GAZETTE
sep
T
em
BER 1986
(Inspector of Taxes)
-v-
Belvedere Estates*
1
At first
instance, the Appeal Commissioners had rejected the
Furniss-
type argument that they should ignore various
inter company transactions, and held that the
transactions were real transactions. In the High Court
the taxpayer company argued that the scheme was
effective since it involved real transactions creating legal
rights, and was within the literal wording of section
18(2)(B). However, Carroll J. pushed this argument to
its logical conclusion and looked at the actual
consequences of the scheme
48
:
"It is not possible to ignore the conveyancing
implications of the transaction. The taxpayer
cannot in one breath say that these are real
transactions creating legal rights and obligations
between the parties, and then claim that which was
in fact accomplished, must be ignored. Even
though in tax law artificial methods of valuation
are adopted, the tax code must nevertheless be
interpreted in the general legal context of the time
it is applied. The ordinary legal consequences of
the parties' acts must, in the absence of specific
statutory provisions to the contrary, be given full
effect."
She therefore held the scheme to have been
ineffective.
49
(C) Technical Arguments
The courts also seem content to strike down tax
avoidance arrangements on a technical basis rather than
resorting to the
Furniss
principle. Thus in the case of
Revenue Commissioners
-v-
T.F.Q.R. and I. McG.
(the
'Club 349' case)
50
the two taxpayers, a Solicitor and an
Accountant set up a club to fund their skiing and other
leisure activities, and lent the club £30,000. They
claimed that interest earned by the club on the money
lent was not liable to tax within section 349, Income Tax
Act, 1967, arguing that the club was a body of persons
established for the sole purpose of promoting athletic or
amateur games or sports within the section. The
Revenue Commissioners contended,
inter alia,
that two
persons did not constitute a 'body of persons' as
defined in section 1(1), ITA, 1967
51
and that the club
had not been established for the sole purpose of pro-
moting sport but also and mainly for the avoidance of
tax. It was not argued that the arrangement was a
"sham"
52
or was within the
Furniss
principle. In the
High Court, McWilliam J. held that two persons could
not constitute a "body of persons", and this was upheld
on appeal to the Supreme Court. Henchy J. said that
"Body" was a collective noun connoting an appreciable
number of persons, and not merely two, united by some
common tie.
53
Griffin J. said
54
"In the construction of a statute it is to be
assumed that words and phrases are used in their
ordinary and natural meaning, unless that is at
variance with the intention of the legislature, to be
collected from the statute itself, or leads to any
manifest absurdity or repugnance."
(D) Transactions not in the ordinary course of trade
The Irish Courts have also considered the application
of principles used in
pte-Ramsay
English decisions to
strike down tax avoidance arrangements.
In
McCarthaigh
(Inspector of Taxes)
-v-
Daly (the
Metropole case)
55
O'Hanlon J. upheld the effectiveness
of limited partnerships for tax purposes. In that case, a
limited partnership was formed to borrow funds from a
hotel company to purchase plant which was leased to
the hotel company qt a nominal rent. The partnership
claimed accelerated capital allowances in the first year
of trading, and the individual partners claimed to offset
the excess allowances against their personal income. The
Inspector of Taxes contended
inter alia,
that the scheme
was
56
:
"merely a colourable transaction advised for the
purpose of securing tax benefits to the partici-
pants and for no other purpose; that it did not
involve the carrying on of any trade or business in
the true sense of the term."
This argument was based on the principles expounded
in the U.K. cases of
Petrotim Securities
-v-
Ay res,
Sharkey
-v-
Wernher
and
Lupton
-v-
A.B.
Ltd.
51
O'Hanlon J. concluded that the arrangement was not
"so obviously devoid of commercial characteristics" as
to bring it within the
Petrotim
case. He said
58
:
"The scheme was not of such an extreme
character as to convince me that it should be
regarded as having no commercial reality, and I
think it may fairly be regarded as a trading
transaction which qualifies for the tax relief
claimed by the taxpayer."
The Judge felt that the arrangement was a real
business transaction. However, he was not prepared to
accept the taxpayer's argument that a trading loss may
be deliberately contrived solely for the purpose of
obtaining relief against taxation.
A similar approach was adopted by Carroll J. in the
High Court in the case of
Bellville Holdings Ltd.
-v-
Cronin (Inspector of Taxes)
59
In that case, an
investment holding company had charged its
management expenses to its subsidiaries up to the
accounts period ended 31 October, 1978. However, in
the next two accounting periods the company did not
charge its subsidiaries and incurred losses of about
£285,000 as a result. Two subsidiaries paid up
dividends, and the holding company claimed to treat the
dividends as taxable income for the purposes of
offsetting the dividend against the losses and reclaiming
the tax credit thereon. Neither subsidiary had paid
Corporation Tax due to group relief, and Advance
Corporation Tax was not payable at the time.
The Irish Appeal Commissioner held, following
Petrotim
, that the transaction was so outside the
ordinary course of business that it was not done in the
course of trade, and decided that notional management
fees equivalent to the market value of the services
should be taken into the computation. The company
appealed, claiming that
Petrotim
did not apply and that
226