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unknown in the law. In
Director of Public
Prosecutions
v Doot
(1973) A.C., the accused, who were American
citizens, planned to import cannabis into the USA by
way of England. One of the vans containing the drug
was found in Southampton and another in Liverpool.
The defence to the charge of conspiracy to import drugs
was that the conspiracy had been effected abroad; this
succeeded in the Court of Appeal but failed in the
House of Lords. In
Palmer v the Queen
(1971) A.C.,
the defence of self-defence in a murder affray which
succeeded recently in the Dwyer case in Ireland, did
not commend itself to the Privy Council.
In
R. v Hyam
(1974) 2 W.L.R., Diana Hyam was an
alleged lover of Jones, who heard that Jones intended to
go on holidays with another woman. Hyam was furious,
went to Jones's house, poured petrol through the letter
box and pushed the newspaper in; she then lit the paper
and caused a fierce fire. She left without raising the
alarm. Two girls who were in the house with their
mother were killed; Hyam's defence was that she merely
intended to frighten the woman. She had also ascer-
tained that at the time Jones was in his own home and
could not come to any harm. Hyam was convicted of
murder which the House of Lords sustained by a 3-2
majority; however, the dissenting view of Lord Diplock
that the decision in
D.P.P. v Smith
(1961) A.C., upon
which the majority relied, was wrong insofar as it
rejected the submission that, in order to amount to the
crime of murder, the offender, if he did not intend to
kill, must have intended or foreseen as a likely conse-
quence of his act that human life would be endangered,
must command respect. In
R. v Lamb
(1967), 2 Q.B.,
the accused pointed in fun a revolver at a friend, but
fired a bullet accidentally, killing the friend. The
accused, having been convicted of manslaughter ap-
pealed and the accused was duly acquitted, on the
ground that his case had not been properly put to the
jury. In
R. v Duffy
(1967) I Q.B., Lillian Duffy went to
the aid of her twin sister, Kathleen, who had been
fighting with a Pakistani. Both girls were convicted of
unlawful wounding, but on appeal, Lillian was acquit-
ted, as her case had not been properly put to the jury.
This summary will show that the learned authors
have dealt most effectively:: with the most up-to-date
cases.
Zander (Michael)—Cases and Materials on the English
Legal System. 8vo; xxvi plus 484 pp.; index (double
column), pp. 477-484; London : Weidenfeld and Nicol-
son, 1973; Series : "Law in Context"; paperback, £2.95.
Mr. Zander will be well-known to members as the
Legal Correspondent of
The Guardian
and as author of
Lawyers and the Public Interest,
but the fact that he is
also a Reader in Law in the London School of Econ-
omics is perhaps not so evident. This book contains a
most useful mine of information on the English legal
system. In discussing the role of the Courts and Tribu-
nals, the reorganisation of the Courts carried on as a
result of the Beeching Report is fully considered; Lord
Gardiner's speech in introducing the Family Division
into the High Court in 1970 is given in full, as is an
excerpt from Abel-Smith and Stevens on the proper role
of the Courts and Tribunals from "In Search of Justice".
With regard to pre-trial civil proceedings, Sir Thomas
Lund is quoted as stating that it is permissible for the
solicitor for either party in civil or criminal proceedings
to interview or take a statement from any witness; the
views of the English Law Society opposing assessors of
claims and contingency fees are fully given, and Master
Jacob is fully quoted on "The present importance of
pleadings" as expressed in Current Legal Problems,
1960, and Master Diamond on "The Summons for
Directions" as expounded in the
Law Quarterly
Review,
1959. JUSTICE in its Report on the Trial of Motor
Accident Cases, 1966, emphasises that counsel's brief fee
becomes payable upon delivery of briefs, and is still
payable subsequently, even though the case is settled.
As regards pre-trial criminal proceedings, Lord Parker
stressed in
Rice v Connolly
(1966 ) 3 W.L.R., that there
was all the difference in the world between telling a
false story—something which a citizen has no right to
do—and preserving silence or refusing to answer—
something they have every right to do. The Judge's
Rules of 1964 are then cited in full. Lord Devlin, in
"Too High a Price for Conviction" in the
Sunday
Times
of 2 July 1972 has rightly emphasised that the proposals
of the English Criminal Law Revision Committee of
1972 are primarily designed to help the police to secure
convictions; this is followed by Professor Cross's out-
standing article on "The Right to Silence and the
Presumption of Innocence" extracted from the 1970
volume of the
Journal
of the Society
of Public
Teachers
of Law.
John Lambert in "The Police
Can Choose" has indicated that the policeman
has at no time been simply a law enforcement
officer, but has discretion to prosecute. But JUSTICE
in its Report on "The Prosecution Process in England
and Wales" (1970), states that "the honest, zealous and
conscientious police officer, who has satisfied himself
that the suspect is guilty becomes psychologically com-
mitted to successful prosecution. The dominance of the
police on the English prosecution process undoubtedly
exposes them to grievous temptations." Clive Davies
emphasises that at any given time a tenth of the prison
population is composed of untried or unsentenced pris-
oners. The English Law Society in its Annual Report
1965-66, on Pre-Trial Discovery, has emphasised the
difficulties which are put in the way of defence counsel
by the police.
To lawyers, English Co. Courts are the acme of infor-
mality, while to the layman, they are surrounded by a
bewildering maze of rules and practices; this the Con-
sumer Council in a lengthy report has termed "Justice
out of Reach". Judge Jerome Frank considers that trial
court fact-finding is the toughest part of the judicial
function, not the elaboration of legal principles. On
the Continent, emphasis is rightly placed on written
evidence; there is no sanctity in oral evidence as in
England.
However, as Gerald Coplan points out in "The
Judicial Discretion to disallow admissible Evidence",
there are many cases when Judges are cussed and have
with malice aforethought refused to exercise their dis-
cretion to exclude evidence, although it was obtained
in circumstances unfair to the accused. For instance in
R. v Maqsud Ali
(1966) 1 Q.B., an English Court had
the temerity to allow evidence of a conversation
between two men which had been recorded without
their knowledge, where neither of the men were
charged.
It has been strangely stated that, unless there is a
statutory obligation to do so, there is no duty ot state
reasons for judicial or administrative decisions; prima
facie
there appears to be an implied duty, particularly
in respect of the Superior Courts.
256