GAZETTE
JULY-AUGUST
1979
RECENT IRISH CASES
TOWN PLANNING
Planning Authority not estopped by
representations made by an official.
The Defendant erected a building
measuring 64 feet in length, 31 feet in
breadth and 19 feet in height in the
rere garden of a premises at Ballygall
Road, Dublin. The Defendant did not
get Planning Permission for the
development which was commenced
in 1975. During the progress of the
work an Inspector from the Dublin
Corporation (Complainants) Planning
Department paid a number of visits
to the site and according to the
evidence of the Defendant's husband
assured him that he could proceed
with the erection of the building and
that the Inspector believed that there
would be no objection by the
Planning Authority if he completed
the building. The Inspector was later
suspended
from
duty
and
subsequently dismissed.
The Dublin Corporation served an
enforcement notice under Section 31
of the Local Government (Planning
and
Development)
Act
1963
requiring the Defendant to remove
the structure and
subsequently
brought proceedings in the District
Court against the Defendant for
failure
to
comply
with
the
Enforcement Order. The District
Justice held that by reason of the
misleading representations made to
the Defendant's husband by the
Inspector
that
the
Dublin
Corporation were estopped from
denying that the building was an
exempted development and dismissed
the summons. He stated a case for
the High Court to determine the
following question of law:
"Was I correct in holding that the
Comp l a i nan t s,
qua
Planning
Authority, were estopped from
denying the representations made by
their former employee".
Held
(per McMahon, J.), having
considered the English cases of
Southend-on-Sea
Corporation
v.
Hodgson Limited
[1961] 2 A.E.R.
41;
Wells
v.
Minister of Housing
[1967] 2 A. E . R. 1041;
Lever
(Finance) Limited v. Westminster
Corporation
[1970] 3 A.E.R. 496;
Minister
for
Agriculture
and
Fisheries v. Matthews
[1951] K.B.
148;
Rhyl
U.D.C.
v.
Rhyl
Amusement Limited
[1959] 1 A.E.R.
257 and
Minister for Agriculture and
Fisheries v. Hulkin
(unreported) and
the Irish case of
Greendale Building
Co. v. Dublin County
Council
(Supreme Court 13 / 5 / 1977 -
unreported, 185/1976) that if the
Dublin Corporation had told the
defendant that the building which her
husband was erecting was an
exempted development they would be
acting 'ultra vires', and could not be
held to have estopped themselves
from asserting subsequently that
Planning Permission was necessary
for the development in question and,
accordingly, no representation by
their agent could work a similar
estoppel.
Insofar
as
the
representation referred to in the
question of law in the case stated
included
a representation
that
Planning
Permission
would be
granted for the development this
could
not
bind
the
Dublin
Corporation to grant
Planning
Permission. Any undertaking by the
Dublin
Corporation
to
grant
Planning
Permission
without
compliance with the provisions of
Section 26 of the Local Government
(Planning and Development) Act
1963 would clearly be 'ultra vires'.
The Right Honourable The Lord
1
Mayor Aldermen and Burgesses of
Dublin
(Dublin
Corporation),
Complainants, v. Elizabeth McGrath
(Defendant) — High Court (per
McMahon J.) — 17 November 1978
— unreported.
SALE OF LAND — FAMILY
HOME PROTECTION ACT 1976
— Assurance void in absence of wife's
consent — Doctrine of Notice.
In March 1961, the Defendant's
husband purchased a house by way
of lease in Artane, Dublin. He
married the Defendant in July 1961
and the house became the family
home. There were four children of the
marriage which proved an unhappy
one. The Defendant claimed that the
husband's improvidence, drinking
and physical cruelty to her caused
her to leave home with her four
children in October 1973. She got a
tenancy from the Dublin Corporation
firstly in a house in Kilbarrack and
later, in June 1976, in a house in
Coolock.
On leaving the Family Home the
defendant went to the FLAC Law
Centre in Coolock because she
wanted to have custody of the
children and to be free of interference
from the husband. On the 20
November 1974 a written Separation
Agreement was executed by the
defendant and her husband which
made no provision for any payments
by the husband for the maintenance
of the wife or children and was silent
as to the family home.
On the 2 August 1976 the
husband entered into an agreement to
sell his interest in the Artane house to
the Plaintiff for £6,400. The Family
Home Protection Act 1976 had
come into force on the 12 July 1976
and both the husband's solicitors and
the plaintiff's solicitors were aware of
its
provisions.
The
Plaintiffs
solicitors, by letter of 10 August 1976,
requested that the Defendant's
consent to the sale (assignment) be
endorsed on the purchase deed,
"unless there is an official Separation
Deed, in which case we require a
copy of same". On the 11 August
1976 the husband's solicitors wrote
in reply:
"Our client and his wife have been
separated for some years. Our
client's wife has been housed by
Dublin Corporation and is therefore
no longer relying on the Artane
house as her family home. We
understand that a Separation Deed
has been entered into but we did not
act for either party at the time and do
not have a copy of the Agreement.
We understand from our client that
he has never had a copy of the
Agreement and that the same is with
FLAC. We understand that Mr.
P.M. of this organisation was
dealing with the matter. We did in
fact try to make contact with the
Coolock Branch of FLAC for the
purpose of obtaining a copy of the
Agreement but this we understand is
at present closed for holidays. We do
not have the address or telephone
number of any other branch and
cannot trace any in the telephone
directory. In view of the fact that the
premises are not now a family home
and your client is the purchaser for
full value, we cannot see how your
client
is concerned
with
the
matrimonial situation".
The husband was at that stage in
Canada (but was back in Ireland by
the 16 August 1976) so his solicitor
could not get the Defendant's address
from him. The Plaintiffs solicitors
did not wait for the Defendant's
husband to return nor for the FLAC
centre to re-open but prepared a
statutory declaration stating that
since the execution of the Separation
Agreement the wife had not relied on
the Artane house as her family home
and that "by virtue of said
Separation Agreement has now no