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GAZE1TE
DECEMBER1977
Resident Executive on the 9
March, 1977, when he was suspended
with pay, and at a meeting of the
Executive Council on the 11
March, 1977, when he was removed
from Office.
Hamilton J. stated that it was well
established that the essential
requirements of Natural Justice at
least included that before someone
was condemned he should have an
opportunity of defending himself and
that in order that he may do so that
he should be made aware of the
charges or allegations or suggestions
which he had to meet; this was
something which was basic to our
system.
Hamilton J. was of opinion that on
the balance of probabilities the
defendant had opened the copy letter
of the 4 Marclq 1977, delivered to
his office and that glancing through it
he did not appreciate that it was
intended by the Resident Executive to
consider the question of his
suspension and removal from office if
he failed to answer the charges
contained therein. This was
supported by the fact that the letter
did not in any way indicate to the
defendant that if he failed to attend
the meeting to which he had been
summoned to answer the charges he
would there and then be suspended.
The letter also summoned the
defendant to attend a specially
convened meeting of the Executive
Council on the 11 March, 1977, at
the Union office but again there was
no indication that his removal from
office was to be considered. The
General President of the Union was
made aware of an entry in the
defendant's working diary indicating
that he was on holiday and no further
effort was made to ascertain whether
or not the defendant was on holiday
and would thus not be in a position to
attend the meetings of the Resident
Executive and the Executive Council.
Hamilton J.
held
that the
resolution of the Executive Council of
the plaintiff Union removing the
defendant from office was null and
void and he made declarations in
accordance with Nos. 1, and 2, of the
defendant's Counterclaim but limited
damages to the l oss of the
defendant's salary.
National Engineering and Electrical
Trade Union, and Eustace Connolly,
Joseph Carter and Sylvester Sheridan
(Trustees) v. Kevin M. P. McConnell
—The High Court—Judgment of
Hamilton J.—Unreported—20 June,
1977.
INJUNCTION—DISMISSAL OF
PROBATIONER GARDA
Supreme Court uphold an Appeal
against an Order of the High Court
condemning the plaintiff's dismissal
from Ms post as probationer Garda.
Plaintiff was dismissed from his post
as probationer Garda shortly before
his two-year probation period had
expired under Regulation 9 of the
Garda Siochana (Appointments)
Regulations 1945. Under these
R e g u l a t i o ns
the
Ga r da
Commissioner had considered that
the plaintiff "is not likely to become
an efficient and well-conducted
Guard." He had formed this opinion
after reading the plaintiff's dossier.
This dossier contained several reports
critical of the plaintiff. One report
disclosed an abnormally high number
of absences through illness. Another
report stated that the plaintiff
required adequate supervision on
duty and went on to cast suspicion on
his amount of sick-leave. A third
report stated that he was inclined to
be lazy and criticized his standard of
discipline. Finally, the Garda
Surgeon reported that his sick record
was excessive and that he had a
"frivolous and immature attitude to
his job."
Held.
The test by which this case was
to be decided was whether the
material in the dossier was capable of
supporting the Commissioner's
opinion. The Commissioner was not
required to reach his opinion on the
basis of a personal interview.
Furthermore, the Court could not
reject his opinion just because it
would have reached a contrary
opinion. In this case, there was ample
evidence in the dossier to support the
opinion of the Commissioner. His
order effectively terminated the
plaintiffs service as a Garda. The
appeal against the order of the High
Court should, therefore, be allowed.^
Brendan Mary Hynes v. Edmund P.
Garvey, per Henchy J.—Supreme
Court (per Henchy J. with Griffin and
Parke JJ.)—unreported—19 July,
1977.
PLANNING ACTS
Whether powers of Compulsory
Acquisition vested In Planning
Authority by Local Government
(Planning & Development) Act,
1963.
The defendant County Council
required 1 rood and 24 perches of
sea shore at Spiddal, Co. Galway,
and made a Compulsory Purchase
Order under "Section 76 of and the
Third Schedule to the Housing Act,
1966, as extended by Section 10 of
the Local Government (No. 2) Act,
1960, as substituted by Section 86 of
the Housing Act, 1966, and Section
77 of the Local Government
(Planning & Development) Act,
1963". The plaintiff objected to the
making of the Order, which was sent
to the Minister for Local Government
for confirmation. The Minister's
officials tried to persuade the plaintiff
to sell voluntarily, but failed. A public
inquiry was then held and the
Compulsory Purchase Order was
subsequently confirmed. The plaintiff
brought proceedings to have the
Compulsory Purchase Order quashed
on the grounds that the defendant
County Council had no power to
acquire lands compulsorily for the
purposes of development or the
provision of amenities. The
defendants disclaimed any reliance on
Section 10 of the Local Government
(Ireland) Act, 1898 (which Section
inter alia
gives a County Council
power to compulsorily acquire land
for the purpose of their powers and
duties).
Held
Section 10 of the Local
Government (No. 2) Act, 1960,
applied the procedure under the
Housing Act, 1966, to acquisitions
on land and other Acts, when those
Acts authorised the Local Authority
to acquire lands compulsorily. It is
not permissible to imply that a power
of compulsory acquisition has been
created, because a power to develop
has been conferred on a Local
Authority. As Section 10 of the 1898
Act was not referred to in the Order
it cannot be invoked to justify it. The
Local Government (Planning &
Development) Act, 1963, does not
confer any power to authorise a
Planning Authority to acquire land
compulsorily for the purposes of that
Act.
Movie News Limited v. Galway
County Council-The High Court
— J ud gme nt
of
Ke n ny
J.—unreported—30 March, 1973.
An appeal in this case was dismissed
on procedural grounds by the
Supreme Court on the 15 July, 1977.
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