GAZETTE
DECEMBER 1995
Admission of Proof of Computer-
Generated Evidence
by Caroline Fennell*
Recent developments in information
technology have posed a major
challenge to the rules of evidence.
These rules and precepts, it is often
alleged, are very much the child of a
different era, and can only with grave
difficulty, if at all, accommodate the
more modern manifestations of
information. One might think of the
information revolution and its
accommodation by the rules of
evidence in terms of a legal dinosaur
struggling to come to terms with
complex changes in the environment
in which it operates. Moreover for
many lawyers the difficulty is twofold,
having themselves to come to terms
with what the actual changes
themselves comprise. What this paper
proposes to do, is to examine the more
obvious and likely areas of impact for
the trial system and its future
operation, of challenges from the
world of informatics, to how we
conduct legal business.
1. Modern Developments in the
Provision and Form of Evidence:
An Account of Historical
Developments and their
Accommodation.
In considering the admissibility of
computer generated evidence in court,
it is useful to look at the area of law
most analogous to computer, or
machine generated evidence as it
might be termed, which is that of
documentary evidence.
It is pertinent
to recall that the admissibility of
documentary evidence has itself made
the transition from 'documents' which
were chiselled in stone or metal to the
written word with which we are now
familiar. Many documents to-day may
of course themselves be computer
generated, though that may not be
evident on their face.
Photographs, tape recordings, and
videos have all been considered to be
documents for the purposes of
i
determining their admissibility in
! evidence at trial. Inscriptions on tomb
stones have been held to be
documents. The definition of
'document' therefore is somewhat
expansive although it has been
described for the purposes of
admission as being that of an object on
which is inscribed a visible writing,
the meaning of which is in issue.
Caroline Fennell
In
R vDaye\
Darling J. defined a
document in the following terms:
. . . Any written thing capable of being
evidence is properly described as a
document and . . . It is immaterial on
what the writing may be inscribed. It
might be inscribed on paper, as is the
common case now; but the common
case once was that it was not on
paper, but on parchment; and long
before that it was on stone, marble,
clay, and it might be, and often was,
on metal.
Nowadays it would be reasonable to
assume that the words bear a
somewhat wider meaning. To-
day's equivalent of paper is often a
disc, tape or film and conveys
information by symbols, diagrams
and pictures as well as by words
and numbers.
2. Rules of Evidence and the
Accommodation of Computer
Generated Evidence.
Computer-generated evidence may be
treated as either real or hearsay
evidence. In
R v Wood (1982f
it was
held that a computer print-out is an
item of real evidence and not hearsay if
the computer in question is used as a
calculator, a tool which does not
contribute its own knowledge but
merely does calculations which can be
performed manually. Nyssens
3
comments that if it is hearsay, the
evidence should be subject to the
normal rules affecting hearsay
evidence. However, some evidence
which has been electronic in source,
process and result, with
no
human
intervention in the process may be
considered real evidence, and
presumed reliable. In both cases,
however, Nyssens emphasises it is
important to establish that the
computer was functioning properly, or
that the document was unaffected by
any malfunction.
It is useful to consider the approach of
the English courts to this issue in a
number of recent decisions. Although
it is not always entirely clear whether
the evidence is being admitted as a
statutory exception to the hearsay rule,
or as real evidence, the approach to
computer generated evidence
generally, and the difficulties posed by
its classification and assessment are
hallmarks for future implementation of
Irish law.
In
R
v
Neville
4
the admissibility of a
computer print-out-microfiche of a
telephone bill was in issue. The mobile
telephone was hired from Talkland, a
subsidiary company of ICL. A different
company Racal, carried out the
telephone operations. The Racal
computer automatically recorded the
date, time and duration of each call and
sent the details to Talkland whose
computer in turn produced an itemised
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