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system was contrary to the principles of freedom of
action and disposal, of economic freedom and of pro-
portionality resulting, in its opinion, from Articles 2
and 14 of the German Basic Law. After making several
statements along these lines the court, recognizing that
the disputes against the Community agricultural regula-
tions gave rise to legal uncertainty, decided to submit
the matter to the Community Court by way of a request
for a preliminary ruling.
This submission to the Court provided the oppor-
tunity for it to give an explicit ruling on the matter:
"The uniform effectiveness of Community Law
would be adversely affected if, in decisions on the
validity of any action by the Community institu-
tions, rules or principles of national law were
adduced. The validity of such actions can be
judged only according to Community Law.
Natio-
nal legal provisions, however framed, cannot over-
ride law stemming from the Treaty, and thus flow-
ing from an autonomous source, without disregard
for its character as Community Law and without
the legal basis of the Community itself being called
into question.
Consequently, the validity of such
Community action or its effect in a member State
cannot be called in question by pleading that
there has been infringement either of basic rights
in the form given them by the constitution of that
State, or of principles of the national constitutional
structure.
However, the question arises whether any similar
guarantee inherent in Community Law has been
disregarded.
Respect for basic rights is an integral
part of the general principles of law of which the
Court of Justice ensures observance. Protection of
these rights, although inspired by the constitutional
traditions common to Member States, must be
ensured within the framework of the structure and
objectives of the Community.
Hence, in
the light
of the doubts expressed by the Administrative
Court, it is necessary to consider whether the
deposit system has violated any basic rights whose
observance must be ensured in the Community
legal system."
The way the Court's argument is poised will have
been noted. The first part conforms with the previous
judgments in
Stork,
Ruhrkohlen-Verkaufsgesellschaft
and
Sgarlata
mentioned above : it strongly emphasizes
the autonomy of the Community's legal system and
hence rejects the introduction into Community Law of
all concepts drawn from national constitutional law.
But this attitude is supplemented by a second set of
ideas, and this is new: where a threat to basic rights
has been alleged, the Court declares that it should be
considered whether any guarantee inherent in Com-
munity Law has been disregarded, as respect for basic
rights must be assured within the Community in con-
formity with the constitutional traditions common to
member States. Here, therefore, the Court recognizes
that the Community should consider as its own the
constitutional traditions of member States, and that it
thereby participates in the common concepts of values
—democracy, liberty, respect for the individual—that
underlie the political system of Western Europe. Theor-
etically the idea by which these concepts are introduced
in Community Law is that of "general principles of
law", it being understood that it is for the Court of
Justice to define their actual content.
Conforming to the principles it had just enunciated,
the Court of Justice continued its judgment by making
a close analysis of the disputed farming system, to reach
the conclusion that, on the whole, it is a matter of
ordinary economic discipline aiming to regulate the
Community's external trade with a minimum of restric-
tions. Thus it would appear that, in reality, no basic
prerogative was at issue.
IV. Conclusions and the Tasks Ahead
(1) The novel concept emerging from what has been
said is that it is possible to build up a protective
system of basic rights independent of any "declaration
of ri'ghts". However, such a construction is conceivable
only within the context of a judicial authority solidly
organized, invested with the appropriate judicial
authority solidly organized, invested with the appro-
priate judicial authority and powers. In the Community
everything derives from the basic attribution of powers
to the Court of Justice, expressed in these terms : "The
Court of Justice shall ensure that the law is observed
in the interpretation and implementation of this
Treaty" (Article 164 of the EEC Treaty; similar to
Articles 31, ECSC Treaty and 136, Euratom Treaty).
In this formula, notice the task of ensuring the respect
for law, which harks back to a legal context much
wider than the law written into the treaties and acts of
application.
From the start, the Court has taken a
broad view of its mission, and this is shown particularly
by the frequent recourse to "general principles of law"
and to the concept of "common legal traditions" in
Member States.
It is precisely this that has inspired
the recent decisions on the guarantee of basic rights.
Hence it would appear that as there are no written
provisions concerning the respect for basic rights in the
Community's constitution, this jurisprudential develop-
ment has been made possible thanks only to the institu-
tion of a solidly framed system of legal redress, whose
implementation is in the hands of a judicial institution
invested with adequate powers and minded to make
constructive use of them.
(2) However, it can also be said that this construc-
tion is only in its infancy : an affirmation of principles
in the
Stauder
judgment; a first attempt at applying
them in the
International
Hendelsgesellschaft
judg-
ment, to find that at this juncture the argument of
basic rights had been wrongly invoked. Thus the task
of defining the material content of the guarantees
given to basic rights in the Community system still
remains.
The Court has said that, in this task, it will be
guided by the "traditions common to member States".
In its work of comparing and reconciling, it will be
compelled by force of circumstances to defer every time
to the highest standard of protection, since it is difficult
to see how Community law can maintain its authority
if it fails to reach a level of protection considered
essential in any individual member State. For once, the
method of reconciling and levelling will be in an up-
ward direction, that is to say, towards solutions giving
the best protection to individual rights.
However, these remarks should not in any way be
taken as minimizing the magnitude or the difficulties
of the task, whose course the Court has set in its recent
judgments. Above all, it is to be hoped that the material
provisions of the European Convention for the Protec-
tion of Human Rights may eventually come to be
considered as forming a part of the law common to
member States, for this international instrument ex-
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