The Need for Organisational Resilience Chapter 5

Germans quickly routed Schmidt. The proceeded towards Kommerscheidt, but were stopped by

recently arrived Sherman tanks and fighter bombers that used a favourable weather window.

What appeared to be a successful operation, turned out to be a nightmare. Schmidt had been

recaptured by the Germans, the 109 th failed to take Hürtgen, the 110 th to achieve their objectives.

Some battalions virtually ceased to exist, others not battle worthy because of casualties, fatigue and

lack of reinforcements and supply.

On November 5 th , Cota assembled a rag-tag force to get it through the Kall trail, to resume their

attack on Schmidt. German units, hovewer, infiltrated this narrow gorge of the Kall stream, inflicting

serious casualties and interrupting this vital supply line.

November 6 th saw Cota leaving his command post and visiting the Vossenack-Kommerscheidt-

Schmidt battle line. He was seen to be appalled the see the conditions his troops were in, and the

terrain of the Kall trail – constantly harassed by the Germans – that made a resumption of offensive

actions so hazardous.

But again, the German took the initiative and attacked Kommerscheidt again. Storming into that

picturesque village, they inflicted heavy casualties on the depleted remains. The Americans withdrew

their forces through the Kall trail, which was under constant pressure by the Germans, inflicting heavy

casualties on the engineer units attempting to maintain this vital and only supply route.

Any hopes to get on the offensive and re-capture Schmidt turned into a hopeless undertaking.

The 28 th division was an empty shell. In the early hours of November 8 th , Cota was greeted in his

command post by General Eisenhower and General Bradely. Eisenhower was aware of the disaster

that unfolded and greeted Cota with Well Dutch, it looks like you’ve got a bloody nose.

The action for the 28 th division was over, although the killing continued in the Hürtgen forest,

turning it into a killing field without precedence in WWI for the U.S. army. The 28 th Infantry division

alone suffered 6,184 casualties, a 40% casualty rate.

After the disastrous days in November 1944, the V Corps conducted an analysis into the attacks

on Vossenack, Kommerscheidt and Schmidt. The weather was poorly that prevented effective close

air support, and hampered operational movement of armoured vehicles. Second, the reliance on a

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