(5) Dr. Helm was of the opinion that accordingly
also licensor and licensee could undertake to refrain
from exporting directly into one another's territory.
The Commission, on the other hand, in its
Davidson
Rubber Co.
decision of 9 June 1972, held the view that
a violation of Art. 85 EEC Treaty obtains, if the Ger-
man, French and Italian licensees of an American
patent owner undertook to refrain from exporting into
one another's territory. The Commission refused to
grant an exemption under Art. 85(3).
II
In the following Dr. Helm dealt with the treatment
of licence agreements under European cartel law :
(1) According to Art. 4(2), No. 2b of Regulation
17, certain licence agreements are exempted from noti-
fication. Such exemption, however, applies to a very
limited number of licence agreements only. For example,
the licence agreement must not contain any restraints
which would bear on the licensor. Since in the Com-
mission's opinion already any exclusive licence contains
a restraint on the licensor, all exclusive licences would,
for instance, be notifiable. In any case of doubt, licence
agreements should be notified to the Commission in
Brussels in order to guarantee the exemption under
Art. 85(3).
(2) Presumably still in 1973 the Commission will
pass a regulation on group exemptions for licence
agreements on patents.
A preliminary announcement was published on
December 24, 1962, in which the Commission listed
numerous clauses regarding patent licences which it
considered unobjectionable, but this announcement is
not binding on the Courts. The Commission itself has
already deviated from it.
(3) Art. 85 EEC Treaty only applies to licence agree-
ments if they may affect perceptibly trade between
Member States and entail a perceptible restraint on
competition. Such constituent elements may be absent
in licence agreements with firms from countries outside
the EEC. This was the case in the Commission's
decision of 9.6.1972
Raymond-Nagoya.
In this case
the German subsidiary of a French company granted
to a Japanese company an exclusive patent licence for
the manufacture in Japan of fastening elements made
of plastic attached to motor cars. This agreement con-
tained several clauses, which—if trade between Member
States had been affected—would have been considered
to be a violation of Art. 85, EEC Treaty. The licence
was an exclusive one, the Japanese enterprise was not
entitled to export the licenced products into the Com-
mon Market, nor was it allowed to challenge the licen-
sed protection rights. The Commission considered the
matter in all its aspects and decided that the agreement
was not against Art. 85, as it did not affect competition
within the Common Market, but only within Japan. A
negative clearance was accordingly granted to this
agreement.
This decision does not necessarily mean that licence
agreements, in which enterprises from third countries
are involved as licensees, are never subject to European
cartel law. If the company concerned had been
Swedish instead of Japanese, it is likely that the decision
would have been different. If, for example, in a licence
agreement, an Irish company prohibits the Swedish
licensee from mnaufacturing and selling competing pro-
ducts, not merely in Sweden, but throughout the Com-
mon Market, it is likely that the Swedish licensee
could successfully challenge the latter clause, as a
violation of Art. 85.
I l l
In the following Dr. Helm spoke about some typical
provision in licence agreements :
(1) If a licensor grants an exclusive licence, he is not
entitled to grant any further licences, nor can he
exercise the patent personally any longer. Still in its
announcement of December 24, 1962, the Commission
was of the opinion that an exclusive licence was un-
objectionable under cartel law aspects. This position
was reconsidered in three recent cases. In the
Burroughs
Delplanque
and the
Burroughs-Geha
cases of 22
December 1971, a Swiss enterprise, which was a sub-
sidiary of the American company, Burroughs, granted
the French firm Delplanque and the German firm Geha
an exclusive manufacturing licence for France and
Germany respectively on a carbon paper product. The
licensees, however, were allowed to sell this product all
over the Common Market—thus the distribution
licence was non-exclusive.
In the
Davidson Rubber
decision of 9 June 1972, an
American company had granted an exclusive licence
for manufacture as well as distribution to a German,
French and Italian company respectively. On the Com-
mission's request the enterprises amended their agree-
ments in a way that any of them was allowed to sell
the licenced products within the entire Common Mar-
ket.
In these cases, the Commission took the view that an
exclusive licence, even if it relates the exclusivity to the
manufacture only, may be subject to Art. 85, because
the licensor was no longer able to conclude licensing
agreements with other interested parties. Dr. Helm
deems this view of the Commission to be wrong; if it
were correct then any purchase agreement would con-
tain a restraint on competition.
However, according to the Commission's view the
exclusive manufacturing licence need not necessarily
violate Art. 85(1). In the
two Burroughs decisions
the
Commission did grant a negative clearance, on the
assumption that the exclusive manufacturing licence
did not come within the European cartel prohibition
because the licensees only had a small market share.
In the
Davidson Rubber case
the Commission esta-
blished a violation of Art. 85(1), because the market
share of the licensees was considerable, but it granted
exemption under Art. 85(3) EEC Treaty for the ex-
clusive licence on the manufacture.
(2) It can be agreed upon in the licence agreement
that the licence terminates prior to the patent. The
licensee can undertake to pay royalties. He can be pro-
hibited from granting sub-licences.
All restrictions of the licensee covering the period
after the expiration of the licensed patents, in parti-
cular the obligation to continue to pay royalties, violate
Art. 85(1).
(3) The Commission declared the following pro-
visions to be unobjectionable :
(a) The obligation to manufacture minimum quanti-
ties of the licensed product.
(b) Payment of a minimum sum for royalties.
(c) The licensee's obligation to observe specific techni-
cal quality standards prescribed by the licensor,
provided they are indispensable.
(d) The obligation to purchase raw materials or ini-
tial products imposed upon the licensee, provided
they are indispensable for a perfect utilization of
the invention.
(4) In contrast to this, the following provisions violate
Art. 85(1):
189




