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GAZETTE
i
1 E
W
I N
APRIL 1992
V
p !o
T
Corporate Guardians
Recent corporate difficulties have
focused attention on aspects of
corporate governance in Ireland. The
roles of the chairmen and non
executive directors have come under
scrutiny, particularly in the
Greencore situation. Without
wishing to add to the comment on
that particular matter, it does
appear that there are unrealistic
expectations of the power and
influence which non-executive
directors can exert.
As things stand, it may be too much
to expect that non-executive directors
- effectively chosen by the board -
exercise firm control over a thrusting
chief and other senior executives in a
prospering company. The sort of
person who is likely to be chosen as
a non-executive director, will
probably be the holder of several
similar positions in other companies,
is likely to be a semi-retired
businessman or an accountant,
lawyer or banker, or an executive of
another company. The atmosphere
of the board is likely to be too
"clubbable" and an autocratic chief
executive supported by other
executive directors is likely to be able
to make life extremely uncomfortable
for any non-executive director who
wishes to "blow the whistle" on any
aspect of the company's affairs.
Supervising one's peers is an
unenviable task at the best of times
and may be virtually impossible in a
board room situation.
Committees of non-executive
directors are of course asked from
time to time to take on particular
duties - perhaps in the area of
recruitment of senior executives -
but to ask them to be the regular
guardians of the interest of the
company, its shareholders or its
employees is to impose a herculean
task on them.
A particular problem arises for the
"worker directors" in our semi-State
sector. In a number of such
companies the clash between their
duties as directors under our
company law and the loyalty which
they naturally feel for the interests of
the workers they represent has given
rise to considerable difficulties on
several occasions.
When the concept of the worker
director was being introduced, some
consideration was apparently given
to introducing the German two tier
system of corporate governance.
Perhaps it was time it was looked at
again.
German public companies have both a
board of directors and a supervisory
board or committee. The supervisory
board appoints the board of
directors, supervises its activities and
may enquire into the directors'
conduct and the state of the
company's affairs. T\vo-thirds of the
members of the superior board are
elected by the shareholders and the
other one-third by the employees by
secret ballot. The supervisory board
therefore operates independently of
the board of directors which carries
on the day to day management of
the company. The supervisory board
meets several times a year to receive
reports from the board of directors
and apparently exercises significant
influence on the conduct of the
company.
This German system has been in
operation throughout the years of
Germany's economic progress in the
post 1945 period. It has clearly not
inhibited the success of Germany's
great trading companies. Perhaps it
is time we thought of including in
our company legislation some of
the practices which have worked
well in countries which are
economically prosperous and not
continue to depend largely on those
which have recently proved so
horrendously inadequate in Great
Britain.
•
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