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GAZETTE

JANUARY/FEBRUARY 1981

A Case of Dependent

Relative Revocation

by

Professor James C. Brady, B.C.L., LL.B., Ph.D. (Q.U.B.)

Dean of the Law Faculty, University College, Dublin.

The statutory provisions governing the revocation of

wills are to be found in Section 85 of the Succession Act,

Subsection (2) of which provides that "no will, or any

part thereof, shall be revoked except by another will or

codicil duly executed, or by some writing declaring an

intention to revoke it and executed in the manner in which

a will is required to be executed, or by the burning, tearing

or destruction of it by the testator, or by some person in

his presence and by his direction, with the intention of

revoking it."

1

Whilst an act of physical destruction will not, by itself,

revoke a will unless accompanied by an

animus revocandi,

a further distinction must be drawn between an act of

revocation which is intended by the testotor to be absolute

and effective forthwith and an act of revocation which is

intended to be conditional upon the efficacy of some other

disposition of the testator's property. The latter type of

revocation has been described as "dependent relative

revocation".

2

The principle of dependent relative revoca-

tion has been held to apply where a testator purported to

revoke a previous will on the assumption that a new will

was valid

3

and where a testator purported to revoke a will

on the assumption that the intestacy rules would effect the

desired provisions.

4

The principle also applies where a

testator purports to revoke a later will on the assumption

that an earlier will, which has been revoked, will be

revived by the revocation of the subsequent will. This is

the precise circumstance which arose in the case of

In the

Goods of Eileen Margaret Hogan Deceased

which

recently came before Gannon J. in the High Court.

5

In the goods of Eileen Margaret Hogan Deceased

The deceased, Mrs. Hogan, had executed a will in

accordance with the statutory requirements in the office of

her solicitor, a Mr. Russell, on 8 August 1977. A photo

copy was made of the will and retained by her solicitor,

the original being given to Mrs. Hogan. Two years later,

on 30 July 1979, Mrs. Hogan revisited her solicitor's

office, again in the company of her daughter Patricia who

had been with her on the earlier visit, for the purpose of

altering her will. Mr. Russell read over to her the terms of

her new will and Mrs. Hogan, having expressed her satis

faction with it, executed the will in accordance with the

statutory requirements. A photocopy of this new will was

retained by her solicitor, the original being taken away by

Mrs. Hogan. Mr. Russell had advised Mrs. Hogan that

as the 1977 will had been revoked she should destroy

it.

6

A chain of events then occurred from which the Court

was obliged to draw certain inferences. On 25 September

1979 Mrs. Hogan opened a deposit account in the

Athlone branch of the Bank of Ireland. On the same day,

after her son Michael (who lived with her) had finished his

evening meal and was reading the evening paper by the

fireside, Mrs. Hogan asked him to bring to her a locked

steel box which she kept in a wardrobe in her bedroom

and in which she kept personal documents. She then went

through the documents in the box by the fireside, burning

some of them. At some stage during this operation Mrs.

Hogan showed Michael a brown envelope saying: "These

documents are important; they concern you principally;

the others are taken care of." She then returned the

envelope to the box without saying what it contained.

Michael was not aware that his mother had made a will

on 8 August 1977 or that she had made another will on

30 July 1979, but his mother had mentioned to him that

there was a will in the office of a Mr. Tormey, a solicitor,

which did not count any more.

7

When Mrs. Hogan died on 6 October 1979 her son

opened the steel box and found therein a brown envelope

containing the will dated 8 August 1977 and the deposit

account book. Extensive searches by Michael and his

sister Patricia, the sole executrix of the 1979 will, failed to

find the will executed on 30 July 1979. Patricia drew the

inference deposed to in her affidavit, that her mother had

intentionally destroyed the original of the 1979 will at the

time she burnt papers from the steel box.

Patricia applied to the Court, with the consent of her

brother Michael and her two sisters, who were benefi-

ciaries under both the 1977 and 1979 wills, to have the

photocopy of the will dated 30 July 1979 admitted to

probate. This latter will gave the deceased's three daugh-

ters larger legacies than had the will of 1977 and also

created a charge on the property devised and bequeathed

to her son Michael in favour of her daughters in a manner

not provided for in the 1977 will.

8

Gannon J. took the view that the evidence disclosed the

following intentions of the deceased:

(1) She did not wish the 1979 will to take effect as a

disposition of her property on her death.

(2) She did wish the 1977 will to be the effective

disposition of her property.

(3) She did not wish to die intestate.

Gannon J. was satisfied that the revocation of the 1979

will was effected in a manner, by burning, permitted by

Section 85 of the Succession Act in relation to which

evidence of the circumstances from which her intentions

5