33 / 338
Provision is made in section 23 widening the
power which a housing authority has to close any
part of a house
let
for human habitation so as to
bring within this power any part of a house
used
for human habitation, whether or not the occupation
is a letting.
The term " market value " as defined by section
32
(b)
of the Housing Act 1950 is extended to mean
that in the case of a house not occupied for the first
time the amount, which, in the opinion of the
local authority, the house if sold in the open market
might reasonably be expected to realise, together
with so much, if any, of the
amount
of the
legal
and
other expenses incidental to the acquisition of the
ownership of the house, as the local authority may
consider proper (section 30).
DECISIONS OF PROFESSIONAL
INTEREST
Practice Note. Costs of Pleadings in High Court.
In Gregory
v.
Minister for Finance, a High Court
jury action heard in Hilary Term, 1958, the jury
found for the plaintiff, but awarded only £350
damages, the injuries which the plaintiff had sus–
tained having turned out to be considerably less
serious than was expected when proceedings were
instituted. The trial Judge (Murnaghan J.) did not
grant a special certificate for costs under s. 12 (i)
of the Courts of Justice Act, 1936. Counsel for the
plaintiff applied
ex parte
to his Lordship for a special
certificate for the costs of instructions for pleadings,
and of the plenary summons, statement of claim
and reply, such costs to be taxed on the Circuit
Court scale. Murnaghan J., after observing that,
without such a certificate, all the plaintiff's solicitor
could recover were the costs of a Circuit Court
Civil bill and of instructions therefor, granted the
plaintiff the special certificate sought, limited to the
plenary summons and the statement of claim and
the costs of instructions therefor.
(92 I.L.T. & S.J. 183.)
Contents of 'Land Commission JLeport must be disclosed
to the objector n>ho must be given an opportunity
of refuting it.
When hearing an objection to which s. 32, sub-s. 3
of the Land Act, 1933, applies it was held by the
Supreme Court (Maguire C. J., Lavery, Kingsmill
Moore, and O'Daly J. J.) that the Lay Commissioners
may not determine any question raised
in
the
objection on information contained in a report
from an official of the Land Commission, when the
contents of the report are not disclosed to the
objector and when he has not had the opportunity
of refuting the contents of the report.
Kingsmill Moore J., in his judgment stated that
he agreed that the determination of the Lay Com–
missioners could not stand and that the appeal must
be allowed.
In his opinion, objections must be
heard upon oral evidence given before the Com–
missioners, or, in case leave were given to use an
affidavit, with a right reserved to the objector to
require the attendance for cross-examination of
any person who had made an affidavit.
It was not
open
to
the Commissioners
to determine any
question raised in an objection on information
contained in a report which was not disclosed to
the objector and which he had no opportunity of
refuting. Any matters which had or might have
any bearing on the questions at issue or which
might influence the decision of the Commissioners
must be brought before them in open court so
that the objector might know of them, might
be able to test them on cross-examination, and might
meet them, if he thought fit, by evidence given
in support of his objection.
(Re Roscrea Meat Products Ltd. 92 I.L.T.R.
100).
Meaning of " without prejudice " in letter.
On the night of 3151 December, 1954, and ist
January, 1955, the plaintiff was injured whilst in
the defendants' employment. She elected to sue the
defendants in negligence in the High Court and the
jury having disagreed was discharged without a
verdict. The defendant company appealed to the
Supreme Court on the ground that there was no
evidence of negligence to go to the jury and the
jury should have been directed to find for the
defendants at the close of the plaintiff's case. The
appeal of the defendants was allowed with costs.
The plaintiff thereupon asked the Supreme Court
under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1934,
section 60 to have compensation assessed under
that Act by the Supreme Court under sub-section (3)
or to have the question of assessment remitted to
the Circuit Court under sub-section (4)
thereof.
The defendant company objected on the ground
that the plaintiff's action for negligence had not been
instituted until more than six months had elapsed
from the date of the accident.
It was held by the Supreme Court that the mere
existence of two letters marked " without prejudice "
passing some ten weeks before the termination of the
six months period without any other evidence of
negotiations for a settlement was not sufficient to
raise the presumption that those letters were con–
cerned with an attempt at settlement, and even if
they were, it would not be proper to conclude that
such attempts persisted
to a date so near the
expiration of the six months as to provide reasonable