tion. Was it each of the markets in metal cans for meat
products, for fish products and in metal caps? Or was
it the whole of the market in metal packaging? Are
those markets subject to competition from glass or
plastic products? On these various points the Court
points out uncertainties, and indeed contradictions, in
the decision, and annuls it on that ground.
THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS
IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES
by PIERRE PESCATORE, Judge of the European Community Court
(Reprinted by kind permission of the Editors of the '
Messrs Sweet and Maxwell)
This document has two objects : to give information on
the state of the problem of protecting basic human
rights in the European Community; and to show in
terms of methods used that it is possible to ensure
appropriate protection by judicial means, even in the
absence of any previous "declaration of rights".*
At first sight it might be doubted whether there is any
relationship at all between Community Law and the
problem of protecting basic rights. It is in fact difficult
to imagine how the functioning of a body whose object
is essentially economic and social can conflict with
human rights. No doubt such considerations explain
why the creators of the Community included no clause
in the Treaties of Paris and Rome dealing with the
protection of these rights.
In fact, it must be conceded that the way the Com-
munity works cannot raise the acute problems that arise
in the case of a State in certain ages and under certain
regimes. How could it be thought that bodies essentially
confined to the economic and social fields might en-
croach on values such as respect for human life,
personal liberty, freedom of conscience, freedom of
opinion and of political action which lie at the root of
concern for the protection of basic rights against the
State?
However, further consideration is necessary. The
functioning of a power-machine such as the Com-
munity, which takes real political action in its own
field and which in so doing legislates and takes de-
cisions, can raise problems concerning basic rights.
These broadly refer to that body of prerogatives usually
called "economic and social rights", representing such
benefits as freedom of movement, freedom to trade,
occupational freedom and the guarantees given to
private property. All these benefits are, admittedly, less
basic than those connected with the most intimate
sphere of the individual in his relations with political
society, but it is nonetheless the case that in a developed
society such as Western Europe they need to be defined
in terms of their relationship to the general interest
and, once defined, to be suitably protected.
1. First Contacts with the Problem of Protecting Basic
Rights
(1) The problem of basic rights arose for the first
time
in the case law
of the Court of Justice and this is
a very typical way : to evade the provisions made by the
Community authorities, some litigants invoked the
guarantees given by their national constitutions.
Thus, in the
Stork
case, settled by judgment dated
4 February 1959,
1
the applicant company, who con-
'Common Market Law Review" and of the publishers,
sidered its interests to be affected by a reorganizational
measure imposed on the Ruhr coal-mining industry by
the High Authority of the ECSC, had pleaded an alleged
violation of Articles 2 and 12 of the German Basic
Law concerning, respectively, the free development of
the individual and occupational freedom. However, the
Court rejected this argument saying that the Community
institutions had only to observe Community Law and
it was not for them to decide on rules of internal law,
including constitutional law.
An identical problem arose in the
Ruhrkohlen-
Verkaufsgesellschaft
case, settled by judgment dated
8 July 1960.
2
Here, also, the applicant firms contested
a commercial regulation imposed by the High Authority
on the Ruhrkohlen-Verkaufsgesellschaft, this time in-
voking Article 14 of the German Basic Law relating to
legal guarantees of private property.
The Court reacted in the same way as in the preced-
ing case, saying that it was not for the Court, as judge
of the legality of the decisions taken by the High
Authority, to ensure respect for internal law, even con-
stitutional law, in force in one or other of the member
States; the Court could therefore neither interpret nor
apply Article 14 of the German Basic Law when exam-
ining the legality of a decision taken by the High
Authority.
In the
Sgarlata
case, settled by judgment dated 1
April 1965,
3
dealing with an objection raised by a
group of Italian citrus-fruit growers to the validity of
a Community agricultural regulation, the applicants
contested the finding of inadmissibility of their action
(in fact the EEC Treaty excludes in principle indivi-
dual actions against regulations), invoking the "basic
principles governing all member countries". Here again
the Court avoided going into the merits of the case and
simply referred to the express provisions of the Treaty.
These judicial decisions, stemming from concern for
the autonomy and primacy of Community Law, were
certainly correct in the sense that the introduction of
appraisal criteria drawn from the constitutional law of
one member State would result in compromising both
the unity and the efficacy of Community Law. At the
same time, these early decisions might seem unsatis-
factory : they reject the argument put forward of an
alleged violation of the standards of the national con-
stitution, but are silent on the question of whether, on
the basis of Community Law, there might be similar
guarantees they ought to take into account. This purely
defensive attitude of the Court might seem to substan-
tiate the idea that Community Law, while tending to
reject the guarantees provided in the national constitu-
116




