PJC Business

PJC 102.1

DTPA/I NSURANCE C ODE

reaffirmed that “only producing cause must be shown.” Transcontinental Insurance Co. v. Crump , 330 S.W.3d 211, 223 (Tex. 2010) (quoting Prudential Insurance Co. of America v. Jefferson Associates, Ltd. , 896 S.W.2d 156, 161 (Tex. 1995)). In Ledesma , the supreme court explained that, “[t]o say that a producing cause is ‘an efficient, exciting, or contributing cause that, in a natural sequence, produces the incident in question’ is incomplete and, more importantly, provides little concrete guidance ... [and] little practical help” to modern jurors. Ledesma , 242 S.W.3d at 46. The supreme court subsequently clarified Ledesma in Transcontinental Insurance Co. , wherein it reasoned that, although “the use of the ‘efficient, exciting, or contributing cause’ lan guage” to define producing cause “is not, in itself, error,” the supreme court believes “those terms ought not to be used to define producing cause in the future.” Transconti nental Insurance Co. , 330 S.W.3d at 223–24 & n.12. Broad-form submission. PJC 102.1 is a broad-form question designed to be accompanied by one or more appropriate instructions. Tex. R. Civ. P. 277 requires that “the court shall, whenever feasible, submit the cause upon broad-form questions.” Tex. R. Civ. P. 277; see Thota v. Young , 366 S.W.3d 678, 689 (Tex. 2012) (rule 277’s use of “whenever feasible” mandates broad-form submission in any or every instance in which it is capable of being accomplished). In Crown Life Insurance Co. v. Casteel , the supreme court reviewed a charge that included five DTPA “laundry-list” theories of liability incorporated into a single question submitting an article 21.21 claim. Crown Life Insurance Co. v. Casteel , 22 S.W.3d 378, 386–88 (Tex. 2000). The supreme court held that it was error to submit four of the five DTPA-based theories of liability because Casteel did not possess the requisite consumer status to maintain an article 21.21 claim. Casteel , 22 S.W.3d at 388. Most importantly, the supreme court decided that this error should be presumed to be harmful when a single broad-form lia bility question commingles valid and invalid theories of liability such that it cannot be determined whether the improperly submitted theories formed the sole basis for the jury’s finding. Casteel , 22 S.W.3d at 388–89. For further discussion, see PJC 116.2 regarding broad-form issues and the Casteel doctrine. Knowing or intentional conduct. If the defendant is found to have knowingly or intentionally engaged in any false, misleading, or deceptive conduct, the DTPA pro vides for additional damages. DTPA § 17.50(b)(1). See PJC 102.21 for a question on knowing or intentional conduct and PJC 115.11 for a question on additional damages. Vicarious liability. If the issue is the vicarious liability of one for another’s con duct, see Celtic Life Insurance Co. v. Coats , 885 S.W.2d 96, 98–99 (Tex. 1994) (dis cussing principal’s liability for acts of agent within the actual or apparent scope of the agent’s authority in DTPA and Insurance Code case) and Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. Wilson , 768 S.W.2d 755, 759 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 1988, writ denied) (citing Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Love , 121 S.W.2d 986, 990 (Tex. 1938)) (company liable for unreasonable collection efforts of outside attorneys com mitted for the purpose of accomplishing the mission entrusted to the attorneys).

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