75 / 462
g a z e t t e
m a r c h '1991
Mr Justice Frank Griffin
- a Retrospect
Mr. Justice Frank Griffin retired as a judge of the Supreme Court
on 12 March, 1991, on attaining the retiring age of 72, after
eighteen years of illustrious service on our highest court.
Frank Griffin was called to the Bar in Trinity term 1946 and to
the Inner Bar in Hilary term, 1961. On 9 October, 1971, he was
appointed to the High Court and on 3 January, 1973, to the
Supreme Court. While on the High Court he was the first presiding
judge in the re-established Special Criminal Court.
When a barrister is appointed to writer has never known Griffin, J. to
be a judge of the High Court or
Supreme Court generally his
working pattern has been formed,
the discipline to which he has sub-
jected himself professionally has
become a habit, his prejudices, if
any, have become established and
his fairness or otherwise is part of
his personality. Frank Griffin's
practice at the Bar was impressive
in volume and extensive in variety.
Where required, his research of the
law was thorough and accurate. He
was gifted with an exceptionally
good memory for facts and people.
He was a skilful advocate and his
overall performance was tempered
by commonsense.
In 1971, when Frank Griffin
believed that he was about to be
confronted with making a choice
between accepting an appointment
to the High Court bench or con-
tinuing his practice, he discussed
his problem wi th a number of his
colleagues. The problem, as he saw
it, was that the professional de-
mands on his time were so heavy
that he thought that if he went on
the bench, he would have more
time to devote to family life. He
made his choice, but he never got
the leisure for which he had hoped.
His period as a High Court judge
was a turbulent period in the
Special Criminal Court which in-
volved a good deal of stress and
strain and, I believe, even a demon-
stration outside his own home.
Many people do not appreciate
the volume of work, ever in-
creasing, thrown on a judge of the
Supreme Court. A judge has to
have the energy and capacity to
draw from the transcript and
ac company i ng do c umen ts a
picture of the case and the issues
involved. Mr. Justice Griffin, in spite
of some vicissitudes of health, had
and has, tremendous energy and
capacity for attention to detail. The
be wrong in any detail in the tran-
script and papers which he had to
read and there have been many
cases in which the volume of papers
lodged in the Supreme Court for
reading by the judges would have to
be seen to be believed.
Every judge of the Supreme
Court is independent in the exercise
of his functions, and is free to
express his personal opinion on
matters of law and fact arising in
the course of a case. It is not
infrequent that judges, for the time
being forming the Court, differ in
their attitudes to issues of law and
fact in a particular case. In a final
court of appeal it is probably helpful
that a problem is looked at from
several angles.
It would be impossible within the
scope of this article to attempt to
make a full assessment of the role
played by Mr. Justice Griffin in the
Supreme Court during his eighteen
years of service. All one can do is
to present the broad picture, as
subjectively viewed by the writer.
During his time on the Supreme
Court, Mr. Justice Griffin served
with three Chief Justices. It is
interesting to recall that Mr. Justice
William O'B. Fitzgerald was ap-
pointed Chief Justice on the same
date as Frank Griffin was appointed
a judge of the Supreme Court.
When Chief Justice Fitzgerald died
in October 1974, he was succeed-
ed by Chief Justice Thomas F.
O'Higgins who resigned in January,
1985 in order to serve as the Irish
Judge on the EC Court and was
succeeded by the present Chief
Justice, Thomas A. Finlay.
From the very beginning Mr.
Justice Griffin's judgments were
independent, balanced, dealing with
the facts accurately, clearly and
fairly, and showing excellent and
lucid research when reciting from
prior precedent. Like virtually all
judges, he had sympathy for the
weak and poor, for the individual
against the powerful corporation but
his sense of fairness and common-
sense prevented him from allowing
sympathy to lead to injustice.
Whereas at times his judgment
simply consisted of concurring with
one or more of his colleagues in
most cases he delivered an inde-
pendent judgment setting out his
own reasons. It is my perception that
in most cases his judgments coin-
cided in their conclusion with that of
the majority of the Court.
As an illustration, I would refer to
one of his early j udgmen ts
delivered in 1974, in
McNamara, an
infant -v- Electricity Supply Board,
[1975], I.R. 1. The plaintiff, an
11-year old boy living in a housing
estate in Limerick City, close to an
ESB sub - s t a t i on wh i ch was
surrounded by a chain-link wire
fence w i th numerous warning
notices, having got over the fence
on to a flat roof came in contact
with a conductor carrying 10,000
volts causing him very serious
injuries including amputation of
part of the right arm and part of the
left arm. The issue was the
obligation, if any, of an occupier
t owa r ds a trespasser, if the
occupier had reason to believe that
trespass was occu r r i ng. The
judgment of Mr. Justice Griffin is a
model of a study of changes in the
law, how they came about, and the
necessity to adjust to modern
conditions. In the course of his
judgment he said: —
"If, by reason of its rigidity or
harshness, a rule is found to be
unsatisfactory it is undesirable
that efforts to circumvent it
should be made rather than it
should be reconsidered. This has
been done in recent years in
regard to the rule in
Addie's Case".
He also said: —
"Purtill's case
was criticised by
counsel for the defendants on
the basis that it was breaking
new ground and that the notion
of proximity was being intro-
duced for the first time in that
case. However, this is not so, as
it is to be found in
Heaven -v-
Pender
....
so t ha t, like
55