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GAZETTE

SEPTEMBER 1981

The Legal Problems of Ageing

(Paper to the Incorporated Law Society Symposium "The Mentally Handicapped and the Law",

27 June, 1981).

by

Charles R. M. Meredith, Solicitor

S

O far as the application and operation of our law is

concerned, it matters little whether the mental

incapacity arises as a result of the passing of the years or

through any other reason. The only area of mental

incapacity which is separately recognised by our legal

system is that of extreme youth — persons under a

certain age being regarded as being incapable of

managing their own affairs.

Until about thirty years or so ago, our law so

recognised the distinction between the two principal

categories of mental disability that those under the age of

21 years were dealt with and described as "Minors",

whereas those suffering from mental disability arising

otherwise than simply through tender years were

described as "Persons of Unsound Mind". This

description was considered to be kinder than "Lunatics",

but increased social awareness, led, ultimately, to all

categories being described as "Wards of Court".

It may be of interest to record that the jurisdiciton of

the Courts over the affairs of persons incapable of looking

after themselves is of vast and authentic antiquity. The

roots of guardianship are embedded in both Roman and

English law. In the ancient Rome of Cicero's time, we are

told, extensive provisions existed under Roman law for

the protection of the property of mentally disabled people,

although no such provision was made for their persons.

Under English law, from which our own law derives,

the intervention of the Courts in the affairs of mentally

disabled people stems from the duty, long recognised, of

the monarch to look after the property of lunatics and

idiots, which duty rested upon feudal lords long before the

passing of the Statute "De Praerogativa Regis" in the

reign of Edward II.

The monarch customarily delegated his functions to his

Lord Chancellor and, gradually, to other Judges and thus

the term "Court" came into the picture. More recently,

the management of the legal and property affairs of

mentally disabled people and of those under the age of 21

years, has been regulated by a series of Statutes, the

principal of which now are the Guardianship of Infants

Act, 1964, which — as its name implies, deals only with

people under the age of 21 years, and the Lunacy

Regulation (Ireland) Act, 1871, — a piece of legislation

which may have been enlightened 110 years ago, but

which is by now limited in its scope, cumbersome, time

consuming and expensive to operate.

The Irish Position Contrasted

Under what, for want of a better expression, we must now

call "Irish" law — England and Wales, Northern Ireland

and Scotland having gone their separate and to a greater

or lesser extent, differing, ways — the concerns of

property and the person are considered separately;

responsibility for the property and for the person of

someone of unsound mind can be vested in separate

individuals although, in fact, the custom is for the one

individual to be appointed by the Court to care for the

property and the person of the Ward.

The name given to the individual in whom this

responsibility is vested is "Committee" — a misleading

name as, in ordinary usage, it implies a group of people

acting in concert, which is the exact opposite of what the

person actually is. The word "Guardian" is already

current in the case of minors and a valid argument could

be made that the same word should apply in the case of

people who are so mentally incapacitated that they need

somebody else to manage their affairs. In some

jurisdictions, the word "Conservator" is also used.

"Guardianship" is a legal relationship which authorises

one individual to become a substitute decision-maker for

another; what should concern us and our legislature is the

ordering of the conduct of that substitute decision-maker

so that, with the greatest ease and flexibility and with the

least expense, all necessary decisions can be taken and all

consequent actions carried out on behalf of the Ward.

Here we come to a very real difficulty which we, with

the benefit of 110 years hindsight, can see was

inadequately appreciated during the reign of the good

Queen Victoria. In her day, things seemed substantially

more black and white than they do today and, then, the

mentally disabled person was almost automatically

regarded as being so lunatic as to be incapable of doing

anything for himself. We have, over the years, come to

realise that there are extensive gradations of mental

incapacity. Many legal jurisdictions have applied

themselves to the difficult but socially necessary task of

differentiating between those gradations and of providing

a legal framework capable, first, of recognising what

gradation of incapacity is present in any case and,

second, of imposing only as much "substitute decision-

making" as that case requires.

In England and Wales, the Mental Health Act of 1959

has revolutionised their law, while Scotland had its own

enactment a year later.

In the United States of America, all 50 States have

their own Statutes and a recent statutory survey of the

whole body of legislation disclosed that while all

American jurisdictions provide statutorily for some form

of guardianship of adult persons and conservatorship of

their property, if they are not able to care for themselves

without assistance, the nature and extent of that provision

is by no means uniform.

For example, fourteen states specifically include

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