268 / 294
(2) The trial of the accused was held in Dublin
Circuit Criminal Court before Judge McGivern in April
1968. He pleaded not guilty to shop-breaking in Pre-
mier Tailors, and to having stolen £250 in cash and
diamond earrings and brooch on 3 /4 December 1967.
(3) The accuscd was in custody at Store Street
Station on 9tii January 1968, in connection with other
matters, when Detective Inspector Lalor said to the
accused : "What about Premier Tailors? I believe you
did it". The accused replied : "We did it, and we got
£225 in an envelope in the safe". The Inspector then
cautioned the accused, and asked him to make a state-
ment, which the accused refused to do. The admissions
of the accused were repeated in more detail to Sergeant
Ryan two hours later.
(4) Judge McGivern held that all the evidence in
paragraph 3 was inadmissable as this was not a volun-
tary confession as there appeared to be evidence by the
Guards which would convict him. As the prosecution
was unable to adduce any further evidence, the Judge
directed the jury to enter a finding of not guilty by
direction.
(5) The Attorney-General referred the matter to the
Supreme Court on the ground that the accused had
freely admitted his guilt. The application would be
grounded upon a "Book of Evidence", which are the
documents which the prosecutor is obliged to serve to
the accused under the Act.
(6 When a question of law is thus referred to the
Supreme Court, it must be decided, on the basis of
factual evidence given at the trial, and not upon any
statements of evidence before the preliminary hearing.
A trial judge however has no discretion to admit an
inculpatory or exculpatory confession made by an
accused which is in law inadmissable because it was not
voluntary. If the accused's statement arises under the
"Judges Rules", the trial judge has a discretion to
admit or not voluntary admissions, as held in
McCarrick v. Leary
(1964) I.R. 225. But this did not
arise in the present case.
(7) If, as may have happened here, the confession
was induced by a false pretence, a trick or a fraud,
this does not of itself exclude the confession if the
trick is not illegal, nor a breach of accused's constitu-
tional rights.
(8) The trial judge in excluding the evidence did
not exercise his discretion at all, as no reference was
made to the Judges Rules. The judge wrongly rejected
the evidence, because he did not consider the question
whether the confession was involuntary. If an accused,
who is in fact guilty, believes that it might in the long
run be advantageous to him to admit his guilt rather
than conceal, any resulting confession is not to be
impugned. The Court should not consider the state-
ments made to Sergearn Ryan. Accordingly the full
Supreme Court held that the Trial Judge had no
grounds for holding that the answers to the reference
to Premier Tailors was not voluntary.
[People v. Cummins; Reference under Criminal
Procedure Act 1967; Supreme Court per Walsh J.;
unreported; 26th July 1972.]
Breach of Union rules does no entitle the Executive
Committee of the Union to declare an illegal strike
and place pickets unsupported by the members.
(1) All plaintiffs and defendants are members of the
Automobile and General Engineering and Mechanical
Operators Union.
(2) One of the defendants, Reilly, was formerly em-
ployed by Ballsbridge Motors Ltd., but was dismissed in
February 1972 following allegations that he had taken
spare parts worth 20p for his own use from the store.
The engineering committee of this section was not
satisfied that Reilly was guilty, but the employers re-
fused to reinstate Reilly.
(3) On 2nd March 1972, the committee sent a letter
to the employers stating they were in dispute with them.
On 3rd March, the Labour Court investigated, and
recommended that Reilly's dismissal be regarded as a
suspension with pay, pending recommendations by a
Rights Commissioner but this was not accepted by the
Union.
(4) On 5th March, the members of the Executive
Committee of the Union informed the workers at Balls-
bridge Motors that they had taken a decision to strike.
The workers present were prevented by the Chairman
of the Executive from discussing this. Pickets were
accordingly placed on the premises on 6th March.
(5) None of the members of the union were in favour
of the strike, nor did they wish to picket. The only
lawful person who can picket is Reilly.
(6) The plaintiffs claim that the Executive Committee
has called a strike in breach of the rules of the union,
and seek a declaration that it was
ultra vires
for the
Union to direct the withdrawal of labour or the placing
of pickets contrary to the wishes of the members, and
that the notices concerning this was invalid. On 10th
March, Kenny J. granting an interim injunction ordered
each of the defendants to be restrained until further
order, from picketing the premises. On 22nd March,
Pringle J. refused an interlocutory injunction, because
the declaration was unlikely to be successful, and that
no irreparable damage can be proved.
(7) The Supreme Court held that the Executive
Committee had directed its members to refuse to work
and thereby create a strike with the employers. The
members have not refused to work, and, there cannot
therefore be any strike. It would be contrary to the
meaning of the rules that the Executive Committee
should circumvent them. The protection afforded by the
Trade Disputes Act 1906 does not permit the defen-
dants to sit in breach of the rules of their union. The
activities of the defendants constitute a clear inter-
ference with the employment of the plaintiffs. There
should accordingly be an order of perpetual injunction
restraining the defendants from picketing, according to
the full Supreme Court.
[Darby and others v. Leonard and others; full Sup-
reme Court per Walsh J.; unreported; 26th July 1972.]
Right to Ancient Lights does not include right to
1
Modern Lights.
The plaintiff, Mary Lavin, the writer (now Mrs. Scott)
was awarded £1,700 damages by Teevan, J. on 31st
July 1968, for diminution of access to light to her
premises, caused by a building erected near her pre-
mises by the defendants. These premises are new, and
were converted into a residence by the plaintiff. The
defendant's premises, opposite the plaintiff's comprises
a substantial building erected in three sections; the
centre section is 124 feet high; these premises cost
£600,000 to build. While the defendant's premises
were being built, there was a preliminary letter, from
plaintiff's solicitor in May 1967 advising them that the
building would diminish the light, and seeking an
assurance that no buildings would be put up which
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