280 / 364
Comment :
The fact that the direction given
by the Judge in his summing up was correct seems
to establish that the evidence was that W.
in
jured I. with a broken glass or that he did not
injure him at all. But decisions of fact are for
the jury and, however overwhelming the evidence
that a glass was used,
the Court of Criminal
Appeal could hardly do other than proceed on
the assumption that it was not used when some,
at least, of the jury may have returned their
verdict on the assumption that the damage was
caused by a fist.
Indeed, it might have been
argued that, since the jury—or some of them—
may have founded their verdict on a fact of
which there was no evidence, the conviction could
not stand at all. Perhaps, however, it is not true
to say that there was no evidence of injury by a
fist, the jury being entitled to infer this fact from
the nature of the injuries.
(R.
v.
Weston, Grim.
L.R.
(1966) p. 512-513).
Proceedings against Receiver
A company was formed to take over the assets
and business of a company of insurance brokers,
and shares in the new company were issued to the
directors of the old company. Subsequently, by
an order of the Court, by consent a motion by,
inter alia,
the old company, a receiver and man
ager of the old company's business was appointed.
Receipts by him totalling some £7,800 he de
scribed as premiums received on behalf of the
new company which he has paid over to that
company. The old
company
challenged
the
propriety of
that payment and
issued a writ
against the new company.
On a motion by the old company for,
inter
alia,
leave to proceed against the receiver fcr
recovery of the £7,800, notwithstanding that the
old company was a party to his appointment.
Held, that a person at whose instance a re
ceiver had been appointed could, provide that
the leave of the Court was obtained bring an
action against the receiver; and that, the best
course of disposing of the present issue involving
the receiver being for it to be tried by action,
leave would be given to join the receiver as party
to the action.
(L.P. Arthur (Insurance) Ltd. (in Liquidation)
v Sisson and Others (1966)
1 W.L.R. p. 1384).
Picketing Crime — Obstruction of Police
The Trade Disputes Act 1906, s.2, authorises
attendance at or near a place where a person
works if the purpose is merely for the purpose
of peacefully obtaining or communication inform
ation or of peacefully persuading any person to
work or absta'in from working. Accordingly,
if
the object of pickets is
in part to seal off the
01!
highway and to cause vehicles approaching the
premises to stop, they are doing something beyond
what is authorised by s.2 of the 1906 Act, and
the offence of obstructing a police constable in
the execution of his duty is committed if they
refuse to desist at the constable's request.
(Tynan v. Balmer (1966) 2 W.L.R. 1181; (1966)
2 All E.R. 133).
Costs
The plaintiff was deprived of part of his costs
under r.7 of the Supreme Court Costs Rules,
1959, where the defendant was willing to settle
the case but the plaintiff's solicitors would not
deliver the medical report until just before the
trial. Disclosure at an earlier stage would not
have harmed the plaintiff in any way. Lyell T-
emphasised that he decided the case entirely on
its facts. (Vose v Barr (1966) 2 All E.R. 226).
Company Law :
Extension of time for Registration
of Charge
Where there is evidence that an equitable charge
has been created by a company, the Court has
power, under s.101, Companies Act 1948,
to
extend the time for registration of the charge if
satisfied,
inter alia,
that the omission to register
was due to inadvertence. His Lordship could not
see what possible explanation there could have
been for not registering the charge in this case
except inadvertence and therefore expressed him
self as satisfied on this point and exercised his
discretion
to extend
the
time for registration,
despite the fact that an action was proceeding in
which the validity of the charge was in
issue.
The risk of injustice to the company alleged to
have created the charge by allowing registration
was far less
than the risk of injustice to
the
chargee by refusing to do so.
(Re Heathstar Properties, Ltd. (No. 2)
(1966)
1 All E.R. 1000).
Section 106 of the Companies Act, 1963
in
Ireland corresponds with the provisions of section
101 of the Companies Act, 1948 of England.
Planning Permission Ultra Vires
Even assuming that the planning permission
granted by a local authority to build a school is
ultra vires,
the owners and occupiers of adjoining
houses are not entitled to a declaration that per
mission is
ultra vires.
The plaintiffs have no legal
rights as against the trustees who are erecting the
school, and they cannot interfere by maintaining
that a valid permission must be obtained from
the local planning authority before
the school
.can be built.
(Gregory and Another v London Borough of
Gamden (1966) 1 W.L.R. 899; (1966) 2 All E.R.
196).