Previous Page  347 / 424 Next Page
Information
Show Menu
Previous Page 347 / 424 Next Page
Page Background

GAZETTE

j Society, deepen (in a metaphorical

I sense) the fading letters on the

J

tombstones of Irish legal history so that

facets of the history of Irish law and its

legal system are presented to new

generations.

j

Professor Brand describes the fortunes

j of the judicial bench in the medieval

| Irish lordship. Judge Hart presents a

j portrait of King's sergeants at law in

Ireland over the centuries and

considers the many facets of the life of

Audley Mervyn

who was elevated to

i the rank of prime sergeant in 1660. Dr.

Colum Kenny

writes on the history of

the Four Courts up to 1796, almost a

period of two centuries and also

contributes a paper with the title "Irish

! ambition and English preference:

chancery appointments, the fate of

| William Conygham Plunkett

". Mr.

Sellar analyses marriage, divorce and

the forbidden degrees, canon law and

| Scots law.

Professor Osborough and The Legal

History Society must be commended.

There is intrinsic merit in studying

legal history for its own sake, but

paraphrasing another, legal historians

in illuminating the past, illuminate the

present, and in illuminating the

present, assist in illuminating the

future.

Dr Eamonn G Hall

| Cr imi nal Evidence

By Richard May. Published by

Sweet and Maxwell, London. Third

edition, 1995; hardback: £58.00 stg.

New editions of this book are

appearing at intervals of just over four

years. Phipson remains the standard

work on the law of evidence. As with

all the other volumes in the Common

Law Series these are not produced with

a degree of frequency that makes them

readily useful. The problem with this

book is a National one. It relates more

j

to the diligence of the parliament of the

United Kingdom in reviewing their

I existing law for the purpose of

| changing it than with the similar

I

enthusiasm displayed in this

1

jurisdiction: that.does not exist.

The Constitution has had the most far

reaching effect on the law of evidence

in this country. Those aspects of the

common law which it has touched

remain the areas which are vital for

day-to-day criminal litigation. Many of

the rules of the common law might be

j regarded as suspect viewed from the

j scope of a broad constitutional

I principle that the purpose of the courts

j is to administer justice. What "justice"

I is has depended to a large extent on

interpretation of the notion of what

might fairly be regarded as a proper

1 and logical exercise of the right of

! access to the courts. With one

í exception that movement has all been

! in favour of the accused. The reason

S for this is that the prosecution were

debarred from appealing rulings in

criminal cases save in the exceptionally

limited circumstance of an appeal from

the Central Criminal Court to the

Supreme Court, now abolished (for

| whatever reason) by the Criminal

Justice Act, 1993. In

The People (DPP)

I v

JT

a mother was mistakenly called on

j

the prosecution of her husband for

! incest against their daughter. The facts

she gave were hardly critical to the

course of the hearing since they

consisted merely of a recitation of the

date of birth of the child and its

patrimony. The accused, however,

representing himself, and in an excess

of enthusiasm, cross-examined his wife

about a number of matters including

their prior sexual history receiving an

answer as to its similarity to the

allegation now made by her daughter.

Under the rules of common law a

| spouse could not be called against the

; other save in circumstances where that

act of violence had been directed

against the spouse, and not against her

children. The Court of Criminal Appeal

overturned that rule of common law in

favour of a more logical interpretation

whereby the right of access to the court

implied within it the right to defend

and vindicate one's constitutional

rights by giving relevant evidence. It

would have been interesting to note

what the Supreme Court might have

made of an appeal, subsequently

withdrawn, whereby the full rigors of

the hearsay rule were to be subjected to

a simple test of logic. Since, for

example, a Bonded Warehouse was

' under the control of the Revenue

Commissioners it would be

inappropriate to apply the full silliness

of the House of Lords ruling in Myers

(1964) whereby evidence of stock

could only be given if all of the stock

j

takers were called as to their personal

I scrutiny of the contents of the

warehouse. That situation was

i

overtaken by the Criminal Justice

: (Evidence) Act, 1992 and what remains

a principle will probably now lie

j

dormant in the light of further statutory

j

reforms. The big issue in Irish criminal

litigation is the admissibility of

I evidence. In regard to this work it is

well that we note that:

1. The Judges Rules of 1918 remain in

force in this jurisdiction. They were

subsequently heavily amended in

the United Kingdom and were then

replaced in total by the Police and

Criminal Evidence Act, 1984 and,

in that form, do not even merit a

mention in this work.

2. The right to silence, such as it is,

remains a rule of the common law

which continues in force in this

jurisdiction. The only change made

is contained in sections 15, 16, 18

and 19 of the Criminal Justice Act,

1984. The first two sections make it

an offence to withhold information

regarding a firearm that is in the

possession of a person or stolen

j

property in the possession of a

|

person. The sections which allow

I

Í

inferences to be drawn from the

|

failure of an accused person to

|

account for objects or marks found

on him and for his presence in a

!

particular place are cast in such

:

I

obscure language that they remain

11 years after the passing of the Act

virtually unexplained to any jury.

Provisions along the line of those

requiring a person to account for his

movements under the Offences

|

Against the State Act, 1939

continue to have a certain internal

logic but every other attempt at

I

cutting down the right to silence has

I

been, whether fortunately or not,

j

given to us in incomprehensible

form. In the United Kingdom the

j

Criminal Justice and Public Order

j

Act, 1994 makes substantial

modifications of the right of silence.

Similarly the procedure at fraud

trials has been substantially

323