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GAZETTE

JULY-AUGUST

1979

CONSTRUCTION OF WILL

Power of Appointment under Will

frustrated by conversion of subject

matter. Proceedings were brought by

the Plaintiff as executor.

The Testator devised and bequeathed

his land and chattels to his nephew

(the Plaintiff) in Trust for such child

of his as he should " in his absolute

discretion consider best suited to

possess the lands and pursue the

occupation of farmer" and he gave

his said nephew the right to appoint

by deed or will in favour of such child

when that child attained 25 years;

and until such appointment he gave

his said nephew full powers of

management and control. The

Testator made no disposition in

default of appointment and gave the

residue of every kind to his nephews

and nieces.

During his lifetime the Testator

owned lands in Co. Carlow. After his

death the Land

Commission

commenced

proceedings

for

acquisition and, notwithstanding

objections by fepresentatives of the

Testator, compulsorily acquired the

lands.

The Plaintiff had five children all

under the age of 25 years and no

appointment had been made by the

Plaintiff. Under the circumstances,

the Plaintiff could not carry out the

Trusts of the Will in the manner

directed by the Testator and sought

directions of the Court as to the

proper application of the sale

proceeds.

McWilliam J. commented that had

the property been compulsorily

purchased before the death of the

Testator, the gift would have been

adeemed and the purchase price

would have passed under the

residuary clause

(Galway's

Will

Trusts

[1950] Ch. 1).

He cited cases

(Lawes

v.

Bennet

(1875) 1 Cox 167;

re Carrington

[1932] 1 Ch. 1;

Jones v. Bailey

[ 19101 1 I.R. 110 and

Mlley v. Carty

[1927] I.R. 541) which turned on the

failure of the donee of the power to

appoint the property into which the

subject matter of the power had been

converted and commented that they

seemed to favour the principle of

ademption where specific property

had been converted before the

directions of the t estator creating a

power could be carried into effect.

However, in the present case,

McWilliam J. felt that a simple gift of

this property to one of the Testator's

grand-nephews would hardly have

been adeemed by the compulsory

purchase before the executor had

given his assent to the devise and that

the correct approach was to try to

ascertain the intention of the Testator

and not to endeavour to adapt a rule

of law or construction to fit the facts.

He had little doubt but that the main

consideration in the mind of the

Testator was that the land should be

owned and worked by some one of

his own family and of his own name.

The lands having been sold they

could not be appointed to one of his

grand-nephews and the Testator's

object could not be achieved.

McWilliam J. referred to the case

of Robinson v. Moore

[1962-63] Ir.

Jur. Rep. 29 in which Dixon J.

reviewed the law regarding the effect

of a Will where property is given by

that Will with a power to appoint to

other people but no appointment is

made and there is not provision in the

Will for a default of appointment. In

considering the alleged "rule" that "if

there is a power of appointment

among certain objects, but no gift to

those objects, and no gift over a

default of appointment, the Court

implies a Trust for or a gift to those

objects equally, if the power be not

exercised", Dixon J. concluded that

the correct approach was to enquire

whether there was any clear

indication that the Testator intended

the objects of the power or some of

them to take not only under the

power but also if the donee failed or

neglected to execute the power.

Held

(McWilliam J.) that there

was no such indication and if there

was any indication, it was that the

Testator was more anxious to benefit

the older generation to whom he gave

the residue and that the proceeds of

the sale of the lands pass under the

residuary clause in the Will.

Patrick J. Tuite v. Mary Tuite & Ors.

High Court (per McWilliam J.) — 3

November 1978 — unreported.

SALE OF LAND - SPECIFIC

PERFORMANCE

Letter from Vendor's estate agents to

Vendor confirming terms

of

agreement for sale constitutes a note

or memorandum in writing for the

purposes of Statute of Frauds.

The Plaintiff, who was a director of a

building company, had, prior to the

events which gave rise to the

proceedings, purchased from the

Defendants part of the Defendants'

lands at Monkstown ("the front

lands"). He was anxious to purchase

the remainder of the lands ("the back

lands") and kept in contact with the

Defendants' Estate Agents. At some

time prior to the 7 December 1977

the Plaintiff offered H.W. of the

Defendants' Estate Agents £175,000

for the back lands. The Chairman of

the Board of the Defendant

Company

indicated

to

the

Defendants' property adviser, M.L.,

the terms on which the Defendants

would be prepared to sell and M.L.

kept in contact with H.W. Between 7

and 19 December, 1977, the Plaintiff

had a number of discussions with

H.W. and eventually agreed to

purchase the back lands for

£175,000 on the terms that the date

for the closing would be six months

from the date of contract, that the

deposit payable would be £30,000,

and that the Plaintiff would pay

interest on the balance of the

purchase money at the rate required

by the Defendants.

Following the completion of this

Agreement H.W. wrote to M.L. in the

following terms:—

"Hall School - Lands at Rere

" Fu r t h er to our telephone

conversation this morning I

confirm that we have agreed

terms, subject to contract, for the

sale of these lands to Mr. Paddy

Kelly of Berkeley Homes Ltd.,

who were the purchasers of the

front lands. The principal terms to

be included in the contract for sale

are as follows:—

"Proposed purchaser: Hickey

Beauchamp Kirwan & O'Reilly,

(In Trust).

"Proposed price: £175,000.

"A non-returnable deposit of

£30,000 to be paid on exchange

of contracts, the balance to be

paid not later than 6 months

thereafter with interest at 12%

from the contract date until the

closing date.

"I am sending a copy of this letter

to Mr. Haugh of A. & L.

Goodbody, solicitors for the

Vendors, and perhaps you could

kindly confirm instructions to him

on behalf of the Committee".

Yours sincerely,

H.W.