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together vertically against the wall of the fitter's shop,
fell outwards, and struck the plaintiff. He was unable
to return to work for twelve months.
(2) After a trial before Butler J., the jury assessed
damages for £8,307 and judgment was given for the
amount against the defendant in July 1970.
(3) The defendants, in appealing, contended :
(1) That the accident could not have been foreseen
by the defendants, and that the case should there-
fore have been withdrawn from the jury.
(2) That the findings of the jury subsequently men-
tioned were without evidence :
(a) That the steel plates were an unusual danger
for the plaintiff, an invitee.
(b) That the defendants should have been aware of
this danger.
(c) That the plaintiff was not guilty of contributory
negligence in allowing the dog to go behind the
plates.
(3) That the judge misdirected the jury in stating that
they could have regard to the fact that the com-
pany's foreman had not considered the steel doors
to be dangerous, and therefore the plaintiff was
entitled to come to the same conclusion.
(4) That the damages awarded are excessive.
There was evidence that the plaintiff and defendant's
staff had passed these steel doors many times previously,
and that they had not been dangerous. The only tech-
nical witness for the defendant was the senior foreman,
who confirmed the steel plates had been in position at
least one year before the accident. He was not respon-
sible for inspecting the plates. The majority of the
Court held that the plaintiff was negligent in allowing
the dog to go behind the plates because, unless some
force was applied to the plates, there was no danger of
their falling outwards. The Judge was not correct in
refusing to withdraw the plaintiff's case from the jury.
The defendants were sued as occupiers of the premises
on which the plaintiff was injured. Accordingly their
duty was to warn the plaintiff of any unusual dangers
known to them. But the intrusion of the dog in knock-
ig down the steel plates was not an unusual danger.
The judge had misdirected himself on this issue.
Accordingly the majority of the Supreme Court
(Fitzgerald and McLoughlin J. J.) allowed the appeal
and dismissed the plaintiff's action. The Chief Justice,
dissenting, would have ordered a new trial.
[Reidy v. Fry-Cadbury Ltd.; Supreme Court; un-
reported; 12th May 1972.]
Is it lawful to impose a sentence of penal servitude
following upon the expiration of a sentence of
imprisonment.
(1) The applicant contends that two sentences of 3
years Penal Servitude imposed on him by the President
in the Central Criminal Court in July, 1970 are un-
lawful because they were to commence from the ex-
piration of a sid months sentence imposed on him at
the same time in respect of a separate offence.
(2) On 12th October 1972, Mumaghan J., directed
the Governor of Portlaoise Prison to certify in writing
the grounds of detention of the applicant.
(3) The applicant was not present at the hearings
before Finlay J . on 23rd and 30th October 1972, when
State Counsel satisfied the Court that, though the six
months sentence had expried, the remaining sentence
was lawful.
(4) It is clear from statutory law, that, if an order
for a substituted sentence of penal servitude is made,
it would not be valid if it were passed prior to the
passing of sentence, but this does not prevent a sentence
of penal servitude from dating in the future, as decided
by
Castro v. R,
6AC. Furthermore Section 20 of the
Criminal Law (Ireland) Act 1828 sanctions this pro-
cedure.
[The State (Jones) v. Governor of Portlaoise Prison;
Finlay J .; unreported; 6th November 1972.]
Dismissal of Busman Violation of Constitutional Rights
The Supreme Court (O'Dalaigh, C.J., Walsh and
Budd, J.J.) held that the dismissal of a Dublin bus
conductor by C.I.E. on October 29, 1960, was a
violation of his constitutional rights.
The Court upheld an appeal by John Meskell,
Crumlin, against an order of Teevan, J., dismissing an
action in which he had sought a declaration that his
dismissal had been effected for the purpose of wrong-
fully coercing him to undertake at all times to be a
member of one of the designated trade unions and was
a denial and violation of and an unlawful interference
with his rights under the Constitution. He had also
claimed damages.
The Supreme Court referred the case back to the
High Court for a trial on the question of damages.
Mr. Justice Walsh, delivering the judgment of the
Court, said that at all times Mr. Meskell had been
a member in good standing of a trade union. When
he joined the company, trade union membership was
not an obligatory term of his employment. He had been
a conductor for 15 years. As from 1958 trade union
membership was made a condition of employment with
the company.
During the following years, complaints were made
by trade unions that some of their members in C.I.E.
had been falling into arrears with union dues and the
other members resented working with them. Mr.
Meskell was one of those who expressed this resent-
ment. Eventually an agreement was reached between
the unions and the company under which all workers
in the particular section—about 3,000—would be dis-
missed and offered new contracts of employment. An
additional condition was that each worker would bind
hmself to be a member of a union.
Mr. Meskell refused to accept this arrangement. All
the employees, with two exceptions, appeared to
accept the arrangement. It appeared that on principle
Mr. Meskell had no intention of signing such a form
under duress. When the matter had been discussed at
a meeting of the Workers' Union of Ireland, a majority
voted in favour of adopting the new procedure, but
Mr. Meskell had abstained on the grounds that the
proposal was a violation of the individual's freedom
of choice.
Conspiracy issue
Mr. Meskell had also sought a declaration that his
dismissal was in pursuance of a conspiracy and a com-
bination between the company, the I.T.G.W.U., the
Workers' Union of Ireland and other bodies for the
purpose of wrongfully coercing him to become a mem-
ber of one of the unions. The company had denied
that his dismissal had been effected for any of the
reasons alleged.
Mr. Justice Walsh held that Mr. Meskell was entitled
to a declaration that his dismissal was a denial and
violation of, and an unlawful interference with his
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