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reach about 700 million by 2050. The growth of urbanization is

rapid, and concentrated on the coasts and along the few rivers. 1950

Cairo, with an estimated population of 2.5 million, grew into Greater

Cairo, a metropolis of about 18 million people. In the same period,

Istanbul went from one to 14 million. This expanding populace was

bound to test the social system, but regimes were unwilling to take

chances with the private sector, reserving for the state a prominent

place in the economy. That model failed, population grew faster than

the economy, and stress fractures already appeared in the 1970s,

with recurrent riots following IMF adjustment programs and the

emergence of radical Islamist movements. Against a backdrop of mil-

itary coups and social unrest, regimes consolidated their rule by

subsidizing basic commodities, building up patronage networks

(with massive under-employment in a non-productive public sector),

and cementing autocratic practices. Decades of continuity in politi-

cal elites between 1970 and 2010 gave the impression that they had

succeeded. The Arab spring shattered that illusion.

The Arab spring exposed a paradox that the Middle East was

both one, yet also diverse. Arab unity was apparent in the contagion:

societies inspired other societies in a revolutionary wave that

engulfed the region yet remained exclusive to it. The rebellious youth

was the same; it watched the same footage on al Jazeera and turned

to the same online social networks. The claims were the same: less

corruption, less police abuse, better standards of living, and off with

the tyrants. In some cases, the struggle was one: Syria became a

global battlefield, calling young fighters from all around the region

to a common cause. But there were differences in the way states

fared during the Arab spring. Some escaped unscathed; some got by

with a burst of public spending or a sprinkling of democratic

reforms, and others yet collapsed into civil wars. The differential

resilience of the regimes owes to both the strength and cohesiveness

I

NTRODUCTION

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