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GAZETTE

SEPTEMBER 1979

The Perils of Destruction

B. S. RUSSELL, M.A., Barrister

[Reproduced from English Law Society's Gazette 28.11.1979]

It is not often that one has the pleasure of reading such

an elegant and comprehensive judgment as that of Oliver

J. in

Midland Bank Trustee Co. v. Hett Stubbs and Kemp

[1978] 3 All ER 571. It deals in masterly fashion with an

important aspect of the duty of a solicitor and, indeed of

the duties of all professional men who have to advise

other persons.

This case (and to understand it in full you should also

read its immediate predecessor in the reports,

Midland

Bank Trustee Co. v. Green

[ 19781 3 All ER 555) sets out

a simple, but sorry, story. The profession does not come

out of it very well. A small error by a very experienced

conveyancer has taken a total of twelve days in court, ten

years of litigation and the citing of 93 cases; the costs in-

volved must be stupendous. However, it has at least

produced a judgment that, if it can evade the Scylla of the

Court of Appeal and the Charybdis of the House of

Lords, could properly be described as the leading case on

negligence of solicitors and, by inference, of other pro-

fessional persons as well. It is no longer safe to rely upon

the Limitation Act 1939; six years from the time of the

advice being given is no longer the time to destroy files. It

is clear that no papers should be destroyed until the poss-

ibility of any action for negligence arising has passed. The

only safe course is to microfilm such records before they

go to destruction; or else keep them for many years. (A

comprehensive schedule of suggested document retention

periods, together with a detailed brochure for solicitors

How Microfilm Can Help Me,

is available free from Oyez

Services Ltd., Microfilm Division, 70-74 City road,

London ECI 2DX, Tel: 01-253 0444).

What led to all this

sturm und drang?

Walter Green

owned a farm, Gravel Hill Farm, in Lincolnshire. He also

appears to have owned a number of other farms, one of

which had the name (which would have pleased P. G.

Wodehouse) of 'Shifty Nocking'. He had sold one to his

younger son, but when his elder son, Geoffrey, wished to

purchase Gravel Hill, Walter was reminded of the death

duty advantage of the possession of agricultural property

and, instead, Geoffrey was given an option for a period of

ten years, in consideration of the payment of £ 1 on 24

March 1961, to purchase the farm at .a set price of £75

an acre. During the next few years Geoffrey occasionally

consulted the defendant firm of solicitors about the desir-

ability of exercising the option, but nobody noticed that

the option had not been registered as an estate contract.

The result was that, after Geoffrey had seriously

quarrelled with his father in 1967, Walter went to an-

other firm of solicitors seeking to defeat the option and

they advised him to sell the farm to his wife, which he did

for £500. They ought also to have advised him that this

would have been a breach of the contractual option, but,

as they said rather primly in a letter ' . .. Whether he

should have done so or not was a matter upon which we

were not asked to advise'. The client on the Clapham

omnibus might have a different view as to the propriety of

that inaction. Anyway, the die was now cast; the farm

was sold, with the startling inclusion of the usual certi-

ficate in the conveyance that the amount or value of the

consideration did not exceed £5500 (the judge took a

merciful view of this palpable undervalue), on 17 August

2 14

1967 and Geoffrey heard about it in September. An

attempt was then made to register the option and to

exercise it; but it was too late.

Proceedings were started on 25 November 1968 and

were subsequently complicated by the deaths of

practically all those concerned in the matter. In the first

case, the

Green

case, Oliver J. gave judgment against

Walter's estate for damages for conspiracy (to be

assessed) but the action against that of his late wife failed

because it had not been commenced within the limitation

period and she was a purchaser for valuable, if not

adequate, consideration.

There followed the action against the defendant firm of

solicitors for damages for negligence or breach of con-

tract. These were parallel claims. The solicitors con-

tended that their failure to register within a reasonable

time was a breach of contract only, and so statute-

barred. The judge's view of that was 'the plea of limita-

tion is an unattractive plea at the best of times ...'. How-

ever, he went on ' . . . it is the familiar experience in cases

such as this that solicitor defendants are not, practically,

entirely free agents in the matter of the defences which

may be raised on their behalf. The inference is obvious

and led to a majestic and complete review of the cases,

which had to include consideration of whether the court

was bound by

Groom v. Crocker

[1938] 1 KB 194

(where the Court of Appeal held that the relationship of

solicitor and client was purely contractual) or whether

there was a general, supervening duty of care under the

principle of

Hedley Byrne v. Heller & Partners

[1964]

AC 465. Having held that there was such a duty, it there-

fore followed that its breach took place when the farm

was sold to Mrs. Green in 1967.

It was also held that there is no general duty on a

solicitor to consider all aspects of his client's interest

generally when consulted on a particular problem, so the

defendant solicitors were not under a duty to consider the

option's registration and enforceability when consulted

about its exercise (a ruling that might surprise the client

on the Clapham omnibus or even, as the judge put it, in

the company car.). Secondly, if the duty owed was purely

contractual, the duty to register was continuous until it

became impossible to perform on the day that the farm

was sold.

Thus, having neatly rolled up all the possible loose

ends, we are left with the situation that almost any

mistake now lies in wait until damage results from it. This

will not only apply to solicitors, but also to any person,

primarily professionals, upon whose advice or action

people rely. It will, equally, not matter whether the advice

or action is gratuitous or paid. It is therefore very

important that insurances cover this in full (even purely

formal advice given at parties!) And that such insurances

cover the personal estates of the solicitors who are partners

in the firm, salaried solicitors and legal executives; and

there should be cover for advisers, whether lawyers or

otherwise, in business. But it is even more important that

full records should be kept of all advice given and that these

should be retained either in their original form, or, if space

is lacking or too expensive, in microfilm form acceptable to

the courts.