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In evidence before the Committee, the sales

manager said that the offer to pay stamp duty if the

purchaser instructed the company's solicitors had

not been put to the solicitors, but was made in an

attempt to encourage the purchaser to instruct these

solicitors so that matters would be expedited.

In November, 1955, the sales manager wrote to the

solicitors stating that the purchaser desired them to

act for and " in these circumstances we shall pay

the stamp duty ". When the completion statement

was submitted it showed the costs as

-£2.1

i8s., and

no sum was included for stamp duty.

In March, 1956, another proposed purchaser was

informed by employees of the company that, if he

instructed the solicitors, he would effect a saving in

his legal costs and the company would pay his

stamp duty.

After some correspondence, this purchaser wrote

to the solicitors saying, "I understand .

.

. that if I

instructed you to act for me there would be a saving

of £25 in stamp duty and £10 for conveyance fees ",

and asking exactly how much he would have to

pay for these items.

The solicitors' reply stated : " on the question of

expenses our clients inform us that they are willing

to pay the stamp duty if the transaction is carried

through by us. In these circumstances, also, your

fees payable to us will be approximately £30 ".

The Committee in their Findings stated that " it

can hardly be doubted that an offer on the part of

the vendor that he will pay the stamp duty for the

purchaser if he instructs a particular solicitor in the

transaction is calculated to attract business unfairly

to that solicitor ", and they ordered that a fine be

imposed upon the partners of the firm concerned.

Solicitors' clerk disqualified under act of

1956

for

1953

offence.

The Divisional Court (The Lord Chief Justice,

Mr. Justice Barry and Mr. Justice Havers) dismissed

an appeal by an unadmitted solicitor's clerk againt

an order of the Disciplinary Committee of the Law

Society made on zoth September, 1957, directing

that no solicitor should in connexion with his

practice take or retain the appellant into or in his

employment or remunerate him without the written

permission of the Law Society. The order was made

under section 16 (i) of the Solicitors Act, 1941, as

amended by section n (i) of the Solicitors

(Amendment) Act, 1956, in respect of an offence

in 1953.

The Lord Chief Justice, giving the reserved

judgment of the Court, said that, by the Act of 1941,

where a solicitor's clerk had been convicted of any

criminal offence in respect of property of the solicitor

by whom he was employed or any client of that

solicitor an application for an order such as was

made in this case might be made. The amending

Act of 1956 allowed the Society to apply for an

order where a clerk had been convicted of any offence

in respect of any property, irrespective of whether

it belonged to his employer or one of his clients.

This applicant was convicted of larceny in 1953 of

property which belonged neither to his employer

nor to a client of his, and he accordingly contended

that to apply the provisions of the Act of 1956 to a

person convicted before that Act came into operation

would be to make its operation retrospective.

It was stated in Maxwell on the Interpretation

of Statutes that it was a fundamental rule of English

law that no statute should be constructed to have a

retrospective operation unless such a construction

appeared very clearly in the terms of the Act or arose

by a necessary or distinct implication; and

that

passage had been approved by the Court of Appeal.

But, in their Lordships' opinion, this Act was not

in truth retrospective. It enabled an order to be made

disqualifying a person from acting as a solicitor's

clerk in the future, and what happened in the past

was the cause or reason for the making of the order

but the order had no retrospective effect. It would

be retrospective if the Act provided that anything

done before the Act came into force or before the

order was made should be void or voidable, or if

a penalty were inflicted for having acted in this or

any other capacity before the Act came into force

or before the order was made. This Act simply

enabled a disqualification to be imposed for the

future which in no way affected anything done by

the appellant in the past. Accordingly, in their

Lordships' opinion, the Law Society had jurisdiction

to make the order complained of.

The appeal was

dismissed.

(In re a Solicitor's Clerk (1957) i W.L.R. 1219 ;

01 (X 957) 3 A11 E- R- 6l 7-)

Circumstances when an unsuccessful plaintiff in an action

to revoke probate is entitled to costs out of his estate.

O'Daly, J., held that an unsuccessful plaintiff, the

testator's brother in a jury action to revoke probate,

on the ground that the testator was mentally un

stable, is nevertheless entitled to his costs out of

the estate when the necessity for bringing the action

is occasioned by the testator's mental condition;

this is so, even where the plaintiff had previously

accepted a share of the estate under a partial intestacy

(i.e., moneys on deposit receipt) under the will, the

grant of probate of which is sought to be revoked.

Per O'Daly, J.—The plaintiff's revocation suit,

tried before a jury, concluded with a verdict in

favour of the defendant-executor. The defendant,

through his counsel, thereupon applied to have the

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