110 / 266
The workman had died in January 1952 as the
result o f an accident in the Erne Development
Scheme, Ballyshannon. The widow obtained an
Irish grant o f administration of his estate, but did
not apply for an English grant. In June 1952, when
instituting proceedings in England, the indorse
ment of the writ stated that her claim was as
“ administratrix o f the estate ” o f her husband.
The defendants thereupon issued a summons asking
that the writ and all subsequent proceedings be set
aside on the ground that the plaintiff had no title
to administer in England.
It was held—That even if it were legitimate to
read the writ and the statement o f claim together,
the effect o f those documents so read was that the
plaintiff was purporting to sue in a representative
capacity as administratrix o f her husband’s estate ;
and therefore the plaintiff had no title to sue and the
writ must be set aside.
Per Singleton, L.J .—Had I been untrammelled by
authority I might well have reached the conclusion
that it matters not to the defendants in which capacity
the plaintiff sues, and no injustice would be done if
this were regarded as an action by a widow, and the
question of administration were not considered.
These technicalities are a blot on the administration
o f the law, and everyone except the successful party
dislikes them. They decrease in numbers as the
years go and I wish that I could see a way round
this one. I do not know why the. Fatal Accidents
Act 1846 contained a provision that the action
must be brought within a year o f the death. There
is no such limiting period in the case of an injury,
however serious.
Per Jenkins L .J. I agree with regret that there
is no alternative but to dismiss the appeal.
Per Morris L .J.—Much as I regret the conclusion
which we have reached, I consider that this appeal
must be dismissed.
(Finnegan
v.
Cementation Co. Ltd., (1953), 1,
All E. R. 1130).
Legality o f delegation o f powers by statutory
tribunal.
Can the power of suspension conferred by Statute on a
local Dock Labour Board be properly delegated and
exercised by a Port Manager
?
No, said the Court of Appeal (Singleton, Denning
and Romer L .JJ.).
This power was a judicial
or quasi-judicial function and the local Board, whose
constitution was provided for, by statutory order,
had no power to delegate it, or subsequently to
ratify a decision by a person to whom the power
o f suspension had been improperly delegated and
therefore the suspension o f the plaintiff workmen
for refusing to unload a ship by the port manager
was a nullity. The Court had power in their
discretion to make a declaration relating to the
decision o f the validity o f a statutory tribunal; and
in the circumstances would grant the plaintiffs a
declaration that their suspension was wrong and a
nullity.
Per Denning L .J.—It was suggested that the action
of the local Board in suspending a man was merely
an administrative function and not a judicial one,
and was similar in character to the action o f an
employer in dismissing him. I do not accept that
view. Under the Order of 1947, so far from the
Board being in the position o f an employer, the
Board are put in a judicial position between the
men and the employers. While an administrative
function can often be delegated a judicial function
rarely can be. No judicial tribunal can delegate
its functions, unless expressly enabled to do so.
It was suggested that it would be impracticable for
the Board to sit as a Board to decide all these cases,
but I see nothing impracticable in that.
I do not doubt that there is power for the Courts
to intervene, not only by certiorari, but also by
way o f declaration. I know o f no limit to the
power o f the Court to grant a declaration, except
such limit as it may, in its discretion, impose upon
itself, and the Court should not I think tie its hands
in this matter o f statutory tribunals. It is axiom
atic that when a statutory tribunal sits to administer
justice, it must act in accordance with the law
Parliament clearly so intended. Why then should
not the Court intervene by declaration and injunc
tion ? I f it cannot so intervene, it would mean that
the tribunal could disregard the law. (Barnard
v.
National Dock Labour Board—(1953) 1. A ll E .R .
1113 .)
Fatal Accidents Acts—Payment into Court
Practice
In an action under the Patal Accidents Acts, i f the
defendantspay
£1,879 l8> °-
^nto
Court with an admis
sion of liability, and i f theplaintiff, refusing to accept this
sum, proceeds to trial, and is awarded
£1,860
damages, is
this a case in which the trial Judge was entitled to award the
costs of the action to the plaintiff under the Pules of Court
whereby the costs in every action, question, and issue tried
by a jury shall follow the event, unless fo r special cause
shown and mentioned in the order that the judge shall
otherwise directi
No, said the Court of Appeal (Porter and Black
L .JJ ., Sheil J.,) reversing Lord McDermott C.J.,
because the “ question ” tried by the jury was the
sufficiency o f the lodgment in Court, notwithstand
ing that the fact and the amount o f lodgment could
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