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THE STATE OF PLAY AND FUTURE OF SERVICES NEGOTIATIONS IN THE WTO
revised the existing GPA, expanded its scope and took into account evolutions in
government procurement. It adopts a horizontal approach and applies to goods, services
or a combination thereof, in the context of government procurement. It remains
to be seen whether the revised GPA will better succeed at reaching its goals than its
predecessor and how it will reflect on GATS negotiations on procurement. The current
EU proposal on GATS procurement disciplines seems to have been dismissed and as
stated, suggestions for future action are only aimed at identification and measurement
of government procurement.
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It can be argued that the conclusion of the revised GPA,
which addresses the sense of urgency felt by the acceding Members and reflects the lack
of understanding on the multilateral level, means GATS disciplines on government
procurement are still far away. Moreover, such GATS negotiations may become even
less attractive if more large economies, such as China or Russia, accede to the GPA.
2.2.3 Subsidies
Article XV, the only GATS provision that explicitly deals with subsidies, states
that ‘in certain circumstances, subsidies may have distortive effects on trade in
services. Members shall enter into negotiations with a view to developing the
necessary multilateral disciplines’. Hence, GATS currently treats subsidies as any other
measure. However, most Members have scheduled exemptions and limitations for
subsidies.
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Additionally, Article XV states that the negotiations should also address the
appropriateness of countervailing procedures.
Considering the importance of subsidies as a policy instrument, it is not
surprising that negotiations on subsidies disciplines in GATS have been slacking.
In practice, Members are partaking in discussions that amount to (i) agreeing on
a GATS definition for subsidy, (ii) investigating which subsidies distort trade, and
(iii) how to identify, measure and, where necessary, discipline such subsidies. If all
this would amount to the conclusion that the trade restrictive outcomes of subsidies
in trade are relatively weak, further negotiations might not even be worth the while.
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The latest WPGR Annual Reports echo these concerns: some Members argue that no
negotiations should be conducted before evidence of trade distortion is found, others
prefer starting negotiations.
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Members only agree on the fact that more and better
information on the trade restrictive effects of subsidies is necessary.
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However, in
practice Members are unwilling to provide such information.
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Lastly, there have not
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S/WPGR/22, Annual Report of the Working Party on GATS Rules to the Council for Trade in Services
(Adopted 10 November 2011) 6.
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Sauvé 326.
46
Gauthier, O’Brien and Spencer 183.
47
S/WPGR/22, Annual Report of the Working Party on GATS Rules to the Council for Trade in Services
(Adopted 10 November 2011) 8; S/WPGR/23, Annual Report of the Working Party on GATS Rules
to the Council for Trade in Services (Adopted 29 November 2012) 4.
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S/WPGR/22, Annual Report of the Working Party on GATS Rules to the Council for Trade in Services
(Adopted 10 November 2011) 8.
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Jara and Domínguez 118.