38
The Gazette of the incorporated Law Society of ireiahd.
[AUGUST, 1911
>
me in pursuance of the judgment therein pro
nounced in Court on March 7, 1911 ;
entered in .
office March 22, 1911.
(2)
I refer to the said objection dated May 9,
1911, and the letter of the plaintiff's solicitor dated
May 10, 1911, requiring my report on objection.
(3) Objection to No. 82 of the plaintiff's costs.
This item—amount, ^10 2s.—is claimed for the
travelling expenses of Doctor Gatchell as a witness
from London to Sligo, /7 14s., and fees for four days
at
£2
2s.—£8 8s. On hearing of the objection, the
affidavits of the plaintiff's solicitor, filed April 29,
1911, and May 5, 1911, and the affidavit of one of
the solicitors for the defendant, filed April 29, 1911,
were read, as also the several exhibits therein
referred to. Order XXXII., rule 4, was also cited
on behalf of the defendant.
In the circumstances
of the case I formed the opinion that as against the
defendant the plaintiff was not entitled to any of
the expenses
in question, and, accordingly,
I
overruled the objection.
Dodd, J., in giving judgment, said :—My
difficulty in deciding the point is greatly
increased by the fact that both solicitors
were so eminently reasonable. They seem
to me to have conducted this case in a way
that deserves encomium from a Judge. The
plaintiff's solicitor was not seeking in any
way to increase the costs, and the solicitors
for the defendant were not in any way
interested in embarrassing their adversary.
This case illustrates the old rule that if a
party is going to admit any fact he ought to
admit it fully and frankly, and without any
reserve whatever.
If it had been conceded
that this was only a question of damages,
the position might have been different.
There is a question of principle involved.
The admission of fact that the death of the
plaintiff's husband was caused by the act
of the defendant would not in the circum
stances have warranted any counsel at the
bar in dispensing with the presence of the
doctor.
I
quite
sympathise with
the
difficulties of the Taxing Masters when they
say they are confronted with an array of
witnesses, making every possible addition to
the costs. The question of damages depended
upon the view that the jury might take of
the action of the doctor who had attended
the deceased. One doctor took a trivial view
of the injury, and said that if he had treated
the deceased the man would not have died.
And I have never heard that in such a case
a medical witness who actually treated the
patient ought not to be produced. Here a
good deal naturally turned upon the treat
ment that the deceased had received, and
upon his condition when he was first profes
sionally attended to.
Evidence was given
on behalf of the defendant that another
doctor in the like circumstances would have
acted differently.
For
this
reason
the
question of the amount of damages largely,
if not wholly, depended upon the opinion
the jury formed of the nature and character
of the medical attention that the deceased
had in fact received at the hands of Dr.
Gatchell. This was not a class of case where
the evidence of Dr. Gatchell could properly
have been taken on commission.
I know the
outcry that would be raised if such an order
had been made. The discretion of the Taxing
Master does not extend so far as to enable
him to disallow the costs of the main witness
in the case, and the sum disallowed should
properly have been allowed.
I am far from
deciding that the Taxing Master should have
exclusive regard to everything said in every
senior counsel's direction of proofs.
Dr.
Gatchell's evidence could not have been
presented to the jury on paper.
It was upon
his evidence that the damages were given.
Without it the damages would not have been
given.
In sending the case back to the
Taxing Master, as I do, I direct him that
the principle he should adopt in the taxation
of the costs is that while he is riot to have
exclusive regard to counsel's directions of
proofs, it is not within his right to disallow
the costs of the main witness upon whose
evidence the entire of the case depended.
(Reported
I.L.T.R.,
Vol. xlv., page 203.)
Finance (1909-10) Act, 1910.
THK following appeared in the Parliamentary
Papers of 28th July :—
Q.
Sir John Lonsdale.
—To ask Mr. Chan
cellor of the Exchequer, if the benefits of
sub-section 2 of Section 61 of The Finance
(1909-10) Act,
1910; only apply
to
the
property of a deceased person where a fixed
duty is payable and where the gross assets
do not exceed £500.
[27th July,
1911.]
A.
Mr. Hobhouse.—
The Answer is in the
affirmative, for the reason that, in other
than fixed-duty cases, the duty, under the
provisions of The Finance Act, 1894, is only
I
chargeable upon the net value of the pro-
i
perty after deduction of the charges or
i
liabilities referred to in the sub-section in
I
question.
[27th July,
1911.J




