CBA Record July_August 2016

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46 JULY/AUGUST 2016
But the Court in Rodriguez added that,
beyond determining whether to issue a
traffic ticket, a police officer’s mission
during a routine traffic stop includes
“ordinary inquiries incident to the traffic
stop.” And the Court listed several examples
of “ordinary inquiries”: checking the driver’s
license, determining whether the driver has
outstanding warrants, checking the car’s
registration, and making sure the driver has
proof of insurance. The Court justified the
performance of these inquiries on the basis
that the police should be able to ensure that
the person they are encountering is not dan-
gerous or operating the car illegally. In other
words, an officer’s interest in safely perform-
ing the traffic stop allows them to perform
these inquiries. With respect to the specific
case before the Court, however, the Court
held that the officer unreasonably prolonged
the stop because performing a dog sniff went
beyond “the officer’s traffic mission.”
People v. Cummings, 2016 IL 115769
(Cummings II)
The State appealed the Illinois Supreme
Court’s decision in Cummings I to the
U.S. Supreme Court, where it remained
pending during the Court’s consideration
of Rodriguez. After deciding Rodriguez, the
Court remanded to the Illinois Supreme
Court to reconsider Cummings 1 in light
of Rodriguez .
On remand, Cummings noted that
Rodriguez only authorized “ordinary inqui-
ries” during a traffic stop. And, Cummings
argued, the officer was not conducting an
“ordinary inquiry” when he asked for Cum-
mings’ license because the officer did not
pull Cummings over for a traffic violation.
In other words, because this was not an ordi-
nary traffic stop, the “ordinary inquiries” of
an ordinary traffic stop—such as checking
to see if the driver had a license—would
not apply. Cummings argued that, once the
officer saw that he was not Chattic, there
were no inquiries left to be made as a part
of the stop, since the officer’s only reason
for pulling over the van was that he believed
Chattic was the driver.
The Illinois Supreme Court disagreed,
citing Rodriguez’s express reference to
a driver’s license check as an “ordinary
inquiry” of a stop. And, the court stated,
such an inquiry cannot unreasonably pro-
long a stop because the inquiry is automati-
cally part of the mission of any traffic stop.
That is so even if, as in Cummings’ case,
the police did not pull over the driver for a
traffic offense. The court determined that a
police officer’s interest in safety during the
traffic stop justified the check for a driver’s
license even though the officer’s reasonable
suspicion “vanished upon seeing” Cum-
mings.
Applying Rodriguez and Cummings II
Understanding the contours of Cummings
II and Rodriguez requires an examination
of the possible situations in which they
would apply. The first example arises when
an officer pulls over a driver for some kind
of traffic violation (e.g., speeding, failure to
signal when changing lanes, etc.). During
the stop, the officer can take the time to
write a ticket and to perform the “ordinary
inquiries” listed in Rodriguez—check the
driver’s registration, proof of insurance, driv-
er’s license, and any outstanding warrants.
It is important to note that, during the
time the officer needs to issue the ticket and
conduct the “ordinary inquiries,” he or she
may also investigate other matters, even if
they have nothing to do with the original
reason for the traffic stop. For example,
if two police officers conducted the stop