The Gazette 1994

GAZETTE

AUGUST/SEPTEMBER

1994

them by the 1935 Act. (2) The executive

could agree to indemnify the local

authority against the cost of observing

the requirements of the 1935 Act, but

such an agreement could not in any way

limit or reduce the statutory obligations

of local authorities or the minister. Thus

budgetary and financial constraints

could not afford an answer to those pro-

ceedings. If the executive wished to

limit or reduce such obligations it

would have to seek the enactment of

appropriate legislation by the Oireach-

tas. (3) S. 31 of the Civil Bill Courts

(Ireland) Act 1851 as adapted did not

apply to the present Circuit Court. It

had been impliedly repealed, first of all

by the creation of the Circuit Court un-

der the Courts of Justice Act 1924, and

subsequently by the Courts (Estab-

lishment and Constitution) Act 1961.

Thus the orders purporting to adapt s.

31 and the order of 23 June 1992 pur-

porting to delete Drogheda as a Circuit

Court venue were of no effect. In any

event these orders had not been made

to regulate the sittings of the Circuit

Court but to provide a defence to the

present proceedings and for that reason

they were void. (4) The events preced-

ing the order of the President of the

Circuit Court suggested that the only

reason for the omission of Drogheda

from the list of towns where the Circuit

Court was to sit was the service of the

dangerous buildings notice in respect of

the Drogheda courthouse. (5) The

county council were obliged under s. 3

of the 1935 Act to provide suitable ac-

commodation as directed by the minis-

ter. They were not bound to maintain

the same courthouse building and were

entitled to abandon an old or dilapi-

dated building provided that they

made available suitable alternative ac-

commodation for the sittings of the Cir-

cuit Court.

Reported at [1994] 1 ILRM 334

David Manning v. John R. Shackleton

and Cork County Council (notice

party): High Court (Barron J) 1 April

1993

Judicial Review - Reasons for decision -

Fair procedures - Arbitration - Compul-

sory purchase order made in respect of ap-

plicant's lands - Question of assessing ap-

propriate compensation - Property arbitra-

tor appointed - Whether obligation on arbi-

trator to provide a breakdown of the reasons

for his award - Whether question of costs

should be remitted to arbitrator - Acquisi-

tion of Land (Assessment of Compensation)

Act 1919

, ss.

3(3), 5(1) and 6(1) - Arbitra-

tion Act 1954, s. 36

Facts The applicant owned lands at

Barryscourt, Co. Cork, a portion of

which became the subject matter of a

compulsory purchase order made by

Cork County Council in 1986. The re-

spondent was appointed to arbitrate the

measure of compensation to which the

applicant was to be entitled. Cork

County Council then made an uncondi-

tional offer of £175,000, exclusive of

costs, in full and final settlement of the

applicant's claim. The offer also in-

cluded an undertaking to carry out cer-

tain accommodation works and further

such undertakings were given by Cork

County Council during the course of

the arbitration hearing. On 12 Decem-

ber 1991 the respondent made an award

of £156,280. As the award did not ex-

ceed the offer which had already been

made, the applicant was ordered to pay

the costs from the date of the offer. The

applicant's solicitors subsequently

wrote to the respondent requesting that

he furnish the applicant with a written

judgment setting out his findings of fact

and of law as well as a breakdown of the

content of the award. The respondent

replied by letter that he was not re-

quired to give a written considered

judgment. By order dated 27 July 1992,

the applicant was given leave to seek

judicial review of the respondent's

award.

Held by Barron J in refusing the relief

sought in respect of the giving of rea-

sons and remitting the matter to the

respondent for the determination of is-

sues pertaining to the award of costs: (1)

The giving of reasons by a person or

body required to act judicially may be

compelled by the High Court when

such reasons are necessary to determine

whether such a power has been validly

exercised. It is not an essential obliga-

tion and arises only when required to

prevent an injustice or to ensure that not

only has justice been done but is seen to

have been done. However, the appli-

cant had not indicated how he was

likely to suffer prejudice or injustice as

a result of the failure to state reasons. (2)

If the applicant had wished to ensure

that, contrary to the normal practice, the

respondent should give reasons for his

award, he should have made a submis-

sion to that effect at the outset of the

hearing. By allowing the hearing to con-

tinue and by failing to seek reasons

from the respondent to be inserted in

the award, he accepted the normal prac-

tice. (3) The applicant had to be taken to

know how the award was broken up

between the heads of claim. So far as

these amounts were dependent upon

fact, the award was final and binding

upon him. So far as there may have been

legal issues which the respondent had

determined, the applicant could have

brought these before the High Court by

asking the respondent to make his re-

port in the form of a special case under

s. 6(1) of the Acquisition of Land (As-

sessment of Compensation) Act 1919,

but he had not done so. The applicant

had likewise waived his right under s.

3(3) of the 1919 Act to require the re-

spondent to specify the amount

awarded in respect of any particular

matter. (4) In relation to the issue of

costs it appeared that the amount of

compensation which was awarded

might have been affected by the nature

of the undertakings given by the notice

party. It would not be possible to say

whether the award was more or less

than the unconditional offer until there

was a determination as to the amount,

if any, which the respondent deducted

from the compensation by reason of the

undertakings which were given in the

unconditional offer and were added at

the hearing. Accordingly the matter

should be remitted to the respondent

for a determination of these issues. In

any event this was a ground for remit-

ting a matter to an arbitrator under s. 36

of the Arbitration Act 1954.

Reported at [1994] 1 ILRM 346

Garden Village Construction Co. Ltd

v. Wicklow County Council: High

Court (Geoghegan J) 1 October 1993

Local Government - Planning and Devel-

opment - Works carried out outside bound-

ary line on map attached to permission -

Application for extension to planning per-

mission refused - Whether refusal based on

misinterpretation of statute - Whether un-

authorised development - Local Govern-

ment (Planning and Development) Act

1963, s. 26(10) - Local Government (Plan-

ning and Development) Act 1982, s. 4

Facts The applicant, a property devel-

opment company, was granted outline

planning permission for a large hous-

ing development of more than 500

houses at Newtownmountkennedy in

Co. Wicklow and subsequently was

granted three planning permissions in

relation thereto. The applicant having

built a small number of the houses car-

ried out substantial works 'pursuant to

such permission' involving,

inter alia,

the installation of a sewage treatment

plant and sludge drying beds, and the

securing of water and electricity sup-

plies. Although it was common knowl-

edge that substantial works had been

carried out, these works were per-

formed outside the red line boundary