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ACTION THEORY 779
upon his critique of positivis
Parsons, positivist action theo
able dilemma. Positivism empha
nation of human actions. Ratio
choice of the most efficient means for the attainment of the
end. Consequently positivist action theory cannot provide a
positive account for the determination of ends themselves. The
absence of an autonomous normative factor in the determina-
tion of action limits the positivist framework to only two
options. Either the ends are randomly distributed among the
actors, or the ends are determined by the conditions of the
situation. Utilitarianism follows the thesis of the randomness of
ends, whereas theories emphasizing heredity and environ-
ment reduce ends to the level of conditions. But, Parsons
suggests, both these strategies are unacceptable. The utilitarian
theory of random distribution of ends confronts the Hobbe-
sian problem of order. In other words order is assumed by
utilitarianism to be based upon coercion. Evidently, however,
coercion cannot adequately explain the existence of order in
society. On the other hand, the reduction of ends to the
level of conditions removes any possibility of agency and
freedom for the actors.11
It is partly due to the immanent contradictions of both
positivism and idealism, Parsons claims, that a progressive
movement toward a voluntaristic theory of action can be
witnessed in modern political theory. Marshall, Pareto,
Durkheim, and Weber are representatives of this march
toward voluntarism. According to voluntaristic theory, the
normative selection of ends and means is not a negative or
residual aspect of human actions. On the contrary, individual
ends are primarily based upon a common normative culture
and value system. Consequently ends are not randomly
distributed, but instead are harmoniously defined by a
common cultural consensus. Identity of the interests of
1 ' Ibid., pp. 47-89.
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