them as executor jointly with his co-defendants.
A solicitor connotes a client and a man cannot be
solicitor for himself. The Court further expressed
the view that even if the mortgagee had survived,
or if the solicitor defendant has not been one of his
executors, his lien would have been lost by reason
of his having acted in the capacity of solicitor for
both mortgagor and mortgagee, even though the
title deeds never left his office.
The solicitor defendant appealed against the order
of the High Court. The Court of Appeal took the
view that the application by the solicitor to the
High Court for an order declaring him entitled to
a retaining lien had been premature and that the
Trial Judge should have refused to hear it in the
form and at the time it was brought before him.
The time when the question of a solicitor's lien
should be decided is in the light of the facts existing
when the moment comes for delivery of the deeds,
and any application for a declaratory order before
that time is misconceived.
In the result, the solici–
tor's application was dismissed and the order of the
Trial Judge was discharged
leaving
it for the
parties to make any further application they thought
advisable at
the appropriate
time. The Court
of Appeal did not express any views on the reasons
given by the Trial Judge for refusing the declaratory
order sought by the solicitor and although the order
of the High Court was discharged, the reasons for
the judgment of that Court will, no doubt, command
respect on the position as it affects solicitors.
In the case of Jordan
v.
Limmer and Trinidad
Lake Asphalt Company and others (62 T.L.R. 302)
an interesting point was raised in connection with
the quantum of damages in an action for damages
for personal injuries. No question was raised on
the issue of liability. The plaintiff in his claim
for damages included as one of the items of special
damage thirty-two weeks' wages at £11
IDS. 6d.
per week. The plaintiff was liable to income tax
which, in accordance with the Income Tax regula–
tions in England, was deducted weekly from his
wages, so that the actual sum receivable per week by
the plaintiff on foot of wages and which he would
have continued to receive had he not suffered the
injuries the subject of the action, would have been
a net sum less than £11 los. 6d. per week.
It was
contended on behalf of the defendants that the
Court in awarding the special damages should take
into account the income tax deducted, and that if
the Court acted on any other basis of calculation
the plaintiff would be awarded for'special damages a
sum exceeding his actual loss as the result of the
accident. It was decided in the case of Fairholme
v.
Thomas Firth and Brown Ltd. (49 T.L.R. 470)
that such a contention could not be upheld in the
circumstances which existed before the introduction
of the " pay as you earn " income tax regulations:
In that case a plaintiff sued for wrongfal dis.nissa
and was awarded £18,000 dr.mg;s, cilcul.uad on
his annual salary. The amount of the inco-ne tix
thereon was ascertainable and the defendants claimed
to be entitled to deduct it. The Court in that cise
held that in assessing damiges as between mister
and servant regard should not be taken of the
servant's liability to the Crown which was
res inter
alias acta.
In Jordan's case the High Court, following
the decision in Fairholme
v.
Thomas Firth and
John Brown, Limited, held that the position was not
altered by the " pay as you earn " regulations and
that the only matter which the Court should consider
was the contract of employment which existed at
the time of the accident, irrespective of the liability
of the plaintiff to income tax. Atkinson, J. held
that he was not called upon to decide whether or
not the plaintiff could be assessed to income tax
in respect of the gross sum included in the damages
awarded on foot of the loss of earnings; that if the
Revenue took the view that it could not be assessed,
or if they claimed to make an assessment and failed
in their claim, so much the better for the plaintiff.
In Cumberland Consolidated Holdings Limited
v
Ireland (62 T.L.R. 215) a question arose which
may sometimes cause trouble between vendor and
purchaser after the completion of the sale of premises
under a contract for sale with vacant possession.
The plaintiff-purchasers and the defendant-vendor
made a contract for the sale with vacant possession
of certain premises. The contract contained
inter
alia
conditions that the plaintiffs were to be deemed
to buy with full notice of the actual state and
condition of the property and should take it as it
was. The premises consisted of a warehouse and
yard, the buildings on which had suffered as the
result of fire, and also cellars underneath
the
buildings. At the time of the signing of the con–
tract the cellars to a large extent were filled with
rubbish consisting of bags of cement and empty
drums, all of which were valueless. After the
completion of the sale the plaintiffs, on finding
that the rubbish had not been removed, called
upon the defendant to remove it and on his failure
to do so removed it themselves and brought an
action in the County Court to recover the cost of
the
removal.
The County Court Judge gave
judgment
for
the plaintiffs and
the defendant
appealed to the High Court. The main argument
for the defendant was that the plaintiffs having
inspected the premises before signing the contract
must accept possession of them as they stood and
that the covenant to give vacant possession was
complied with by handing over the keys, and by
the fact that neither the vendor nor any other person
was thereafter in a position to set up any right of