The Gazette 1981

GAZETTE

CEMBER

insurer in deciding whether to

accept the risk or fix the premium.

If this be proved, it is not necessary

further to prove that the mind of

the actual insurer was so affected.

In other words the insured could

not rebut the claim to avoid the

policy because of a material mis-

representation by a plea that

the particular insurer concerned

was so stupid, ignorant or reckless

that he could not exercise the

judgment of a prudent insurer and

was in fact unaffected by anything

the insured had represented or con-

cealed."

Held

Per Kenny J.):

1. That it was material to the

insurance efTected by Chariot

that goods belonging to Chariot

had been destroyed by fire in the

Leeson Street premises owned by

Consolidated; and that the cir-

cumstances of thefire and the fact

that Chariot ultimately got

payment

direct

from

the

insurance company concerned

for the damaged goods were

matters which could reasonably

have affected the judgment of a

prudent insurer in taking the risk

or in fixing the premium.

2. That in relation to the proposition

by Counsel for the second-named

Defendant brokers that the onus

of establishing that the matter not

disclosed was material to the risk

lay on the first named Defendants

and that to discharge the onus

they had to establish that the

matter not disclosed did afíect,

and not might have affected, their

judgment^,

that

the Court rejected

the second

part of that

proposition and stated that it was

necessary only to establish that

the fact not disclosed would have

reasonably affected the judgment

of a prudent insurer.

3. That the appeal of the first-named

defendants should be allowed.

4. That

the

second-named

Defendant insurance brokers

owed a contractual duty to their

client to possess the skill and

knowledge which they held

themselves out to the public and

to their client as having and to

exercise this in doing their clients'

business; and that they were also

liable in tort if they failed to

exercise that skill and knowledge;

and that in fact the brokers were

liable to Chariot in contract and

in tort and Chariot therefore was

entitled to such damages Chariot

had sustained as a result of the

broker's breach of contract and

negligence.

Chariot Inns Ltd. v. Assicurazioni

General! S.P.A. and Coyle Hamilton

Hamilton Philips Ltd.,

Supreme

Court (per Kenny J.) with Henchy and

Griffin J.J. concurring) — 23 January

1981 — unreported.

RESTRAINT OF TRADE

A resolution of the Equestrian Feder-

ation of Ireland to the effect that hor-

ses representing Ireland at inter-

national equestrian events could only

be Irish bred horses was

intra vires

the powers of the Federation, which

had sole jurisdiction in respect of

national equestrian affairs; neither

was such a resolution in restraint of

trade as it was reasonable and fair in

the context of the Irish horse indus-

try.

The Plaintiff was a professional show

jumper and had achieved world

statute as a horseman. The proceed-

ings against the Defendants who were

members of and constituted the

Equestrian Federation in January

1978. The effect of" this resolution

was to reiterate and repeat the con-

sistent policy of the Federation which

was not to permit Irish competitors

at International events to be mounted

on other than Irish horses, but to

make a special exception in favour of

the Plaintiff, who was then resident in

Germany, in respect of those inter-

national events at which com-

petitors from the different countries

could compete as individuals. The

Plaintiff, then resident in Ireland,

complained that the decision incor-

porated in this resolution interfered

with his freedom to earn a livelihood

and was a restraint of trade which

could not be justified as being

reasonable. The resolution was also

attacked on the ground that it was

'Ultra vires'

the powers of the

Defendants as the

Equestrian

Federation of Ireland.

Under

its

constitution,

the

Federation was declared to be "the

body responsible for both the

national and international aspects of

all equestrian sports in Ireland." It

had the power "at its discretion" to

authorise members of teams and in-

dividuals, who had been selected or

approved, to compete in inter-

national and friendly events. Its re-

gulations, incorporated under the

constitution and powers of the

Federation, provided for a scheme

under which competitors from each

country at international events had to

be entered by the country's own

federation and thereupon each com-

petitor competed at the international

event in question as a representative

of his country.

In the High Court, Hamilton J.

held that the Resolution was not

ultra

vires

the power of the Federation but

that it was a restraint of trade which

could not be justified. Against the

judgment and order of the High

Court, the Defendants appealed to

the Supreme Court.

Held

(per O'Higgins CJ.):

Allowing the appeal, that the re-

solution was

intra vires

the powers of

the Federation and even though in

restraint of trade, it was reasonable

and justified in the Irish context.

Per

O'Higgins C.J.:

"The need for the rule in the first

instance and the object of main-

taining it was and is to build up the

Irish half-bred horse industry in

the interests of equestrian sport

generally in the country. It is the

view of the Federation, fairly and

reasonably held, that in doing so it

is serving the interests of the

generality of young riders of

limited means and thereby serving

the general interests of the public."

Macken

O'Reilly and Others,

Supreme Court, (per O'Higgins C.J.

with Griffin and Park J J. concur-

. ring; and Henchy and Kenny J.J. dis-

senting) — 31 May, 1979 —

unreported.

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