is void for uncertainty. Accordingly the requisi-
tions of the defendants in respect of that clause have
been sufficiently answered by the plaintiffs.
(Kearns and McCarron v. Manresa Estates Ltd. —
Kenny J. — unreported — 25 July 1975.)
Appeal in slander action fails—Farmers in
Dispute
A slander action arising out of remarks alleged to
have been made at public meetings of dairy farmers
and milk producers 1970/71 came before Mr. Justice
Griffin in the High Court on Circuit in Cork.
The case was originally tried in the Cork Circuit
18 months ago, when the plaintiffs, Timothy Mur-
phy, dairy farmer, and his two sons, Cornelius and
Daniel, all of Ballclough, sued Michael Cronin,
Rylane, for £2,000 damages for slander.
The Circuit Court Judge dismissed the claim and
an appeal was lodged against the decision by Cornelius
and Daniel Murphy in the High Court, their father
having died in the meantime.
The remarks which form the subject of the action
were alleged to have been made at meetings attended
by large numbers of dairy farmers and representatives
of the Agricultural Organisational Society held in
Enniskeane on January 8th, 1970 in Coachford on
January 9th, 1970, and in Agha'bullogue on December
23rd, 1971.
The plaintiffs claimed that Michael Cronin, the
defendant, said and repeated at the later meetings that
one producer was completely debarred from taking his
milk to Ballyclough, because he added a certain sub-
stance to his milk and would not give a guarantee
never to do it again.
These words applied to the three plaintiffs and im-
plied that they had acted wrongfully and were fraudul-
ently gaining a reward for themselves. The words were
alleged to be slanderous and to hold the plaintiffs up
to public ridicule and contempt.
In a general denial the defendant pleaded that if the
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